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Abstract 
Checking  is  one  of  the  most  common  symptoms  observed  in  Obsessive 
Compulsive  Disorder  (OCD)  with  50-80%  of  patients  (Antony,  Downie,  & 
Swinson, 1998; Henderson & Pollard, 1988; Rasmussen & Eisen, 1988) and 
an  additional  ~15%  of  the  general  population  demonstrating  subclinical 
checking compulsions (Stein et al., 1997). A common finding is that checking 
actually impairs the memory of those items checked (van den Hout & Kindt, 
2003a,  2003b),  even  though  the  mechanism  underlying  checking-related 
memory  impairment  has  remained  elusive.  This  is  a  shortcoming  that  we 
presently  address  in  a  series  of  short-term  memory  experiments  and 
attentional tasks comparing high and low checkers (see VOCI; Thordarson et 
al., 2004). Generally, our memory tasks required stimuli to be remembered in 
their  locations,  which  was  designed  to  engage  the  episodic  buffer  (EB)  of 
working  memory  (WM)  (Baddeley,  2000).  The  key  manipulation  was  to 
present an intermediate probe (between encoding and recall) in the form of a 
resolvable  or  misleading  challenge  which  questioned  an  aspect  of  the 
encoding set; this was either present or absent, respectively. As expected, 
misleading probes specifically (Exp. 1, 2, extreme meta-comparison 3 & 9; 
Harkin  &  Kessler,  2009;  2011a;  Harkin,  Rutherford,  &  Kessler,  2011)  and 
intermediate probes generally (Exp. 4; Harkin & Kessler, 2011a) tap into the 
inhibitory  impairments  of  high  (not  low)  checkers,  which  hampers  EB 
functionality and impairs their memory. Indeed, it was only during misleading 
trials that high checkers made more unnecessary eye movements specifically 
to  empty  locations  (Exp.  5;  Harkin  &  Kessler,  subm).  Furthermore,  for 
ecologically valid stimuli high checkers were impaired in inhibiting attention to 
threatening ‘ON’ states (Tasks 6 & 7; Harkin & Kessler, in press) and in their 
ability to recall if an appliance was ‘ON’ or ‘OFF’ (Exp. 8; Harkin, Rutherford, 
& Kessler, 2011). High checkers’ intact performance on baseline no-probe-1 
trials  excludes  a  capacity-based  explanation  of  their  WM  impairments. 
Overall,  confidence  measures  revealed  a  general  task-independent 
impairment which was attenuated by an intermediate probe. These findings 
were  then  used  to  create  a  classification  system  based  upon  Executive-
Functioning,  Binding  Complexity  and  Memory  Load  (EBL)  to  explain 
otherwise  discrepant  findings  from  58  memory  studies  (Harkin  &  Kessler,   iii 
2011b).  Thus,  the  contribution  of  this  research  is  not  only  to  (Exp.  1-9) 
indicate  an  actual  mechanism  (i.e.,  episodic  buffer  of  WM)  of  memory 
impairment in checking/OCD but it also provides a new research platform on 
which  to  base  where  we  will  and  will  not  observe  memory  impairments  in 
OCD participants. The conclusion summarizes the main findings with respect 
to the development and maintenance of OCD symptoms, highlights limitations 
and provides solutions to these through future research.  
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1. Introduction: Repeated checking impairs memory, but how? 
Obsessive-Compulsive  Disorder  (OCD)  is  characterized  by  repetitive, 
intrusive, impulses and thoughts that are experienced as inappropriate and 
anxiety provoking. The lifetime prevalence of OCD is between 1.5% and 3% 
(Stein et al., 1997), making it a debilitating and relatively common disorder. 
OCD  patients  experience  intrusive  thoughts  (obsessions)  that  they  feel 
compelled to neutralize through ritualistic behaviours (compulsions). Checking 
compulsions are most commonly observed in OCD with 50-80% of patients 
reporting  this  subtype  (Antony,  Downie,  &  Swinson,  1998;  Henderson  & 
Pollard,  1988;  Rasmussen  &  Eisen,  1988)  and  an  additional  ~15%  of  the 
general population demonstrating subclinical checking compulsions (Stein et 
al., 1997).  
 
Despite  the  commonality  of  checking  little  is  understood  about  the 
mechanisms  which  mediate  this  phenomenon  (Cuttler  &  Graf,  2007).  One 
prominent theory is that checkers are compelled to check to compensate for 
impairments of memory. For example, in a meta-analysis of checkers memory 
performance,  Woods  et  al.  (2002)  concluded  that  not  only  do  they  have 
objectively verifiable impairments in working and episodic memory but they 
also suffer from a subjective impairment in memory (i.e., they lack confidence 
in their ability to remember). Checkers may objectively fail to remember if they 
performed  an  action,  such  as  switching  the  iron  off,  and/or  they  may 
subjectively lack confidence in their ability to remember (Cuttler & Graf, 2007; 
Sher, Mann, & Frost, 1984). Thus,  poor memory and/or lack of confidence 
appears to fuel ritualistic checking, yet as they check and re-check to increase 
certainty  this  paradoxically  decreases  memory  accuracy  and  confidence 
(Rachman & Shafran, 1998; Radomsky & Alcolado, 2010). For example, van 
den Hout and Kindt (2003b) asked participants to repeatedly turn on, off or 
check a computer simulation of a six burner gas stove for 20 trials after which 
they were asked to report the vividness, detail and memory confidence for 
their  last  check  of  the  stove.  In  the  checking,  compared  to  the  control-
condition  checkers  had  a  significant  decrease  in  the  three  aforementioned 
metacognitive  measures  and  the  authors  concluded  that  checking  breeds  
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doubt, not certainty (van den Hout & Kindt, 2003b, 2004). Further, the same 
research  group  (van  den  Hout  &  Kindt,  2003a)  showed  that  repetitively 
checking the same stimulus resulted in a shift in the nature of their memory 
recollections  from  being  detailed  and  vivid  (remember  judgment)  to  being 
hazy,  indefinite  and  unclear  (know  judgment)  (Tulving,  1985).  This  they 
proposed  was  similar  to  the  memory-ambivalence  reported  by  clinical 
checkers (Reed, 1985).  
 
Therefore, while these authors reported the outcome of checking, the exact 
mechanism  of  memory  change  was  not  stated.  However,  Radomsky  and 
Alcolado (2010) provided a more specific indication of the domain specificity 
and the mechanism through which checking impaired memory. They asked 
participants to either mentally check their memory of an electrical stove or 
physically check an electrical stove. Mental checking required participants to 
“... imagine your hand manipulating the knobs, just like you would see yourself 
doing  so  in  a  real  physical  check”  (Radomsky  &  Alcolado,  2010,  p.  347). 
Memory accuracy was then determined with respect to the question: “Which 
three  knobs  did  you  check  on  the  last  trial?”  (p.  347).  The  observed 
impairments were modality-specific: Repeated mental checking only impaired 
memory  and  metamemory  for  mental  but  not  physical  checks.  Whereas, 
repeated  physical  checking  only  impaired  memory  and  metamemory  for 
physical  but  not  mental  checks.  Domain  specificity  is  further  substantiated 
with compulsive staring resulting in distrust in perception not memory (van 
den Hout et al., 2008; van den Hout et al., 2009), whereas checking memory 
produced distrust in memory not perception (see Dek et al., 2010). 
 
1.1.  The  story  so  far:  Core  features  of  checking-related  memory 
impairment  
In light of the aforementioned points and in agreement with Rachman’s (2002) 
suggestion that any cognitive theory of pathological checking must account for 
such memory problems, we highlight the following key aspects of checking 
related memory impairment. 
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(1)  Checking is domain specific, as only the cognitive processes (memory, 
metamemory)  that  are  the  object  of  checking  (physical  vs.  mental; 
Radomsky & Alcolado, 2010) are negatively affected (Dek et al., 2010). 
This is in agreement with Nelson and Narens (1994) who proposed that 
the reactivation of memory traces can never provide an entirely veridical 
representation of the original input. That is, our memories will never be as 
vivid and ‘‘true’’ as the original experience and so unnecessarily checking, 
manipulating, and/or interacting with them appears to further impair the 
veridicality  of  their  contents.    In  certain  domains  compulsive  checkers 
might  be  overly  aware  of  these  natural  shortfalls  of  memory  traces, 
strongly experiencing doubt and starting to check the same memory trace 
over and over again, yet, without the possibility to enhance certainty.  
 
(2)  The  contents  of  memory  are  sensitive  to  interference  from  internal 
(mental) and external (physical) sources (Radomsky & Alcolado, 2010). 
For example, misleading/intrusive information can be generated internally 
in the form of intrusive thoughts (‘‘I think I left a burner on’’) or can be 
provided  by  external  prompting  (i.e.,  experimentally  directed  mental 
checking; Radomsky & Alcolado, 2010). Kikul et al. (2011) measured the 
impact of cognitive self-consciousness (CSC: focus on their thoughts and 
mental strategies during encoding) and dual-task manipulations upon the 
subsequent  recall  of  a  complex  visual  stimulus  for  OCD  patients  and 
healthy controls. OCD patients’ memory was impaired in the CSC and the 
dual-task  conditions,  whereas  in  controls  only  the  dual-task  condition 
resulted  in  impaired  memory.  This  suggests  that  as  the  external  CSC 
manipulation was congruent with the symptomatology of the OCD group, 
their  internal  focus  on  their  thoughts  attenuated  performance  in  the 
primary memory task. More specifically, Omori et al. (2007) reported a 
negative  correlation  between  poor  inhibition  and  impaired  memory  in 
OCD-checkers  but  not  OCD-washers.  Suggesting  that  an  inability  to 
inhibit  (i.e.,  stop  thinking  about/ignore)  internally  generated  and/or 
externally threatening stimuli mediates checkers’ memory performance. 
Indeed, inhibition is said to be required for the successful performance of 
a  task  during  the  simultaneous  presence  of  task-irrelevant-stimuli,  
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responses and (possibly) thoughts (Friedman & Miyake, 2004). Further, it 
was  observed  that  a  checking  OCD  subgroup  had  poorer  memory 
compared to cleaners and controls (Cha et al., 2008) with checking and 
obsessional  severity  (e.g.,  “Did  I  check  correctly?”)  associated  with 
increased  anxiety  and  poorer  organization  in  early  memory  encoding 
(Jang et al., 2010). From this body of evidence we suggest that checkers 
have a cognitive profile which if pressured in the correct manner – i.e., 
experimentally  and/or  real-life  –  will  negatively  influence  their  memory 
performance.  Yet,  if  the  stimulus  domain  does  not  induce  intrusive 
thoughts or there is no suitable external challenge then no performance 
deficit will be observed.  
 
(3)  Points  1  and  2  converge  on  the  recent  perspective  that  memory 
impairment  in  OCD/checking  are  not  attributable  to  a  general  mnestic 
deficit  but  rather  are  secondary  to  executive  dysfunction  (Bannon, 
Gonsalvez,  &  Croft,  2008;  Greisberg  &  McKay,  2003;  Olley,  Malhi,  & 
Sachdev, 2007; Omori et al., 2007; Penades et al., 2005). This explains 
the  domain-specificity  of  checkers’  memory  impairment:  Disrupted 
memory only occurs when a memory task or real life event taps into a 
dysfunctional  component  of  the  executive,  i.e.,  failure  to  suppress 
intrusive information.  
 
1.2. The present story: The central role of working memory  
From the aforementioned points it is clear that in specific instances checkers’ 
memory is impaired, however, the question as to what stage memory traces 
are interfered with remains unresolved (Coles, Radomsky, & Horng, 2006). Is 
the effect purely confined to episodic long-term memory or does it operate 
already  at  an  earlier  stage?  Interference  may  occur  within  episodic 
representations in short-term Working-Memory (WM) and affect their transfer 
into Long-Term-Memory (LTM). For example, the familiar checkers question 
of  “Did  I  turn  ALL  the  burners  off?”  could  arise  seconds  after  leaving  the 
kitchen and could strongly affect how they remember the state of the stove 
hours later.  
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A body of research indicates that memory impairments of OCD patients can 
occur at the level of WM and that this is attributed to deficits in executive 
control and not memory capacity per se. For example, Van der Wee et al. 
(2003) used a spatial variant of the n-back WM task with four levels of load. It 
was only at the highest load level (3-back) that patients with OCD significantly 
differed  from  controls  with  errors  of  48%  versus  25%,  respectively.  They 
argued that OCD patients may over-scrutinize their performance or have a 
deficit  in  supervisory  (i.e.,  executive)  processes,  as  opposed  to  deficits  in 
maintenance or manipulation, which suggests that general capacity limitations 
are not responsible for the results. We propose that the stability of executive-
memory impairment at higher levels of task complexity is further supported by 
its presence across a range of WM tasks, for example, the spatial WM task 
(Purcell et al., 1998a, 1998b), paired association learning (Morein-Zamir et al., 
2010)  and  the  corsi  block  tapping  task  (Boldrini  et al.,  2005;  Moritz  et  al., 
2003; Zielinski, Taylor, & Juzwin, 1991; Zitterl et al., 2001). In these instances 
OCD memory impairments are not attributable to capacity per se (i.e., intact at 
lower load levels; see also Ciesielski et al., 2007; Henseler et al., 2008) but 
rather represent a failure of executive functioning to match increasing task 
demands in terms of strategic resource organization. However, we highlight 
the following limitation of this conclusion: As load linearly increases in these 
tasks and OCD impairment occurs at higher load level, one cannot fully rule-
out the role of impaired capacity. In compromise, for example, on the n-back 
task  we  suggest  that  load  (i.e.,  increasing  visuospatial  information)  and 
executive  control  (i.e.,  maintaining  and  sorting  through  that  visuospatial 
information) are closely interrelated, making it difficult to tease apart which 
cognitive processes plays the (if at all) dominant role. Thus, one of the aims of 
the  present  experiments  is  to  provide  a  clearer  delineation  between  intact 
capacity and memory impairment driven by primary executive dysfunction.  
 
In sum, the literature reveals that poor memory performance of OCD generally 
and checking specifically is explained by an interaction between deficits of 
inhibition,  overactive  performance  monitoring  (Veale  et  al.,  1996),  and 
impairments  in  WM.  Whereby,  an  inability  to  ignore/inhibit  irrelevant 
internal/external  stimuli,  likely  triggers  an  existing  preponderance  to  
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monitor/examine  the  contents  of  WM  and  impairs  the  veridicality  of  their 
contents (see Salkovskis, 1999; Veale et al., 1996). Importantly, these three 
factors  have  been  identified  as  candidate  endophenotypes  of  OCD,  which 
implicates them at the neurocognitive level as central – impairment in first-
degree relatives (heritability) and state independence – to the illness of OCD 
(Chamberlain et al., 2007; Delorme et al., 2007; Menzies et al., 2007; Riesel 
et al., 2011) and checking specifically.  
 
1.2.1. A unifying framework: Baddeley’s (2000) model of working memory  
Despite the likelihood that WM representations are the target for compulsive 
checkers’ concerns (Shimamura, 2000), the specific relationship between WM 
performance and checking is poorly understood (see Woods et al., 2002 for 
review). Here we propose that checkers’ executive impairments – i.e., failing 
to  inhibit  irrelevant  stimuli  and/or  repeatedly  questioning  the  veridicality  of 
memory  representations  (cf.  Nelson  and  Narens,  1994)  –  will  reduce 
performance  already  at  the  stage  of WM.  Not  only  does  this  highlight  the 
centrality  of  executive  dysfunction  in  impaired  OCD/checkers’  memory 
performance  but  it  also  implies  the  sensitivity  of  memory  per  se  to 
interference. Based on these considerations, we propose Baddeley’s (2000) 
model of WM as a unifying framework for explaining: (1) generally, deficits of 
executive  control  and  memory  in  compulsive  checking/OCD  and  (2) 
specifically,  the  mechanism  underlying  poor  memory,  i.e.,  executive 
dysfunction interferes with fragile attention-dependent bindings maintained in 
the EB (EB) (see fig. 1) (Harkin & Kessler, 2009). To reiterate, Baddeley’s 
(1986)  original  model  included  a  central  executive,  phonological  loop  and 
visuospatial  sketchpad  and  was  deemed  separate  from  long-term  memory 
(LTM) (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). While this simple model explained a range of 
data (e.g., phonological similarity; Baddeley, 1966), it could not account for all 
experimental  phenomena.  For  example,  the  visuospatial  sketchpad,  a 
capacity  limit  of  4  units  was  observed  for  the  maintenance  of  individual 
features (colors or orientations) as well as for integrated objects with colors 
and  orientations  (Luck  &  Vogel,  1997).  In  addition,  the  original  separation 
between WM and LTM was unsupportable because: (1) chunking in verbal 
WM is aided by existent information in LTM (e.g., Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995),  
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(2) patients with disturbed phonological loop functioning are impaired in long-
term language learning (Baddeley, Papagno, & Vallar, 1988), and (3) bindings 
in  visuospatial  WM  influence  long-term  visuospatial  learning  (Logie, 
Brockmole, & Vandenbroucke, 2009).  
 
1.2.2. The centrality of the episodic buffer  
The  complementary  nature  of  WM-LTM  processes,  in  addition  to  efficient 
chunking and binding, hinted at a distinct cognitive resource, one that could 
integrate  information  from  a  variety  of  sources  (e.g.,  phonological,  color, 
location, smell) into a single memory episode. The so-called “binding problem” 
(e.g., Treisman, 1996) refers to the fact that information presented in visual 
scenes rarely consists of isolated features. Rather, features pertain to objects, 
objects to locations, and objects are further embedded into episodes together 
with a plethora of contextual information. A parallel processing architecture 
like the human brain needs mechanisms for tracking “what goes with what” in 
order to generate and maintain bindings between multiple features (Hinton, 
McClelland, & Rumelhart, 1986). Therefore, accurate memory (WM and LTM) 
requires the encoding, maintenance and retrieval of bindings between various 
aspects of a multimodal episode (Allen, Baddeley, & Hitch, 2006). Baddeley 
(2000), therefore, extended his classic 1986 WM model to include an “EB” 
that allowed for multimodal, temporarily integrated representations and served 
as an interface with episodic LTM. Based on this development, we proposed 
(Harkin & Kessler, 2009) that an executive dysfunction (e.g., unsuppressed 
intrusive  thoughts/stimuli)  might  strongly  impair  the  consolidation  of 
representations in the so-called EB of WM, impairing memory over the short- 
and possibly long-term (Harkin & Kessler, 2009: see fig. 1).   
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Figure  1.  Adaptation  from  Baddeley  (2000)  as  originally  proposed  by  Harkin  & 
Kessler (2009). The grey parts of the WM framework highlight the components and 
their interactions which we propose to be involved in compulsive checking. A specific 
central executive dysfunction (inhibition of irrelevant thoughts/stimuli) interferes with 
binding of the episodic buffer disrupting memory performance over the short-term 
and potentially the long term. Further explanations in the text. 
 
Baddeley  (2003)  later  emphasised  the  parallels  between  his  EB  and  the 
concept of a “global workspace” (Baars, 2002; Dehaene & Naccache, 2001), 
which is a formal neuro-cognitive approach to conscious/aware processing. In 
short,  this  embraces  the  notion  that  compulsive  checking  and  associated 
executive  impairments  affect  the  current  stream  of  consciousness  (e.g., 
Salkovskis, Forrester, & Richards, 1998). Thus, intrusive thoughts that doubt 
the veridicality of memory traces (e.g., “Did I REALLY turn all the burners 
off?”) could therefore be more detrimental for compulsive checkers because 
they  cannot  easily  inhibit  these  thoughts  from  affecting  ongoing  conscious 
processing (cf. Bannon, Gonsalvez, & Croft, 2008; Salkovskis, Forrester, & 
Richards, 1998). This concurs with the finding that ‘not just right’ obsessions 
significantly  correlated  with  checking,  control  and  some  elements  of 
perfectionism (Coles et al., 2003). 
 
Furthermore, Miyake et al. (2000) observed that various facets of executive 
control  are  interconnected,  which  neatly  explains  the  manner  in  which 
executive  dysfunction  impairs  memory  functioning.  Their  latent  variable 
VISUOSPATIAL 
SKETCHPAD 
(Locations of stove burners 
and knobs  
/locations of letters) 
EPISODIC LTM 
(Memorizing stove states 
over long-term)  
PHONOLOGICAL LOOP 
(Phonological code for 
knob position 
(“ON”/”OFF”) 
/letter phonemes) 
LANGUAGE   VISUOSPATIAL 
SEMANTICS 
CENTRAL EXECUTIVE 
- Rehearsal/Checking Control  
- Inhibition Dysfunction of 
irrelevant thoughts/stimuli 
 
EPISODIC BUFFER  
(Binding of stove 
burners + knobs to on/off 
codes 
/letters to locations)  
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analysis identified three major control functions of the central executive: (1) 
inhibition:  resist  disruption  from  task-irrelevant  stimuli,  (2)  shifting:  shift 
attention  between  different  yet  task-relevant  options,  and  (3)  updating: 
“updating and monitoring of WM representations” (p. 56). Specifically, their 
analysis  revealed  that  while  these  were  relatively  independent  constructs, 
they were also interdependent, which implies they all rely to some extent upon 
the  attentional  resources  of  the  central  executive  (Eysenck  et  al.,  2007). 
Therefore, it follows that an inability to ignore irrelevant stimuli may potentially 
reduce  the  attention  allocated  to  the  concurrent  updating  of  information 
presently maintained in the EB of WM. We, therefore, propose the EB as the 
focal  point  for  memory  impairments  in  OCD/checking:  EB  functionality 
(binding)  is  vulnerable  to  interference  through  executive  dysfunction  (e.g., 
failure to inhibit intrusive thoughts/stimuli). In other words, interference from 
executive dysfunction reduces the veridicality of multimodal bindings within 
the EB, attenuating memory performance.  
 
1.2.3. Episodic buffer bindings’ sensitivity to interference  
While  there  is  some  debate  regarding  the  exact  mechanism  for  binding 
multimodal features together into a representation (i.e., object-unit hypothesis; 
Luck  &  Vogel,  1997  versus  independent-unit  hypothesis;  Wheeler  & 
Treisman, 2002), researchers tend to agree that attentional effort (executive 
control) is required for their generation and maintenance (Delvenne & Bruyer, 
2006; Fougnie & Marois, 2009; Hyun, Woodman, & Luck, 2009; Makovski, 
Sussman, & Jiang, 2008; Rudner & Ronnberg, 2008; Wheeler & Treisman, 
2002).  Thus,  critically  for  the  present  thesis,  the  EB  is  assumed  to  be 
controlled  by  the  central  executive”  (Baddeley,  2000,  p.  421)  which  is 
consistent with Wolters and Raffone’s (2008) tri-partite definition of executive 
functioning:  (1)  Attentional  Control:  top-down  selective  activation  of  task-
relevant  representations  and  suppression  of  task-irrelevant  stimuli  and 
responses,  (2)  Maintenance:  holding  task-relevant  information  in  an  active 
state,  and  (3)  Integration:  flexibly  bind  and  manipulate  information  from 
multimodal  sources,  in  the  service  of  controlling  task  execution.  Therefore, 
memory  impairments  occur  if  distraction  is  sufficient  to  interfere  with 
attentional control specific to the maintenance and integration of bindings in  
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the  EB  (Elsley  &  Parmentier,  2009).  For  example,  Wheeler  and  Treisman 
(2002)  measured  WM  recall  with  single-  and  whole-probe  displays  and 
reported  a  binding  impairment  specific  to  the  whole-probe  condition.  They 
argued  that  as  binding  is  dependent  upon  sustained  attention  so  the 
presentation  of  a  whole-probe  withdraws  attention  to  those  bindings 
simultaneously  maintained  in  WM.  Also  greater  attentional  resources  –  as 
measured by a larger N2pc ERP amplitude – was observed for the binding of 
colors to locations than individual colors (Hyun, Woodman, & Luck, 2009). 
Fougnie and Marois (2009) tested the role of attention in binding using an 
attentionally demanding Multiple Object Tracking (MOT) task, which involved 
tracking  through  space  relevant  targets  among  irrelevant  distractors,  all  of 
which are moving. The MOT was presented between the encoding set of a 
separate memory task (color, shape, color and shape, conjunctions of color 
and shape) and the memory probe at the end of the trial. Only memory for 
feature  bindings  (conjunctions  of  color  and  shape)  was  impaired  and  was 
specific to the attentive tracking of the MOT as similar attenuation was not 
observed for a static distractor. They hypothesized that attention iteratively 
refreshes  multimodal  representations  in  WM:  it  is  only  when  a  distractor 
sufficiently interferes with attention that there is a failure to maintain features 
in a bound manner (e.g., Harkin & Kessler, 2009, 2011a; Harkin, Rutherford, 
& Kessler, 2011; Kessler & Kiefer, 2005; Mather et al. 2006). This dove-tails 
nicely  with  findings  showing  that  the  more  emotionally  engaging  a  given 
distractor is to an individual (or group) the more it interferes with attention-
dependent bindings (Dolcos & McCarthy, 2006; Johnson et al., 2005; Mather, 
2007;  Mather  et  al.,  2006).  Mather  et  al.  (2006),  for  example,  presented 
pictures of high, medium and low arousal in various locations. Picture-location 
accuracy  decreased  as  arousal  increased.  Interestingly,  depression  scores 
were negatively correlated with picture-location accuracy for negative images. 
Emotional arousal, therefore, interfered with binding accuracy at a global (all 
subjects)  as  well  as  an  individual  (depressed)  level.  In  this  reasoning, 
complex representations that are salient to a checking/OCD individual/group 
will likely result in memory impairments (i.e., Cha et al., 2008; Jang et al., 
2010).  
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1.3. The aim of the present experiments: Targeting the episodic buffer  
With these points in mind, the present series of experiments set out to: (1) 
engage the EB using stimuli which require multimodal conjunctions between 
phonological  (letters)  or  visual  (kitchen  appliances)  and  spatial  (locations) 
features and (2) hamper EB functionality by presenting an intermediate probe 
that was relevant to the executive impairments of high but not low checkers 
during the WM retention interval. 
 
1.3.1. Primary experimental manipulations  
Specifically, we presented an intermediate probe (between the encoding set 
and  memory  task)  in  the  form  of  two  types  of  external  challenge  which 
resulted in two main trial types:  
 
(1)  Resolvable  Trials:  probing  an  aspect  of  the  encoded  set 
(identity/location)  where  a  correct  response  is  possible,  i.e.,  it  is 
resolvable. For example, asking for the color of an item at a location 
where one was presented.  
 
(2)  Misleading  Trials:  probing  an  aspect  of  the  encoded  set 
(identity/location)  where  a  correct  response  is  impossible,  i.e.,  it  is 
irresolvable. For example, asking for the color of an item at a location 
where none was presented.  
 
1.3.2. Primary experimental predictions 
In relation to these experimental manipulations we make a strong and a weak 
hypothesis with respect to the memory performance of high compared to low 
checkers.  
 
Accuracy – Strong Hypothesis 
Compulsive  checkers  have  been  reported  to  show  a  deficit  in  inhibiting 
intrusive thoughts and distracting stimuli (e.g., Olley, Malhi, & Sachdev, 2007; 
Omori  et  al.,  2007;  Savage  et  al.,  2000).  As  inhibitory  functioning  is 
associated  with  the  ability  resist  interference  from  distractors  (Friedman  & 
Miyake, 2004), it follows that impaired inhibitory functioning will reduce the  
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ability to accurately maintain task goals when confronted by externally task-
irrelevant  stimuli  (see  Eysenck  et  al.,  2007). We  therefore  expect  that  the 
presence  of  a  misleading  but  irrelevant  probe-1  question  will  especially 
interfere with the WM representations of higher checkers. This, we argue, is 
analogous to the process of having just completed a task (e.g., turning off the 
stove)  and  then  almost  immediately  starting  to  check  the  maintained  WM 
representations for their veridicality (see above; Radomsky & Alcolado, 2010). 
Thus, checking the contents of memory is likely to be driven by a thought or 
an external stimulus that is task-related but irrelevant to the successful recall 
of the memory trace, e.g., external misleading cue: “Was that letter there?” 
leading  to  the  thought:  “I  am  unsure!”  This  assertion  is  supported  by  the 
observation  that  OCD  checkers  are  poorer  at  tolerating  uncertainty  (i.e., 
misleading  probe-1  letter)  than  OCD  non-checkers  and  controls  (Tolin, 
Woods, & Abramowitz, 2003), and that an inability to tolerate uncertainty is 
associated with subsequent checking and repeating rituals (Lind & Boschen, 
2009;  Tolin, Woods,  &  Abramowitz,  2003).  Misleading  intermediate  probes 
may  induce  checkers  to  ‘check  another  time’  in  an  attempt  to  ‘be  sure’, 
however, as we have seen this only serves to further undermine memory at 
the  level  of  accuracy  and  confidence.  As  a  result,  we  expect  that  high 
checkers will have poorer memory for misleading but not resolvable trials in 
comparison  to  low  checkers.  We  suggest  that  for  a  misleading  probe, 
checkers are more likely to repeatedly compare the visually presented probe 
to the contents of the memorised set, yet, frustratingly without success. At the 
representational level this would lead to a competition between a strong visual 
stimulus and weaker, memorised bindings. The stronger this competition is 
(lack  of  suppression  of  misleading  information)  and  the  more  often  this 
competition is repeated (checking) the more strongly the originally encoded 
memories are weakened – ultimately resulting in a performance deficit on the 
actual  memory  test  (probe-2)  (see  Simplified  Comparison  Hypothesis: 
Makovski, Sussman, & Jiang, 2008). 
 
Accuracy – Weak Hypothesis 
For high checkers, an intermediate probe (resolvable or misleading) will be 
experienced as generally distracting (executive impairment) which will result  
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in  the  withdrawal  of  attention from  attention-dependent bindings underlying 
the encoding set. (Gajewski & Brockmole, 2006; Wheeler & Treisman, 2002). 
This  will  result  in  high  checkers  having  poorer  memory  performance  for 
misleading and resolvable trials in comparison to low checkers. 
 
Measuring working memory capacity 
For either the weak or the strong hypothesis, and in agreement with previous 
findings (e.g., Ciesielski et al., 2007; Henseler et al., 2008) we predict that 
WM capacity will not explain these group differences. To support this we will 
include  trials  without  an  intermediate  probe  (no-probe-1  trials)  which  will 
measure  WM  functioning  under  ideal  conditions.  Thus,  for  these  trials  we 
expect  that  high  checkers  memory  performance  will  not  to  differ  from  low 
checkers. In doing so we will provide a clearer demarcation of the conditions 
where primary executive dysfunction results in secondary memory impairment 
in OCD-checking and that WM capacity is not responsible (c.f., Cha et al., 
2008;  Omori  et  al.,  2007).  However,  we  do  expect  to  potentially  observe 
memory impairments in no-probe-1 trials in our latter experiments, i.e., 7 and 
8. As these experiments use stimuli concordant with the symptoms of high 
checkers, this may evoke anxiety, which as discussed previously (see Dolcos 
& McCarthy, 2006; Johnson et al., 2005; Mather, 2007; Mather et al., 2006) 
may  generally  interfere  with  attention  to  bindings  irrespective  of  an 
intermediate probe. It is important to reiterate, that this is not evidence of a 
general impairment in the WM capacity of high checkers, as the absence of 
impairment in no-probe-1 trials in ours (Exp. 1-4) and others experiments at 
low load levels (e.g., Ciesielski et al., 2007; Henseler et al., 2008; van der 
Wee et al., 2003, 2007) argues against this. 
 
Reaction Times 
We will measure reaction times (RTs) in relation to the memory task. We do 
not  expect  that  RTs  will  differ  between  high  and  low  checkers  on  this 
measure. If this is the case then we will be able to rule out a speed-accuracy 
trade-off with respect to high checkers poorer memory performance, i.e., they 
will not be faster than low checkers. 
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Confidence 
We will also measure confidence after the memory task (probe-2). We justify 
this by observing the centrality of doubt regarding memory performance in 
checking (for reviews see Woods et al., 2002 and Muller & Roberts, 2005). 
With  the  literature  showing  two  prominent  effects:  (1)  checking  impairs 
confidence (e.g., van den Hout & Kindt, 2003a) and (2) poorer confidence 
motivates  checking  (e.g.,  Alcolado  &  Radomsky,  2011). Tolin  et  al.  (2001) 
reported that with repeated exposures to threatening stimuli, OCD patients 
showed a progressive decline in memory confidence across trials compared 
to  anxious  and non-anxious  controls.  More  specifically,  after  1-week,  OCD 
checkers had poorer confidence in memory for threatening stimuli compared 
to non-checking OCD patients. This suggests that poor memory confidence is 
a characteristic of OCD in general, but is particularly pronounced amongst 
checkers in the long-term. A finding that is concordant with the plethora of 
evidence  showing  that  repeated  checking  reduces  memory  confidence 
specific to the domain of checking (Dek et al., 2010; Radomsky & Alcolado, 
2010; Radomsky, Gilchrist, & Dussault, 2006; van den Hout & Kindt, 2003a, , 
2003b) with this metamemory effect occurring in as few as two checks (Coles, 
Radomsky,  &  Horng,  2006).  Considering  this  alongside  the  evidence  that 
OCD  checkers  have  less  confidence  in  their  memories  compared  to  OCD 
non-checkers  and  controls  (MacDonald  et  al.,  1997;  McNally  &  Kohlbeck, 
1993; Sher, Frost, & Otto, 1983); low memory confidence in checkers may 
contribute  to  the  self-perpetuating  mechanism  of  further  checking  and 
reduced confidence (Rachman, 2002). This agrees with the recent research 
demonstrating that poor memory confidence predicts repeated checking. For 
example,  Nedeljkovic  and  Kyrios  (2007)  showed  that  low  trait  memory 
confidence was associated with severity of checker’s obsessional symptoms 
(i.e.,  “Did  I  turn  it  off?”)  and  higher-order  executive  processes  related  to 
memory  (i.e.,  attention/concentration)  (Nedeljkovic  &  Kyrios,  2009a).  In  a 
similar manner, Cougle, and colleagues reported that checkers doubted their 
own memory abilities, lacked confidence in their memory for OCD stimuli, and 
that  confidence  correlated  with  memory  accuracy  (Cougle,  Salkovskis,  & 
Thorpe,  2008;  Cougle,  Salkovskis,  &  Wahl,  2007).  This  suggests  that  low 
memory confidence may be a risk factor for checking especially in a context of  
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uncertainty  (Tolin  et  al.,  2003),  a  suggestion  confirmed  by  Alcolado  and 
Radomsky  (2011)  who  showed  that  manipulating  confidence  (positive  vs. 
negative false feedback) influenced subsequent urges to check. Those who 
received  false  feedback  (low  memory  confidence  condition)  had  stronger 
urges  to  check  than  those  who  received  positive  feedback  (high  memory 
confidence  condition).  In  addition,  Nedeljkovic  and  Kyrios  (2007)  proposed 
that covert checking (i.e., comparing misleading P1 to contents of WM) and 
poor metamemory are particularly detrimental for tasks that are dependent 
upon the maintenance of internal representations, i.e., the type of WM task 
used in the current experiments. 
 
In  the  context  of  the  present  experiments,  checking  implies  a  lack  of 
confidence  in  the  veridicality  of  the  reactivated  WM  information  that  is 
detrimental without the original sensory information to check against, or even 
with competing new sensory information present. As a result, we expect high 
checkers  will  have  generally  poorer  memory  confidence  relative  to  low 
checkers;  a difference  that  will  be further mediated  by  the presence  of  an 
intermediate  probe.  In  addition,  if  high  checkers  are  specifically  unable  to 
ignore a misleading probe – due to impairments of inhibitory functioning – not 
only will they have poorer memory in a misleading context but they will also 
reveal poorer memory confidence relative to low checkers. 
 
1.4. Creating high checking and low checking groups  
All of the present experiments require us to determine the checking tendency 
of each individual participant. To this end we used the checking subscale of 
the Vancouver-Obsessional Compulsive Inventory (VOCI; Thordarson et al., 
2004).  The  VOCI  consists  of  55  items  that  comprise  6  subscales: 
Contamination  (12  items),  Checking  (6  items),  Obsessions  (12  items), 
Hoarding (7 items), Just Right (12 items), and Indecisiveness (6 items). Each 
item is rated 0 (not at all), 1 (a little), 2 (some), 3 (much), or 4 (very much) in 
response to the prompt: ‘‘How much is each of the following statements true 
of  you?’’  The  VOCI  possesses  excellent  inter-item  reliability  in  student, 
community, OCD, and clinical control populations (Cronbach’s  alpha: 50.96,   
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0.90,    0.94,    and    0.98,  respectively).  Although  participants  completed  all 
items of the VOCI, only the checking subscale was used to create a high and 
a low checking group.  
 
1.5. The structure of the present thesis  
The  present  experiments  will  measure  memory  performance  of  high 
compared to low checkers in novel WM tasks – fulfilling the aforementioned 
design  criteria  –  and  a  specific  measure  of  inhibitory  (i.e.,  executive) 
functioning.  
 
Chapter  2.  Checkers’  show  robust  and  consistent  impairments  in  a  misleading 
context: A simple working memory task  
Experiments 1, 2 and an extreme group meta-comparison provide our first 
attempt to interfere with the WM performance of high but not low checkers 
(see  Harkin  &  Kessler  2009).  Simply,  we  present  letters  in  locations  and 
measure the impact of a misleading versus resolvable intermediate (probe-1) 
upon the WM and metamemory performance of high and low checkers. In line 
with our strong hypothesis, we expect that high checkers will be unable to 
ignore  a  misleading  intermediate  probe  which  will  then  impair  memory 
performance  on  the  subsequent  WM  (probe-2)  task.  We  do  not  expect  to 
observe difference in basic WM capacity (no-probe-1 trials). 
 
Chapter 3. Checkers’ memory impairments persist in more complex working memory 
experiments 
Experiments 3 and 4 attempt to increase the group differences observed in 
Experiments  1  and  2  (see  Harkin  &  Kessler,  2011a).  In  Experiment  3  we 
increase the complexity of the encoding set (letters in locations) by presenting 
the letters in different colours. We expect that increasing the binding load of 
the encoding set will increase its sensitivity to interference, which may boost 
the memory impairments of high checkers observed in Experiment 1 and 2. 
Then,  in  Experiment 4  we  attempt  to  increase  the  strength  of  interference 
caused by the intermediate probe by presenting it as a strong visuospatial at a 
resolvable  or  misleading  location.  We  predict  that  this  strong  visuospatial 
distractor  (relative  to  Exp.  1,  2,  and  3)  will  definitively  tap  into  checkers’  
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impairments in inhibiting irrelevant stimuli and so boost memory impairments. 
In  this  instance,  high  checkers  may  be  generally  distracted  by  such  an 
intermediate  probe  leading  to  poorer  WM  performance  in  misleading  and 
resolvable trials alike (i.e., supporting the weak hypothesis). 
 
Chapter 4. Do checkers actually check?: An eye movement study 
In  Experiment  5,  we  address  a  primary  methodological  limitation  of  our 
previous experiments (see Harkin, Miellet, & Kessler, subm). Specifically, we 
cannot say with certainty that high checkers do actually check the contents of 
WM when presented with a misleading intermediate probe. To this end, we 
use  eye  tracking  as  a  means  of  measuring  fixation  number  and  fixation 
duration across three critical periods of our original WM paradigm (i.e., Exp. 1, 
2; Harkin & Kessler, 2009). We focus on these eye movement measures as 
these  mimicked  the  symptoms  of  checking,  i.e.,  fixation  number  related  to 
unnecessary checking and fixation duration similar to perseveration. Simply, 
we expect that in misleading trials high checkers’ inhibitory impairments for 
misleading  information  results  in  them  checking  (longer  looking  at)  the 
contents of WM in a manner which is unnecessary (specifically in misleading 
trials) and uninformative (empty locations), in comparison to low checkers and 
resolvable trials. Checking empty locations will provide specific evidence that 
in a context of uncertainty (misleading trials) high checkers’ attempt to remove 
it  by  examining  locations  were  no  additional  task-relevant  information  is 
present. 
 
Chapter 5. Using ecologically valid stimuli to address previous experimental concerns 
In Tasks 6 and 7 (see Harkin & Kessler, in press) and Experiments 8 and 9 
(see  Harkin,  Rutherfored,  &  Kessler,  2011)  we  again  attempt  to  tap  more 
strongly  into  the  executive  impairments  of  checkers  by  using  stimuli  (i.e., 
electrical kitchen appliances) that are more concordant with their symptoms. 
Please note that the reference to Tasks 6 and 7 (as opposed to Experiments 
6 and 7) is to avoid confusion which arose in explaining and discussing the 
counterbalanced design which was used in this case. Tasks 6 and 7 attempt 
to  determine  if  checkers  do  in  fact  suffer  from  executive  impairments  in  a 
novel application of the Inhibition of Return (IOR; Posner, Cohen, & Rafal,  
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1982) paradigm. If so, this will provide explicit evidence that checkers suffer 
inhibitory  impairments  for  stimuli  that  are  specific  to  their  symptomatic 
concerns.  Experiments  8  and  9  then  require  participants  to  memorise  the 
location of the same (Tasks 6 and 7) electrical kitchen appliances presented 
on a kitchen countertop. Between encoding and the memory task we again 
presented a spatial location probe as it previously (Exp. 4) revealed strong 
and  robust  group  differences.  We  then  tested  memory  by  asking  if  an 
appliance had been ‘ON’ or ‘OFF’ (Exp. 8) or if it was correctly located (Exp. 
9). By using such symptom specific stimuli, high checkers may possibly reveal 
novel and potentially larger WM impairments relative to low checkers. 
 
Chapter  6.  The  role  of  working  memory  in  compulsive  checking  and  OCD:  A 
systematic classification of 58 experimental findings 
Then  using  evidence  from  the  previous  experiments  (1-9)  and  that  of  the 
existing OCD literature we provide a classification system which allows us to 
position individual OCD memory experiments and explain why they did or did 
not  report  memory  impairments  (see  Harkin  &  Kessler,  2011b).  This 
classification  system  moves  away  from  the  classic  verbal  versus  visual 
distinction and issues of basic capacity. Rather, we extend the argument that 
memory  impairments  in  OCD  are  secondary  to  executive  dysfunction  and 
highlight  that  the  following  three  main  factors  which  underlie  memory 
impairment  in  OCD:  (1)  E:  executive  functioning  efficiency,  (2)  B:  binding 
complexity of stimuli used and (3) L: overall load of task upon WM resources. 
We use this EBL classification to explain otherwise discrepant findings from 
58 studies. 
 
Chapter  7.  Conclusion:  Overview,  clinical  implications,  limitations  and  future 
research, and contribution to OCD memory research   
Finally, we conclude with an overview of our current experimental findings as 
they relate to our primary hypotheses, followed by a discussion of the manner 
in which checkers’ attention/WM impairments contribute to the maintenance 
and  development  of  their  symptoms.  Then  limitations  of  the  research  are 
identified and, when appropriate, avenues of future research are proposed as  
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a  solution.  Finally,  the  contribution  of  our  findings  and  theories  are  then 
discussed with respect to OCD memory research as a whole.  
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2.  Checkers’  show  consistent  and  robust  memory  impairments  in  a 
misleading context: A simple working memory task  
The following three experiments were our first attempt to measure the impact 
of an irrelevant intermediate probe upon subsequent WM performance of low 
and  high  checkers  (see  Harkin  &  Kessler,  2009).  We  presented  4  letters 
randomly in 6 possible locations (encoding set); with the primary memory task 
(probe-2)  requiring  the  participant  to  determine  if  an  individual  letter  was 
correctly or incorrectly located with respect to the original encoding set. We 
chose an easy primary task (4 letters in 6 locations) to avoid group differences 
due  to  differences  in  WM  capacity  at  high  load  (see  Van  der Wee,  2003; 
Purcell  et  al.,  1998a,  1998b)  and  we  included  a  control  condition  without 
intermediate probe (no probe-1) to obtain a baseline indication of capacity. 
The checking manipulation between the encoding set and the memory task 
was induced by presenting a probe that was potentially misleading in its form. 
Participants were asked explicitly where a specific letter had been, while this 
letter, e.g. “T” or “K” (see fig. 1), either was (hence, resolvable) or was not 
(hence, misleading) part of the encoded set. For the latter, we expect that 
questioning the location of a letter that is not solvable will tap into checkers 
established  executive  impairments  in  inhibition  (Olley,  Malhi,  &  Sachdev, 
2007; Omori et al., 2007) the inherent irresolvability of misleading information 
will induce a degree of repeated checking of the veridicality of the encoded 
representations  especially  in  high  checkers  (Veale  et  al.,  1996).  This  is  in 
agreement with the observation that intolerance of uncertainty (i.e., aversion 
to uncertainty about the presence/absence of probe-1) mediates checking in 
OCD (Lind & Boschen, 2009; Tolin et al., 2003). Thus, high checkers will have 
impaired memory performance in a misleading but not a resolvable context 
compared to low checkers and these differences will not be due to capacity, 
i.e., no group difference on no-probe-1 trials. We expect that confidence – 
measured after the memory task – will be poorer in high compared to low 
checkers and that this will be mediated by the presence of an intermediate 
probe. We tested these hypotheses in two experiments (Exp. 1: low vs. high 
checkers;  Exp.  2:  replication  of  Exp.  1)  and  an  extreme  group  meta-
comparison  (using  high  checkers  from  Exp.  1  and  2  which  scored  in  the 
clinical range according to the VOCI; Thordarson et al., 2004).   
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2.1. Experiment 1 
2.1.1. Method 
Participants 
40 Participants (mean 22.7 years: 12 male, 26 female) from the University of 
Glasgow gave written informed consents. British Psychological Society ethical 
requirements were met, including that of participant debriefing. A median split 
of VOCI checking scores was used to obtain two groups: low (mean = 1.11, 
SD = 1.10) and high (mean = 9.53, SD = 5.49) “checkers”.  
 
Stimuli and Procedure 
Participants sat 90cm from a 19’’ computer screen ran at 800x600 resolution 
with their head on a chin rest. Stimuli were capital letters in font Arial, size 18 
and were presented against a black background within a 2 (columns) by 3 
(rows) matrix covering an area of 300x420 pixels. After 1000ms fixation, 4 
letters  were  presented  randomly  in  4  of  the  6  possible  locations  and 
participants had 2000 ms to encode the identity and the location of each letter 
(see fig. 2). After 500 ms, the probe-1 question requested the location of a 
specific  letter.  Participants  indicated  the  location  through  a  2x3  spatially 
mapped keypad and were instructed to respond within 4000 ms (to keep the 
WM delay constant). Whether the probe-1 letter had or had not been part of 
the encoded set created the resolvable versus misleading (irresolvable) trials. 
In a baseline condition probe-1 was omitted to measure WM performance on 
the primary task under ideal conditions.   
 
A 1000 ms interstimulus interval (ISI) separated probe-1 and probe-2. Since 
baseline trials did not include the intermediate probe-1 a black screen was 
shown for 5500 ms between encoding and probe-2 (equaling the ISI between 
encoding  and  probe-2  on  the  other  trial  types).  Probe-2  was  the  actual 
memory test for each trial and required participants to indicate if a letter was 
correctly located with respect to the originally encoded set. In all trials the 
probe-2 letter had been part of the encoded set in terms of identity while the 
probe location was correct only on 50% of the trials.  
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Figure 2. Schematic procedure of resolvable and misleading trials. A set of 4 letters 
presented  randomly  in  4  out  of  6  possible  locations  had  to  be  encoded  within  2 
seconds. Encoding was then followed after 500 ms by a first probe letter (probe-1) 
which  was  either  part  or  not  part  of  the  encoded  set,  i.e.,  was  resolvable  or 
misleading.  Subsequently  participants  had  to  indicate  if  the  probe-2  letter  was 
correctly or incorrectly located with respect to the encoded set, which was the actual 
memory test. Finally confidence in the probe-2 response had to be indicated on a 
scale from 1 (highly certain) to 6 (highly uncertain). Further explanations in the text.  
 
Finally, a scale was displayed prompting participants to indicate their degree 
of confidence in their probe-2 response (6 levels: 1=totally certain to 6=totally 
uncertain). Three self-paced breaks were included and the experiment lasted 
approximately 90 minutes. The resolvable block comprised 180 trials with 120 
resolvable  trials,  40  misleading  trials,  and  additional  20  baseline  trials  (no 
probe-1). Correspondingly, the misleading block (180 trials) was made up of 
40 resolvable trials, 120 misleading trials, and again 20 baseline trials. The 
sequence of these blocks was counterbalanced across participants in order to 
avoid order effects.  
 
Design 
A two (group: low vs. high checkers) by two (block type: mostly resolvable vs. 
mostly misleading block) by three (probe-1 trial type: resolvable, misleading, 
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no  probe-1)  mixed  design  was  employed  with  group  as  the  between-  and 
block and probe-1 as the within-subjects factors.  
 
2.1.2. Results 
MANOVA’s for a 2x2x3 design were carried out for reaction times, accuracy 
and  confidence  on  probe-2  responses  due  to  violations  of  the  sphericity 
assumption (Mauchley’s tests). As our theoretical predictions focused on the 
effect of checking induced by resolvable vs. misleading probe-1 trials we also 
conducted 2x2x2 ANOVA’s removing the no-probe-1 trials. The datasets of 
two participants were not used in further analysis as accuracy was at chance 
levels in at least one condition. All other participants performed well above 
chance level in all conditions (> 70% accuracy). 
 
Probe-2 reaction times 
The MANOVA (2x2x3) for probe-2 latencies revealed a main effect of trial 
type (F(2,72)=10.65, p<0.001) and the ANOVA for the reduced 2x2x2 design 
(without  no-probe-1  trials)  also  revealed  a  main  effect  of  trial  type 
(F(1,36)=9.46,  p<0.004).  This  indicates  that  the  misleading  trials  were  the 
slowest (Table 1).  
 
Table  1:  Reaction  times  for  all  participants  for  resolvable, 
misleading and no probe-1 trial types. 
 
Trial Type  Resolvable  Misleading  No Probe-1 
RT (msec)  1782.021  1896.743  1982.715 
 
Probe-2 accuracy 
The MANOVA (2x2x3) for probe-2 accuracy revealed a main effect of block 
(F(1,36)=5.64, p<0.03) which was indicative of generally less accuracy in the 
misleading block than the resolvable block. The main effect of trial type was 
also significant (F(2,35)=3.53, p <0.04) and indicated the greater accuracy in 
the  no-probe  1  trials  relative  to  the  resolvable  and  misleading  trials. 
Importantly,  the  simple  effect  for  no-probe  1  trials  (baseline)  revealed  no 
significant difference between high- and low-scorers (F(1,36), p<0.5, p>0.48) 
indicating that WM capacity was comparable between groups.  
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Figure  3.  Experiment  1:  Group  (low  vs.  high  checkers)  x  block  (resolvable  vs. 
misleading)  x  trial  type  (resolvable  vs.  misleading)  interaction  plot  for  probe-2 
accuracy. Vertical bars denote standard errors. 
 
Next,  we  removed  the  no-probe-1  trials  to  focus  on  the  more  relevant 
resolvable and misleading trials. The ANOVA for the reduced 2x2x2 design 
revealed a significant 3-way interaction (see fig. 3) for group x block x trial 
type (F(1,36)=4.35, p<0.05). To clarify which conditions generate this complex 
interaction we split the analysis into two more simple 2-way ANOVAs of group 
x block, for resolvable and misleading trials separately (see left and right plots 
in fig. 3). Only the interaction for misleading probe-1 trials (right plot in fig. 3) 
reached significance (F(1,36)=5.98, p<0.02), suggesting that accuracy (on the 
subsequent probe-2) for misleading trials differed significantly between blocks 
and between checking groups. Most interestingly, this difference appears to 
exist only within the misleading block (low checkers: 93.90 vs. high checkers: 
90.79)  supporting  our  strong  hypothesis  that  high  checkers  memory 
performance is more impaired in the misleading compared to the resolvable 
context.  
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Probe-2 confidence 
The  MANOVA  (2x2x3)  for  confidence  in  probe-2  responses  revealed  a 
significant main  effect  of  trial  type  (F(2,35)=8.67, p<0.001)  with  misleading 
probe-1s inducing the least confidence in subsequent probe-2 responses. In 
addition, however, there was a significant 3-way interaction of group x trial 
type  x  block  (F(2,35)=4.16,  p<0.03).  Figure  4  shows  that  high  checkers 
indeed show decreased confidence compared to low checkers, but that this 
difference is not consistent across trial types and blocks, i.e., a quite similar 
pattern is observed for the two groups for resolvable trials in both blocks (left 
in fig. 4) while a more dissimilar pattern is revealed for misleading and no 
probe-1 trials (middle and right in fig. 4).   
 
 
Figure  4.  Experiment  1:  Group  (low  vs.  high  checkers)  x  block  (resolvable  vs. 
misleading)  x  trial  type  (resolvable,  misleading,  or  no  P1)  interaction  plot  for 
confidence  in  probe-2  responses.  The  scale  ranged  from  1  (highly  certain)  to  6 
(highly uncertain), i.e., lower values reflect higher confidence. Vertical bars denote 
standard errors.  
 
The ANOVA for the reduced 2x2x2 design (without no-probe 1 trials) failed to 
reveal  any  significant  results,  suggesting  that  the  MANOVA  results  were 
substantially driven by the difference between misleading and no-probe1 trials 
(see fig. 4 middle and right graphs).  
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Finally we directly compared confidence between resolvable and misleading 
trials for equal frequencies to further understand the role of the misleading 
trials in the significant 3way interaction of the MANOVA. That is, we compared 
the 120 resolvable trials of the resolvable block to the 120 misleading trials of 
the  misleading  block.  “Group”  was  included  as  a  second  factor.  This  2x2 
ANOVA  revealed  a  significant  group  x  trial  type  interaction  (F(1,36)=8.56, 
p<0.006) that is shown in Figure 5. This interaction further substantiates the 
difference in confidence ratings between groups observed for misleading trials 
within the misleading block (middle graph fig. 4), where high checkers had 
less confidence than low checkers.  
Experiment 1: Confidence Interaction Plot for Group x Trial Type
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Figure 5. Experiment 1: Group (low vs. high checkers) x trial type (resolvable trials in 
the resolvable block vs. misleading trials in the misleading block) interaction plot for 
confidence  in  probe-2  responses.  To  re-iterate,  lower  values  reflect  higher 
confidence. Vertical bars denote standard errors. 
 
2.1.3. Discussion of Experiment 1 
We found evidence in reaction time (RT) and confidence ratings (CR) data, 
suggesting  that  our  manipulation  was  successful  in  inducing  checking, 
although  the  WM  task  was  very  easy  (all  conditions  revealed  mean 
accuracies over 90%). This effect was most evident in RTs, where across 
blocks  and  groups  probe-2  responses  were  performed  faster  after  a 
More 
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Confidence  
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resolvable probe-1 than after a misleading probe-1. This effect was supported 
by the confidence ratings, where misleading trials led to lower confidence than 
resolvable  and  no-probe-1  trials.  Furthermore,  high  checkers  had  less 
confidence  than  low  checkers  on  misleading  trials  compared  to  resolvable 
trials when the respective trial types where blocked together. Finally and most 
importantly  we  observed  group  differences  in  performance  accuracy  for 
misleading trials within the mostly misleading block as reflected in a significant 
interaction of group, trial type and block. This suggests that checkers cannot 
easily ignore a misleading cue even if the experimental context emphasizes 
the irrelevance of the cue (i.e., strong hypothesis). Since this is the result with 
the potentially strongest impact on our understanding of compulsive checking 
we  wanted to ensure its reliability. In a replication study we presented the 
misleading block only and focused on the group differences for the misleading 
trials. 
 
2.2. Experiment 2 (replication of Experiment 1) 
2.2.1. Method 
Participants 
40  volunteers  (mean  age  23.88:  14  male,  25  female)  participated  in  this 
second study and a median split of the VOCI scores was used again to obtain 
a group of high (mean = 8.65, SD = 3.70) and a group of low (mean = 1.05, 
SD = 1.18) scorers on the checking scale.  
 
Stimuli and Procedure 
The same stimuli and procedure as in Experiment 1 were employed. The only 
change  was  that  only  the  misleading  block  was  presented  (2/3 misleading 
trials).  
 
2.2.2. Results 
In order to test for a replication of the main finding of Experiment 1 we carried 
out hypothesis driven t-tests to compare probe-2 accuracy for high and low 
checkers. We expected high checkers to show again a lower performance for 
misleading  probe-1  trials,  which  was  supported  by  a  significant  t-test 
(t(1,37)=2.276, p<0.029) (fig. 6). The t-tests for the resolvable and no-probe-1  
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trials  did  not  reach  significance  (both  t(1,37)<0.35, p>0.56),  supporting  the 
notion  that  there  were  no  general  differences  in  WM  capacity.  This  again 
supports  the  strong  hypothesis  which  we  proposed  in  section  1.4.2.  With 
respect to confidence ratings (CR) numerically observed group differences did 
not reach significance (resolvable, misleading, no-probe-1: p>0.28). 
 
Figure  6.  Experiment  2:  Group  comparison  (low  vs.  high  checkers)  for  probe-2 
accuracy on misleading trials only. Vertical bars denote standard errors. 
 
2.2.3. Discussion of Experiment 2 
The accuracy outcome is a clear replication of the main finding in Experiment 
1,  allowing  for  a  convincing  conclusion  that  higher  checking  disposition  is 
related to attenuated performance within the episodic part of WM if misleading 
information is provided. However, in both experiments we used a median split 
to create the two checking groups (low versus high). As a result, the high 
checking  group  in  both  experiments  (Exp  1  =  9.53;  Exp  2  =  8.65)  scored 
below  the  clinical  mean  (15.6)  of  compulsive  checkers  on  the  checking 
subscale  of  the  VOCI  (Thordarson  et  al.,  2004)  making  our  conclusions 
tentative with respect to the clinical population. Therefore, we conducted a 
“meta-comparison” where we compared the extremely high checkers (mean 
score 15.8) to the lowest scorers (0.5) across both experiments. 
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2.3. Extreme Groups Meta-Comparison 
We compared the data of the 10 participants with the highest scores on the 
checking subscale of the VOCI (mean = 15.8, SD = 2.57) to the data of the 10 
lowest scoring participants (mean = 0.5, SD = 0.71) from both experiments. 
Critically, the high group scored in the clinical range for checking according 
the VOCI (Thordarson et al., 2004). Only the data from the misleading block 
were employed for participants drawn from Experiment 1 (n=6) to keep the 
data congruent to Experiment 2. Like in Experiment 2, hypothesis driven t-
tests were conducted. Our strong hypothesis was again supported as only for 
misleading trials did extreme high checkers differ significantly from extreme 
low checkers (t(1,18)=2.289, p<0.034) (see fig. 7). Whereas, the t-tests for the 
resolvable (t(1,18)=0.141, p>0.175) and no-probe 1 (t(1,18)=0.33, p>0.745) 
trials did not reach significance, supporting the notion that the two extreme 
groups  were  comparable  with  respect  to  general  WM  capacity.  Again, 
numerically observed group differences for confidence ratings did not reach 
significance (resolvable, misleading, no-probe-1: p>0.39). 
 
Figure  7.  Extreme  Scorers  Meta-Analysis:  Group  comparison  (extreme  low  vs. 
extreme high checkers) for probe-2 accuracy on misleading trials only. Vertical bars 
denote standard errors. 
 
2.4. General Discussion 
The  aim  of  these  first  experiments  was  to  show  that  internal  WM 
representations, i.e., cross-modal bindings within the EB, can be affected by 
Extreme Comparisons: Extreme Low vs. Extreme 
High Checkers Probe-2 Accuracy for Misleading Trials
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
95 
96 
97 
98 
ACC(%) 
Extreme High  
Checkers
Extreme Low  
Checkers 
    30 
unproductive  checking.  Deteriorated WM  performance  was  expected  to  be 
more  pronounced  in  participants  with  a  high  checking  predisposition.  We 
found  evidence  in  reaction  time  (RT)  and  confidence  ratings  (CR)  data  of 
Experiment 1 suggesting that our manipulation was successful in inducing a 
certain amount of detrimental checking in all participants. This effect was most 
evident in the RTs of Experiment 1 (Table 1), where across groups responses 
on the actual memory test (probe-2) were performed faster after a resolvable 
probe-1 than after a misleading probe-1. This effect was supported by the 
confidence  ratings,  where  misleading  trials  led  to  lower  confidence  than 
resolvable  and  no-probe-1  trials.  Importantly,  this  concurs  with  the  classic 
attention-based  WM  rehearsal  finding  of  Awh  and  Jonides  (2001)  who 
reported slower memory probe RTs when attention was previously directed to 
a  different  location  (mismatch  condition/misleading  trials)  compared  to  the 
same location (match condition/resolvable trials).  
 
Regarding our group hypothesis Experiment 1 revealed less confidence for 
high checkers than low checkers in misleading trials but not in resolvable trials 
(fig.  5).  However,  in  Experiment  2  and  in  the  extreme  groups  meta-
comparison  only  numerical  differences  were  observed,  possibly  suggesting 
(1)  that  the  task  was  too  easy  to  affect  metacognitive  judgments  in  a 
straightforward way or (2) that the method of recording a confidence reduced 
actual between-group differences as participants perhaps responded more to 
end  the  trial  than  to  indicate  their  actual  confidence.  As  a  result,  we  use 
different confidence response measures in latter experiments. That is, group 
differences  were  only  revealed  as  part  of  quite  complex  3-way  and  2-way 
interactions in Experiment 1, which was not possible with the reduced design 
in Experiment 2 and the meta-comparison. Importantly and in agreement with 
previous findings (e.g., Ciesielski et al., 2007; Henseler et al., 2008) we did 
not  observe  general  differences  in  WM  capacity  between  high  and  low 
checkers: performance on resolvable and no probe-1 trials was comparable in 
both experiments as well as in the extreme groups meta-comparison. This 
suggests  that  group  differences  are  not  a  WM  capacity  issue  per  se  - 
especially  with  low  demands  employed  here  and  in  other  research  (e.g., 
Morein-Zamir et al., 2010; Purcell et al., 1998a; van der Wee et al., 2003).  
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According to our group hypothesis regarding probe-2 accuracy, we observed 
differences  in  performance  accuracy  in  Experiment  1  when  irrelevant  but 
misleading probes were maximally concentrated: for misleading trials when 
these trials where highly frequent (misleading block). This crucial finding was 
replicated  in  Experiment  2  and  was  also  revealed  in  the  extreme  group 
comparison  across  experiments  underpinning  the  clinical  relevance  of  our 
findings. This provides a convergence of support for our strong hypothesis 
that  in  misleading  trials  high  checkers’  WM  performance  will  be  poorer 
compared to low checkers.  
 
We  conclude  that  our  experimental  manipulation  resonated  with  personal 
checking dispositions and affected WM representations. It appears that low 
checkers have learned more readily to ignore irresolvable probes especially in 
an  experimental  context  where  such  probes  were  highly  frequent  so  their 
irrelevance became even more obvious (misleading block). In contrast, high 
checkers  might  have  “checked  yet  another  time”  whether  the  probe  letter 
“really” wasn’t anywhere. That is, high scorers appeared to be less able to 
suppress the misleading probes and the associated intrusive thoughts. In turn, 
this  might  have  initiated  repeated  scans  through  WM  to  compare  the 
irresolvable probe with each letter-location binding over and over again. We 
propose that the competition between a strong, visually present letter-stimulus 
and the fragile letter-location bindings in the EB weakens these multimodal 
representations.  This  assertion  is  supported  by  the  simplified  comparison 
theory of Makovski, Sussman and Jiang (2008). In this they suggested that 
exhaustively  comparing  every  probe  item  (i.e.,  misleading  P1)  with  those 
maintained in memory (encoding set: letters in locations) may come at a cost 
to  WM  performance.  Therefore,  repeated  checking  due  to  insufficient 
suppression  of  misleading  information  might  have  therefore  resulted  in 
repeated competition and increasingly weaker bindings. This is in agreement 
with research showing that: (1) checkers (not washers) have impairments in 
memory that are associated with dysfunctional inhibitory control (Omori et al., 
2007),  (2)  urges  to  check  are  mediated  by  the  degree  of  experienced 
intolerance of uncertainty (Rachman & Hodgson, 1980; Tolin et al., 2003) (i.e., 
which  checkers  likely  experienced  when  externally  challenged  by  a  
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misleading letter) and (3) doubt/uncertainty regarding the contents of memory 
will increase the likelihood of covert checking (Alcolado & Radomsky, 2011; 
McNally & Kohlbeck, 1993), which in turn may interfere with the integrity of 
internal representations (Makovski, Sussman, & Jiang, 2008; Nedeljkovic & 
Kyrios, 2007; Radomsky & Alcolado, 2010). This latter point is supported by 
the  established  sensitivity  of  attention-dependent  bindings  of  the  EB  to 
interference.  
 
In Figure 1 we provided our original adaptation of Baddeley’s (2000) model to 
predict  and  interpret  our  findings  of  compulsive  checking.  Thus,  while  we 
originally  proposed  Baddeley’s  (2000)  model  of  WM  in  explanation  of  the 
manner (i.e., executive-memory interaction) and cognitive location (i.e., EB) 
underlying  memory  impairment  in  OCD-checking,  we  now  further  elucidate 
upon  this.  According  to  this  framework  compulsive  checking  could  involve 
three components that together make up a vicious circle.  
 
(1)  Executive dysfunction could result in a lack of suppression of misleading 
information,  which  is  in  strong  agreement  with  the  susceptibility  to 
intrusive thoughts (Bannon, Gonsalvez, & Croft, 2008; Salkovskis, 1999) 
and the general executive dysfunction (Olley et al., 2007; Omori et al., 
2007)  reported  in  clinical  OCD  samples.  The  misleading/intrusive 
information can be internally generated in form of intrusive thoughts (“I 
think  I  left  a  burner  on”)  or  can  be  externally  provided  in  form  of 
challenging questions (“Where was the letter?” or “Are you ABSOLUTELY 
SURE  that  you  turned  all  burners  off?”).  This  explains  domain-specific 
WM deficits because WM performance is only disrupted when the WM 
task requires a component of the central executive that is dysfunctional, 
e.g., does not suppress intrusive information (Dek et al., 2010; Radomsky 
& Alcolado, 2010). If there is no external challenge or the stimulus domain 
does  not  induce  intrusive  thoughts  then  no  performance  deficit  will  be 
observed (Friedman & Miyake, 2004). This point should be considered in 
all WM research that compares OCD performance to typical populations. 
In the case of our experiments we provided an external challenge and we 
observed  the  effects although  the  stimuli  were  not  related  to  individual  
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checking domains. Our considerations might also provide an explanation 
for  the  potential  progression  of  subclinical  checking  towards  clinical. 
Checking  might  be  likely  to  create  conditioned  associations  over  time 
between external or internal challenges of performance (e.g. “Did you/I 
turn the stove off?”) and intrusive thoughts (e.g. “I think I left a burner on”) 
mediated by anxiety (e.g., MacLeod & Mathews, 1991). This would in turn 
incrementally  increase  the  likelihood  of  detrimental  checking  in  this 
specific domain and could lead to self-reinforcement of intrusive thoughts 
(e.g., Hartston & Swerdlow, 1999). 
 
(2)  The  lack  of  suppression  of  misleading  information  in  turn  might  trigger 
repeated  checking of the EB  contents.  In  the  case of our findings,  the 
competition  between  a  visually  present  probe  letter  and  fragile  letter-
location bindings in the EB of WM weakens these bindings the more often 
this competition is repeated. With intrusive thoughts the challenge for the 
bindings  is  generated  within  the  system  itself  and  the  more  often  the 
bindings are reactivated and their veridicality challenged the less reliable 
they will become. Paradoxically, while high-scorers check to improve their 
performance it actually undermines performance by reducing the accuracy 
of the WM representation (Radomsky & Alcolado, 2010). In that sense 
checking  critically  differs  from  mere  rehearsal.  Both  processes  imply 
reactivation  of memory  representations,  yet,  while  rehearsal  reactivates 
“without questioning”, checking seems to imply a lack of confidence in the 
veridicality  of  the  reactivated  information  that  is  detrimental  without  the 
original sensory information to check against, or even with competing new 
sensory information present.  
 
(3)  The  final  component  is  the  consolidation  of  EB  representations  into 
episodic LTM. If the EB representations are progressively weakened by 
checking then the consolidated representations in LTM will be affected as 
well  (Tolin  et  al.,  2001),  thus,  further  increasing  the  likelihood  of 
subsequent checking in LTM that has been shown to decrease accuracy 
and confidence in episodic representations (van den Hout & Kindt, 2003a, 
2003b). Savage et al. (1999; and Deckersbach et al., 2000; Penades et  
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al., 2005; Savage et al., 2000; Segalas et al., 2008) reported intact copy 
but  impaired  immediate  and  delayed  memory  performance  of  OCD 
patients  on  the  Rey-Complex  Figure  Task  (i.e.,  a  complex  visuospatial 
stimulus  requiring  the  organization  and  maintenance  of  multiple 
feature/object-location  bindings).  Preserved  copy  performance  and  no 
additional  loss  of  information  between  the  immediate  and  delayed 
conditions  indicated  that  memory  capacity  did  not  moderate  memory 
performance.  Rather,  a  failure  in  executive  functioning  to  efficiently 
encode visuospatial information during the copy phase mediated impaired 
performance  in  their  immediate  and  delayed  recall.  In  other  words, 
impairment  of  the  visuospatial  organization  and  reconstruction  in  the 
observers’ EB had a direct impact on the amount of information encoded 
and  recalled  immediately  after  construction  and  the  longer  term. 
Furthermore, OCD checkers have exhibited poorer memory confidence for 
threatening  stimuli  that  they  had  been  repeatedly  exposed  to  (akin  to 
repeated  checking)  one  week  earlier  compared  to  non-checking  OCD 
patients (Tolin et al., 2001). A self-awareness of repeated loss of accuracy 
and confidence in memories may finally increase the likelihood and the 
strength of misleading intrusive thoughts which would then be harder to 
ignore (e.g. Hartston & Swerdlow, 1999). High checkers might therefore 
end up in a vicious circle of checking at various stages of memory that 
does not improve but further deteriorates memory traces (Nedeljkovic et 
al., 2009b). The notion proposed here slightly shifts the explanatory focus 
from  retrieval  to  consolidation,  which  has  direct  clinical  relevance.  We 
suggest  that  a  combined  WM  and  LTM  explanation  might  provide  a 
comprehensive  etiological  starting  point  for  the  qualitatively  different 
experience that individuals with checking disorders appear to exhibit in 
their pathological desire to check and their dissatisfaction with it after it 
has been executed.  
 
Therefore, we place executive dysfunction at the heart of high checkers WM 
impairments as opposed to deficits in WM capacity per se.  
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2.4.1. Limitations and future research 
While we argue that our data have added to the checking-memory literature in 
an  important  way  we  have  identified  the  following  limitations  and  future 
avenues of research that have emerged with respect to Experiments 1 and 2.  
Firstly, the use of sub-clinical samples of high checkers may appear to limit 
the  conclusions  that  can  be  made  with  respect  to  clinical  populations. 
However, we argue that the results of our extreme groups meta-comparison 
(clinically scoring versus lowest scoring participants across Exps. 1 and 2) 
substantiates the clinical implications of our findings. Furthermore, the result 
that  even  within  the typical  population  checking  tendencies  impact  on WM 
performance is of importance. For example, subclinical checkers have shown 
similar deficits to those observed in clinical OCD, i.e., the Wisconsin Card 
Sorting  Task  (Gershuny  &  Sher,  1995)  and  the  Wechsler  Memory  Scale 
(Sher, Mann, & Frost, 1984). Further, this same group have shown memory 
deficits  for  everyday  activities  (Sher,  Mann,  &  Frost,  1984),  prospective 
memory impairments (Cuttler & Graf, 2007, 2008, 2009) and were poorer at 
distinguishing real from imagined events (Rubenstein et al., 1993). This has 
lead some researchers to suggest that a subclinical analogue is a valid means 
of understanding a variety of features relevant to clinical OCD, especially as 
they  are  free  from  confounds  such  as  medication,  clinical  state,  or  co-
morbidity (Mataix-Cols et al., 1997; 1999a). Indeed, considering this alongside 
the commonality of checking in OCD (50-80%; (50-80%; Antony, Downie, & 
Swinson, 1998; Henderson & Pollard, 1988; Rasmussen & Eisen, 1988) and 
the population generally (15%; Stein et al., 1997),  subclinical checkers may 
provide  a  ‘purer’  means  for  determining  the  specific  impact  of  executive 
deficits upon WM functioning. Future research, however, should ensure the 
validity  of  our  claims  by  using  a  larger  clinically  scoring  or  a  clinically 
diagnosed  sample.  Also,  if  the  observed  WM  performance  is  specific  to 
pathological checking, then it should differ from performance associated with 
other  obsessive-compulsive  sub-types  (e.g.,  hoarding,  contamination,  cf. 
Abramowitz,  McKay,  &  Taylor,  2005)  and  other  disorders,  i.e.,  generalized 
anxiety disorder, social phobia and depression. Secondly, with respect to the 
probe-1  design  we  did  not  explicitly  manipulate  checking  per  se  but 
hypothesized that high checkers are likely to check the content of WM more  
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often  relative  to  low  checkers  if  irrelevant  but  misleading  information  is 
provided. It could however be that checkers are simply more distracted by an 
irrelevant  probe,  which  reduces  the  attentional  processes  required  for 
rehearsing the encoded information (see Cuttler & Graf, 2007, for a similar 
notion). This does not necessarily imply enhanced checking behaviour per se. 
Nevertheless,  the  detriment  in  memory  performance  of  high  checkers  was 
observed  for  misleading  trials  only,  while  resolvable  and  no-probe-1  trials 
were comparable. This suggests that it was the misleading content and not 
the mere presence of a distracting probe that attenuated WM performance. 
Yet this does not fully rule out the possibility of distraction and future research 
should  directly  manipulate  checking  within  a  WM  paradigm,  which 
unfortunately is not trivial without overly affecting the primary WM task. For 
example,  in  a  delayed-match-to-sample-task  Rotge  et  al.  (2008)  provided 
OCD patients with the opportunity to check and recheck the original encoded-
set to allow verifications with respect to the accuracy of the memory probe. 
They reported that while OCD patients WM performance was intact, they did 
make  more  verifications  and  spent  longer  before  subsequent  checks 
compared to healthy controls. Interestingly, these behavioural patterns were 
more pronounced in checkers. Thus, allowing checkers to physically check 
may  show  that  they  do  in  fact  check  but  it  will  likely  attenuate  WM 
impairments which are sensitive to verifications occurring purely within WM. 
Indeed, we test this very hypothesis in Experiment 5, where we measure the 
eye movements of high and low checkers to examine group differences when 
presented with misleading compared to resolvable probes. In addition, what 
participants were experiencing during the WM task could have been recorded 
in  more  detail  after  the  experimental  procedure.  For  example,  participants 
could have been asked to: (1) rate the degree of uncertainty they felt when 
presented with a misleading compared to a resolvable probe, (2) explain how 
and when they actually check the contents of their memory, and/or (3) what 
different strategies did they employ (if any) for misleading, resolvable and no-
probe-1 trials. This information could have then been independently coded 
and  analysed,  with  the  aim  of  revealing  phenomenological  differences 
between high and low checkers in how they experienced and dealt with a 
misleading compared to resolvable intermediate probes. Thirdly, the use of  
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letters and locations has limited ecological validity with respect to checkers' 
idiographic believe systems and anxieties. The use of ecologically valid stimuli 
within  a  WM  paradigm  might  reveal  even  stronger  effects  than  the  ones 
reported  here  –  especially  if  the  high-checking  group  was  drawn  from  a 
clinical population. This could also shed light on the implications of anxiety 
associated with specific checking domains (e.g. MacLeod & Mathews, 1991). 
This  point  is  addressed  specifically  in  Experiments  7  and  8  by  requiring 
participants to encode and recall electrical kitchen appliances located on a 
kitchen countertop. Finally, the basic WM task employed here was very easy. 
Stronger  group  differences  regarding  the  impact  of  misleading  information 
could be revealed with a harder task (cf. Van der Wee et al., 2003). A point 
specifically addressed in Experiments 3 and 4 presented below.  
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3.  Checkers’  memory  impairments  persist  in  more  complex  working 
memory experiments 
Experiments  3  and  4  are  a  logical  extension  from  the  findings  and 
methodology of Experiments 1 and 2 (Harkin & Kessler, 2009). Whereby, we 
set  out  to  determine  in  more  detail  the  relation  between  WM,  misleading 
information, and checking disposition. Our experimental extensions were two-
fold. Firstly, in  Experiment 3 we increased the complexity of the WM task by 
including a further feature dimension (colour) to test whether a harder task 
would increase the performance difference between high and low checkers 
(i.e., van der Wee et al., 2003). Our reasoning being that in normal subjects, 
inhibitory functioning is impaired when concurrent demands upon the central 
executive are high (Eysenck et al., 2007). For example, Graydon and Eysenck 
(1989)  reported  that  the  negative  effect  of  distracting  stimuli  on  task 
performance increased as a function of greater load within WM. Also Lavie et 
al. (2004) showed that selective attention performance was more negatively 
affected by distracting stimuli when demands upon WM were high but not low. 
Therefore,  as  our  present  experimental  manipulation  (Experiment.  3)  calls 
upon  extra  attentional  resources  –  compared  to  Experiments  1  and  2  – 
interference with this attention may further attenuate memory performance, 
especially in checkers who previously were shown to be poorer at inhibiting a 
misleading intermediate probe. Secondly, in Experiment 4 we challenged the 
fragile letter-location bindings via their “weaker link” by asking which letter had 
been in a specific location, while there either had or had not been a letter. In 
this  case,  locations  were  the  weaker  link  as  they  have  no  permanent 
representations in LTM to aid WM encoding. In contrast, Harkin and Kessler 
(2009)  asked  where  a  specific  letter  had  been,  thus,  accessing  the 
representations via their stronger letter-identity part (stronger because letters 
are stored in LTM). The expectation was that this could further undermine the 
trust  that  high  checkers  have  in  their  memory  representations  resulting  in 
more pronounced group effects.  
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3.1. Experiment 3 
Similar to Harkin and Kessler (Exp. 1 and 2; 2009) the checking manipulation 
consisted of presenting an intermediate probe (between the encoding set and 
the actual memory test) that could be misleading in the sense that it was not 
resolvable. In Experiment 3 (see fig. 8) this probe asked for the colour of a 
letter that was either part of the encoding set, hence resolvable (e.g., What 
colour was Z), or not part of the encoding set, hence irresolvable (e.g. What 
colour  was  K). We  wanted  to  investigate  whether  enhancing  the WM  task 
difficulty  by  adding  colour  as  another  feature  dimension  would  result  in 
stronger  group  effects  with  high  checkers’  performance  being  dramatically 
worse than low checkers’ for misleading/irresolvable trials. Checking induced 
by the misleading information could have an increasingly negative effect the 
more  difficult  the  task  is.  We  were  also  expecting  to  observe  similarly 
enhanced  group  effects  for  confidence,  i.e.,  high  checkers  revealing  less 
confidence in their WM performance than low. 
 
3.1.1. Method 
Participants 
40 Participants (mean 19.55 years; 7 male, 33 female) from the University of 
Glasgow gave written informed consents. British Psychological Society (BPS) 
ethical requirements were met. We used the checking subscale of the VOCI 
(Thordarson et al., 2004) and employed a median split of checking scores to 
obtain two groups: low (mean = 1.74, SD = 1.69) and high (mean = 12.57, SD 
= 5.32) “checkers”.  
 
Stimuli and Procedure 
Participants sat 90cm from a 19’’ computer screen ran at 800x600 resolution 
with their head on a chin rest. Stimuli were capital letters in font Arial, size 18 
and were presented against a black background within a 2 (columns) by 3 
(rows) matrix covering an area of 300x420 pixels. After 1000ms fixation, 4 
letters  were  presented  randomly  in  4  of  the  6  possible  locations  and 
participants had 2000 ms to encode the identity and the location of each letter 
(fig. 8). After 500ms, the probe-1 question asked for the colour of a specific 
letter.  Participants  indicated  the  colour  through  6  colour  coded  keypad  
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responses and were instructed to respond within 4000 ms (to keep the WM 
delay constant). Whether the probe-1 letter had or had not been part of the 
encoded  set  created  the  resolvable  versus  misleading  (irresolvable)  trials. 
Asking for the colour of a letter added to the difficulty of this task, particularly 
in the case of misleading trials. In a baseline condition probe-1 was omitted to 
measure WM performance on the primary task under ideal conditions.   
 
Figure 8. Experiment 3: Schematic procedure of resolvable and misleading trials. A 
set of 4 letters in 6 possible colors were presented randomly in 4 out of 6 possible 
locations had to be encoded within 2 s. Encoding was then followed after 500 ms by 
probe  (probe-1)  asking for the color  of  a  letter  that  was  present  or  not,  i.e.,  was 
resolvable  or  misleading.  Subsequently  participants  had  to  indicate  if the  probe-2 
letter match or mismatched it location with respect to the encoded set, which was the 
actual memory test. Finally confidence in probe-2 response had to be indicated on a 
scale from 1 (highly certain) to 6 (highly uncertain). Further explanations in the text. 
 
A 1000 ms interstimulus interval (ISI) separated probe-1 and probe-2. Since 
baseline trials did not include the intermediate probe-1 a black screen was 
shown for 5500 ms between encoding and probe-2 (equalling the ISI between 
encoding  and  probe-2  on  the  other  trial  types).  Probe-2  was  the  actual 
memory test for each trial and required participants to indicate if a letter was a 
match  or  a  mismatch  in  terms  of  location  with  respect  to  the  originally 
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encoded  set.  It  is  important  to  note  that  we  only  analysed  probe-2 
performance  and  how  it  changed  depending  on  the  various  probe-1 
manipulations. In all trials the probe-2 letter had been part of the encoded set 
in terms of identity while the probe location was a match on 50% of the trials. 
Finally, a scale was displayed prompting participants to indicate their degree 
of confidence in their probe-2 response (6 levels: 1=totally certain to 6=totally 
uncertain). Three self-paced breaks were included and the experiment lasted 
approximately 90 minutes. The resolvable block comprised 180 trials with 120 
resolvable trials, 40 misleading trials, and additional 20 baseline trials (no-
probe-1). Correspondingly, the misleading block (180 trials) was made up of 
40 resolvable trials, 120 misleading trials, and again 20 baseline trials. The 
sequence of these blocks was counterbalanced across participants in order to 
avoid order effects.  
 
Design 
We employed a 2 (group: low vs. high checkers) by 2 (block type: mostly 
resolvable vs. mostly misleading block) by 3 (probe-1 trial type: resolvable, 
misleading, no probe-1) mixed design with group as the between- and block 
and probe-1 as the within-subjects factors.  
 
3.1.2. Results 
MANOVA’s  were  employed  due  to  violations  of  the  sphericity  assumption 
(Mauchly’s tests). Statistics for the 2x2x3 design were carried out for reaction 
times,  accuracy  and  confidence  on  probe-2  responses.  Note  we  only 
analysed performance on probe-2 (depending on the different levels of the 
intermediate probe-1). As our theoretical predictions specifically focused on 
the effect of checking induced by resolvable vs. misleading probe-1 trials we 
also conducted a 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA removing the no-probe-1 trials. 
 
Probe-2 response latencies 
The MANOVA (2 x 2 x 3) for probe-2 latencies failed to reveal any significant 
main effects or interactions.  
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Probe-2 response accuracy 
The  MANOVA  (2  x  2  x  3)  for  probe-2 accuracy  revealed  a  main  effect of 
probe-1  trial-type  (F(2,37)=18.38,  p<0.001).  Further  analyses  revealed  that 
resolvable  and  misleading  probe-1  significantly  differed  from  no-probe-1 
(F(1,38),  p<0.001,  p<0.001,  respectively).  Resolvable  versus  misleading 
probe-1 approached but did not reach significance (F(1,38)=3.0224, p=0.09). 
This  indicates  greater  probe-2  accuracy  for  no-probe-1  trials  compared  to 
misleading  and  resolvable  trials  and  that  there  was  a  trend  toward  less 
accuracy for misleading trials. There was a significant main effect of probe-2. 
Correctly  located  probe-2  trials  where  significantly  less  accurate  than 
incorrectly  located  trials  (74.4%  vs.  88.7%:  F(1,38)=33.33,  p<0.001).  We 
argue that an accurate correct probe-2 response requires the precise memory 
of the probe letter in its original location so that the match between probe and 
memory  exceeds  the  response  threshold.  In  contrast,  incorrectly  located 
probe-2  trials  can  be  accurately  performed  using  incomplete/partial 
information  such  as  overall  letter  locations  and/or  possibly  letter  shape 
information that can quickly generate a mismatch (i.e., round ‘D’ vs. jagged 
‘X’). Especially with a complex task like the one employed here (in contrast to 
Harkin & Kessler, 2009) where several features have to be bound together 
this asymmetry has become obvious in performance.     
Experiment 1: Accuracy Interaction Plot for 
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Figure  9.  Experiment  3:  Group  (low  vs.  high  checkers)  x  probe-2  (correct  vs. 
incorrect) x trial type (resolvable, misleading, no-probe-1) interaction plot for probe-2 
accuracy. Vertical bars denote standard errors.  
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Most  importantly,  there  was  also  a  significant  3-way  interaction  (fig.  9)  for 
group x probe-2 x probe-1 trial type. This interaction was the result of high 
and low checkers having different accuracy for different levels of probe-2 and 
probe-1 trial-type. First, the main effect of probe-2 was apparent in the data 
pattern  in  Figure  9:  accuracy  was  poorer  overall  for  correct  compared  to 
incorrect probe-2 trials. Second, no group differences (low vs. high checkers) 
were  revealed  for  mismatch  probe-2  across  the  three  probe-1  trial  types 
(F(1,38)=  resol:  p=0.12;  misl:  p=0.65;  no-p1:  p=0.27).  This  indicates  that 
group  differences  are  likely  to  reside  in  the  match  probe-2  condition. 
Therefore, we conducted an ANOVA by removing the no-probe-1 trials as no 
significant group differences were revealed, indicating that WM capacity was 
intact. The ANOVA for this reduced design again revealed the significant 3-
way interaction for group x probe-2 x trial type (F(1,38)=7.54, p=0.009). The 
simple interaction for group x probe-1 trial type for correct probe-2 trials was 
significant (F(1,38)=4.95, p=0.032) (left plot fig. 9). To determine which effects 
generated this interaction we analysed the simple effects. The only effect that 
reached  significance  was  the  high  checkers’  performance  on  resolvable 
(73.1%) versus misleading (67.1%) trials (F(1,38)=6.95, p=0.012). The same 
comparison for low checkers failed to reach significance (71.9% vs. 73.4%; 
p=0.58). This supports our hypothesis that high checkers have an executive 
deficit in inhibiting information that is misleading and irrelevant. As a result 
checkers seem to look for the colour of a letter that was actually not presented 
disrupting the ‘true’ information retained in memory.  
 
Probe-2 confidence ratings 
The  MANOVA  (2  x  2  x  3)  for  confidence  on  probe-2  responses  revealed 
significant main effect of probe-1 (F(2,37)=28.415, p<0.001). No-probe-1 trials 
had  the  most  confidence  and  were  statistically  different  from  resolvable 
(F(1,38)=41.99,  p<0.001)  and  misleading  trials  (F(1,38)=51.99,  p<0.001). 
There  was  a  significant  main  effect  of  probe-2  trial  type  (F(1,38)=27.256, 
p<0.001), indicating that there was less confidence for correct probe-2 trials 
versus incorrect. The MANOVA revealed a 3-way interaction for group x block 
x probe-2 that approached significance (F(1,38)=3.88, p=0.056). However, the 
ANOVA  for  the  reduced  design  (removed  no-probe-1  trials)  produced  a  
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significant 3-way interaction (F(1,38)=5.04, p=0.031) (fig. 10a: MANOVA and 
fig. 10b: ANOVA).        
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Figure  10a.  Experiment  3:  MANOVA  for  Group  (low  vs.  high  checkers)  x  block 
(resolvable  vs.  misleading)  x  probe-2  (correct  vs.  incorrect)  interaction  plot  for 
confidence  in  probe-2  responses.  The  scale  ranged  from  1  (highly  certain)  to  6 
(highly uncertain), i.e., the lower value reflect higher confidence. Vertical bars denote 
standard errors. 
 
Experiment 1: ANOVA 
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Figure  10b.  Experiment  3:  ANOVA  for  Group  (low  vs.  high  checkers)  x  block 
(resolvable  vs.  misleading)  x  probe-2  (match  vs.  mismatch)  interaction  plot  for 
confidence  in  probe-2  responses.  The  scale  ranged  from  1  (highly  certain)  to  6 
(highly uncertain), i.e., the lower value reflect higher confidence. Vertical bars denote 
standard errors. 
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There was a tendency to have less confidence in correct than incorrect probe-
2  responses,  a  pattern  that  corresponds  with  poorer  accuracy  in  correct 
versus  incorrect  probe-2  responses.  The  removal  of  no-probe-1  trials 
(ANOVA) increased the magnitude of difference between groups, with high 
checkers  having  poorer  confidence  across  conditions  (block  and  probe-2) 
compared to low. This suggests that for no-probe-1 trials, high checkers have 
comparable confidence to low checkers. 
 
3.1.3. Discussion of Experiment 3 
In conclusion, high checkers’ performance was poorest for misleading trials in 
the correct probe-2 condition. No difference was observed between groups in 
the  easier  incorrect  probe-2  condition,  indicating  that  irrelevant  and 
misleading stimuli capture the attention of high checkers to a greater extent 
than low. This also indicates the capacity differences between groups are not 
responsible for the slight group performance difference in the correctly located 
probe-2  condition.  However,  while  this  pattern  was  not  confined  to  the 
misleading block only, as had been the case in our previous findings (Harkin 
& Kessler, 2009), it was not more pronounced in that the difference between 
the groups was not dramatically enhanced. It would seem that by increasing 
the complexity of the WM task performance drops for everyone by a similar 
amount  with  high  checkers  not  suffering  disproportional  losses  of 
performance.  Confidence  responses,  however,  revealed  that  the  mere 
presence of an intermediate probe (resolvable or misleading) resulted in high 
checkers’ poorer confidence overall, which was not observed as clearly in our 
previous studies. For high checkers, therefore, the presence of an irrelevant 
intermediate  probe  in  a  hard  WM  task  appears  to  affect  confidence  more 
strongly than their actual performance compared to low checkers. 
 
3.2. Experiment 4 
Since  increased  complexity  of  the  WM  task  resulted  in  a  general  drop  in 
performance  without  a  more  accentuated  group  effect  we  employed  an 
alternative strategy. If checking is really detrimental to bindings by inducing a 
competition between incoming perceptual information (misleading probe) and  
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the  fragile  multimodal  bindings  in  the  EB  then  it  could  be  even  more 
detrimental for high checkers if the veridicality of the encoded representations 
was questioned with respect to their ‘weaker link’. In our case the locations 
are the weaker link compared to letters as they do not have a LTM trace that 
could  support  their  retention.  The  prediction  therefore  was  that  we  would 
observe  very  clear  group  effects  with  a  misleading  probe  that  specifically 
challenges the spatial part of the WM representations. 
 
Hence,  for  the  intermediate  probe  (probe-1)  we  asked  which  letter  was 
presented at a particular location while there either had (resolvable) or had 
not  been  a  letter  (misleading)  (see  fig.  11).  We  expected  high  checkers’ 
memory performance to be generally impaired for resolvable and misleading 
conditions. This would support a general executive difficulty in suppressing 
irrelevant  information  (Wolters  and  Raffone,  2008).  Specifically,  the  largest 
impairment was expected for the most difficult (match probe-2) and frustrating 
conditions (misleading trials/block). Intact basic WM capacity is expected in 
baseline no-probe-1 trials. 
 
3.2.1. Method 
Participants 
40 Participants (mean 20.12 years: 10 male, 30 female) from the University of 
Glasgow gave written informed consents. BPS ethical requirements were met. 
A median split of VOCI checking scores was used to obtain two groups: low 
(mean = 0.89, SD = 1.15) and high (mean = 10.48, SD = 5.96) “checkers”.  
 
Stimuli, Procedure, and Design 
This  experiment  used  the  same  encoding  (4  letters  in  6  locations)  and 
memory test (probe-2 correct or incorrect location) as Experiment 1. However, 
in this case the 4 letters were randomly selected from D, F, G, H, J, and K. 
This  served  the  intermediate  probe-1  manipulation.  After  500  ms,  the  2x3 
matrix  was  again  presented,  but  empty,  and  this  time  the  participant  was 
asked to indicate what letter had been at an indicated location. Participants 
selected  the  letter  they  believed  to  be  at  that  location  by  pressing  the 
corresponding  letter-key  on  the  keyboard  and  were  instructed  to  respond  
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within 4000 ms (to keep the WM delay constant). The probe-1 spatial cue 
either indicated a location where a letter had been present (resolvable) or a 
location that had been empty (misleading).  
 
 
Figure 11. Experiment 4: Schematic procedure of resolvable and misleading trials. A 
set of 4 letters presented randomly in 4 out of 6 possible locations had to be encoded 
within 2 s. Encoding was then followed after 500 ms by probe (probe-1) asking what 
letter was at a cued location, where a letter was present or not, i.e., was resolvable or 
misleading.  Subsequently  participants  had  to  indicate  if  the  probe-2  letter  either 
correctly or incorrectly located with respect to the encoded set, which was the actual 
memory test. Finally confidence in probe-2 response had to be indicated on a scale 
from 1 (highly certain) to 6 (highly uncertain). Further explanations in the text. 
  
In a baseline condition probe-1 was omitted to measure WM performance on 
the primary task under ideal conditions. Finally, as in Experiment 3 a scale 
was displayed prompting participants to indicate their degree of confidence in 
their  probe-2  response  (6  levels:  1=totally  certain  to  6=totally  uncertain). 
Three  self-paced  breaks  were  included  and  the  experiment  lasted 
approximately  90  minutes.  The  same  overall  design  as  Experiment  3  was 
employed. 
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3.2.2. Results 
Again full MANOVA (2 x 2 x 3) and reduced ANOVA (2 x 2 x 2) designs were 
employed to analyse, reaction times (RT), accuracy (ACC), and confidence 
(CF).  
 
Probe-2 response latencies 
The MANOVA (2 x 2 x 3) for probe-2 latencies revealed a main effect for 
probe-2  trial  type  (F(1,38)=25.18,  p<0.001)  with  correct  probe-2  responses 
(1969ms)  faster  than  those  that  were  incorrect  (2120ms).  There  was  a 
significant  2-way  interaction  for  block  x  trial-type  (F(2,76)=6.16,  p<0.004). 
Resolvable trials in a resolvable block had a faster RT than misleading trials, 
a pattern that was reversed for misleading trials in the misleading block. This 
suggests that when a trial and a block were congruent then RTs were faster 
than when they were incongruent. In addition, no-probe-1 trials were slower in 
a predominantly misleading block than a resolvable block. This indicates that 
a  misleading  block  increases  decision-making  time  and  block  context  was 
sufficient to influence decision-making time in baseline WM trials.  
 
Probe-2 response accuracy 
The MANOVA (2 x 2 x 3) for probe-2 accuracy revealed a main effect for 
probe-2 (F(1,38)=17.65, p<0.001), with more accurate responses for incorrect 
compared to correct, replicating Experiment 3. The main effect of block was 
significant  (F(1,38)=10.98,  p<0.003),  with  less  accuracy  overall  in  the 
misleading block compared to the resolvable. This matches our expectations 
that  a  misleading  block  is  particularly  distracting  and  attenuates  WM 
performance.  The  main  effect  of  trial-type  was  significant,  and  indicated 
significantly greater accuracy in the no-probe-1 trials compared to resolvable 
and misleading (both comparisons: p<0.001). The absence of this main effect 
in the reduced ANOVA (removal of no-probe-1 trials) supports the impact of 
no-probe-1 trials.  
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Figure 12. Experiment 4: Main Effect of Group (low vs. high checkers) for probe-2 
accuracy. Vertical bars denote standard errors. 
 
Finally and most importantly, the main effect of group reached significance 
(F(1,38)=5.83,  p<0.021)  with  high  checkers  being  less  accurate  than  low 
checkers across all conditions (fig. 12). This group difference was observed 
for resolvable (t(1,38)=5.66, p<0.023) as well as for misleading (t(1,38)=5.53, 
p<0.024)  trials  (fig.  13,  left).  While  the  group  difference  did  not  reach 
significance for the baseline no-probe-1 trials, there was a statistical trend for 
lower performance of high checkers (p=0.092).  
 
Although we found a main effect of group for the first time, which supports the 
claim that our strategy of challenging WM via the ‘weaker spatial link’ was 
indeed more detrimental for high checkers,  we also expected at the same 
time that basic WM capacity in the baseline trials (no-probe-1) would not differ 
between high and low checkers. Hence, we conducted a more specific group 
analysis  for  the  no-probe-1  trials  and  found  that  high  checkers  had 
significantly less accurate no-probe-1 responses in a misleading compared to 
a  resolvable  context  (t(1,38)=14.82,  p<0.001),  a  difference  that  was  not 
observed for low checkers (t(1,38)=2.42, p=0.127) (fig. 13, right). Thus, the 
trend  for  a  group  effect  on  no-probe-1  trials  was  mainly  driven  by  the 
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misleading  context.  Comparable  performance  in  the  resolvable  context 
indicates that, conform to our expectations, high checkers are not impaired in 
WM  capacity  per  se  but  negatively  influenced  by  the  misleading  context. 
However, we are aware of the limitation of conducting post-hoc contrasts in 
the absence of a significant interaction, In defence, we propose that as we 
predicted repetitive checking within a misleading context (strong hypothesis) 
that this carried over onto no-probe- trials, thus we justify the use of these 
exploratory contrasts but highlight their limited statistical robustness. 
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Figure  13.  Experiment  4:  Left  Graph:  Group  (low  vs.  high  checkers)  x  trial-type 
(resolvable,  misleading,  no-probe-1)  interaction  plot  for  probe-2  accuracy.  Right 
Graph: Group (low vs. high checkers) x block-type (resolvable vs. misleading) for no-
probe-1. Star denotes significant difference. Vertical bars denote standard errors. 
 
Probe-2 response confidence ratings 
The MANOVA (2 x 2 x 3) for confidence in probe-2 responses revealed a 
significant  main  effect  of  group  (F(1,38)=4.25,  p<0.05),  with  high  checkers 
having less confidence overall than low checkers (see fig. 14). High checkers 
revealed a lack of confidence that operates irrespective of a specific condition. 
Such  a  general  deficit  was  not  observed  previously,  suggesting  that  an 
intermediate  spatial  probe  was  particularly  detrimental  to  checkers’ 
confidence.  A  significant  main  effect  of  probe-1  trial  type  (F(1,38),  16.10,  
p<0.001)  was  driven  by  the  significant  differences  of  misleading  and 
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Misleading  Resolvable  Misleading  Resolvable  No-Probe-1 
Experiment 4: Accuracy Plot for (1) Group x Probe-1 (left) 
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    51 
resolvable trials compared to no-probe-1 trials. This was further modulated by 
block as indicated by a significant 2-way interaction between block and trial-
type  (F(1,38)=5.45,  p<0.007).  This  interaction  directly  reflected  the  block  x 
trial-type  accuracy  pattern  with  less  confidence  for  conditions  with  less 
accuracy and vice-versa.  
 
Figure  14.  Experiment  4:  Main  Effect  of  Group  (low  vs.  high  checkers)  for 
confidence. Vertical bars denote standard errors. 
 
 
3.2.3. Discussion of Experiment 4 
Experiment  4  revealed  that  high  checkers  had  poorer  accuracy  and  less 
confidence overall. In support of our weaker hypothesis (see Section 1.4.2.) 
high checkers’ memory was generally impaired by the presence of distracting 
spatial information in form of an intermediate probe whether it was resolvable 
or not. Checkers were also significantly poorer at suppressing the cumulative 
effect  of  misleading  spatial  information  (misleading  block)  which  interfered 
with baseline performance (no-probe-1 trials). Reaction time data supported 
this, as a misleading block context was sufficient to increase decision making 
time  also  in  baseline  trials.  A  misleading  block  was,  therefore,  generally 
distracting but especially so for high checkers.  
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3.3. General Discussion 
Overall  the  results  support  and  extend  the  previous  findings  that  checking 
goes hand in hand with a lack of confidence and may lead to attenuated WM 
performance under certain circumstances. This seems to be the case when 
distracting and/or misleading information is presented, which, instead of being 
ignored, seems to induce repeated checking of the encoded memory traces. 
Paradoxically, while high-scorers check to improve their memories it actually 
undermines performance by reducing the accuracy of the WM representation. 
In that sense checking critically differs from mere rehearsal. Both processes 
imply reactivation of memory representations, yet, while rehearsal reactivates 
“without questioning”, checking seems to imply a lack of confidence in the 
veridicality  of  the  reactivated  information  that  is  detrimental  without  the 
original sensory information to check against - especially if competing new 
sensory information is present.  
 
In  Experiment  3  checkers'  memory  was  poorest  in  a  combination  of 
misleading  and  correct  probe-2  trials.  Overall  performance for  both  groups 
was  poorer  for  correct-probe-2  trials,  suggesting  we  may  have  induced  a 
certain degree of checking in all participants by increasing WM task difficulty. 
This is in agreement with MacDonald et al. (1997) who in a very difficult task 
(recall 50 words that were presented for 1sec after 7mins of distractor tasks) 
reported  no  difference  in  recall  proportion  between  checkers  (0.179),  non-
checkers  (0.142)  and  controls  (0.188).  As  indicated  by  the  low  memory 
scores,  in  such  an  experiment  (and  perhaps  ours)  extant  OCD/checkers’ 
executive-memory impairments would need to be extremely acute to impact 
memory  performance  and  significantly  differentiate  them  from  controls. 
However, for checkers, misleading trials were especially disrupting conform to 
our hypotheses. High checkers also had less confidence in their responses, 
indicating a metacognitive deficit that seems to affect WM performance which 
corroborates the findings in Harkin and Kessler (2009). In line with previous 
findings (Ciesielski et al., 2007; Henseler et al., 2008; Harkin & Kessler, 2009) 
there were no group differences on the resolvable and the no-probe-1 trials, 
suggesting that even in a difficult WM task the observed differences between 
high and low checkers on misleading trials were not an issue of WM capacity  
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per  se.  However,  the  group  differences  on  misleading  trials  were  not 
dramatically enhanced compared to the previously reported effects in an easy 
WM task (Harkin & Kessler, 2009). This indicates that high checkers did not 
suffer  disproportionally  from  the  enhanced  task  difficulty,  which  further 
underpins  our  claim  that  checkers  are  not  impaired  at  the  level  of  WM 
capacity per se.  
 
In  Experiment  4  we  challenged  participants  in  a  more  refined  way.  In  this 
case, an intermediate probe questioned participants about a specific location 
which was either resolvable (letter at this location) or misleading (no letter at 
this location). We argue that this challenges the integration of letter-location 
representations through their ‘weakest link’, i.e., spatial location. Considering 
that memory spans are better for word stimuli compared to nonsense word 
stimuli, with the only difference being the availability of words in LTM (Hulme, 
Maughan, & Brown, 1991). We propose that while letters have an existent 
representation in LTM, contributing to retention in WM, spatial locations do 
not, which should make the latter more sensitive to interference affecting this 
dimension across memory, i.e., bindings of locations to letters. Support for 
this can be drawn from the research which has shown impacted verbal-spatial 
(Elsley  &  Parmentier,  2009)  versus  intact  object-feature  binding  (Allen, 
Baddeley, & Hitch, 2006) with concurrent mental load. From this we can infer 
that attention is mobilized to a greater extent when binding occurs across the 
boundaries  of  the  slave  systems  of  WM,  i.e.,  the  visuospatial  sketchpad 
(location)  and  phonological  loop  (letters)  (Elsley  &  Parmentier,  2009).  The 
stimuli  we  present  are  multimodal  which  refers  to  fact  that  different 
components  of  our  stimuli  are  processed  in  different  cortical  streams, 
specifically: the ventral (‘What’) and dorsal (‘Where’) streams for object and 
location representations, respectively (Goodale & Milner, 1992). Therefore, if 
accurate task performance is dependent upon accurate object (‘What’) and 
location  (‘Where’)  information  then  this  will  rely  upon  the  maintenance  of 
accurate object-location conjunctions in what Baddeley had termed the “EB” 
(see Keizer, Colzato, & Hommel, 2008; Olson et al., 2006). Within the WM 
model  of  Baddeley  (2000)  this  suggests  that  information  which  requires 
binding across the ‘What’ and ‘Where’ streams is likely to be more sensitive to  
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interference compared to that which is processed primarily within one stream. 
Thus, due to the lack of location representations in LTM sustained attention is 
required for their accurate maintenance in WM, which in turn makes letter-
location bindings particularly sensitive to interference when challenged at the 
level of location.   
 
This may explain why Experiment 4 was the first to reveal poorer accuracy 
overall for high compared to low checkers in an easy WM task, suggesting in 
line  with  our  weaker  hypothesis  (see  Section  1.4.2.)  that  an  intermediate 
spatial probe was in fact strongly distracting for checkers (fig. 13, left). The 
observed  trend  towards  poorer  performance  for  high  compared  to  low 
checkers in the baseline condition (no-probe-1 trials) is noteworthy (fig. 13, 
left).  We  attribute  this  to  the  cognitive  style  that  checkers  adopt  in  a 
misleading context which they ‘carry-over’ to the processing of baseline trials 
(see  fig.  13,  right).  This  also  fits  the  established  profile  of  clinical 
checking/OCD typified by the inflexibility to shift cognitive processing style in 
the face of changing demands and despite its detriment to performance (e.g., 
Fenger et al., 2005; Omori et al., 2007; Veale et al., 1996). In conclusion, the 
very  clear  group  differences  we  obtained  in  Experiment  4  indicates  that 
checkers  WM  performance  are  susceptible  to  challenges  by  distracting  or 
even misleading information, especially if this challenge is directed towards 
weakly  encoded  information  like  the  episodic  spatio-temporal  context  of 
events that is not supported by LTM concepts.  
 
Together  Experiments  3  and  4  provide  evidence  that  the  episodic  spatio-
temporal  context  is  indeed  the  weaker  link  in  the  EB  representations.  In 
Experiment 3 high-checkers performance is attenuated in the more difficult 
correct  probe-2  condition  which  seems  to  require  exact  letter-location 
information relative to incorrect trials that can be accurately performed using 
partial information only. However, the overall greater difficulty of Experiment 3 
reduced  the  between-group  effects  (c.f.,  MacDonald  et  al.,  1997)  whereas 
accessing  representations  via  spatial  locations  in  Experiment  4  enhanced 
group effects. High-checkers’ questioning of the veridicality of letter-location 
bindings  accessed  via  the  weaker  location  feature  resulted  in  deteriorated  
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overall  performance  (86.6%)  compared  to  the  performance  observed  by 
Harkin and Kessler (2009) with an identical encoding and retrieval task, yet, 
with an identity-cue as probe-1 task (93%). Low-checkers, on the other hand, 
revealed  more  comparable  overall  performance  here  (91.8%)  and  in  the 
original Harkin and Kessler (2009) paper (92.8%). An alternative explanation 
could be that the high checker group in the present Experiment 4 was special. 
However,  this  is  not  the  case:  in  Harkin  and  Kessler  (2009)  Experiment  1 
revealed a mean score of 9.5, Experiment 2 a score of 8.7 and in the extreme 
group comparison the high checkers reached a score of 15.8. The present 
Experiment  3  revealed  a  mean  score  of 12.6,  so  the  score  of 10.5  in  the 
present  Experiment  4  falls  well  within  this  range.  Together  these  points 
support our argument that location – extending to the spatio-temporal context 
in general - is the weaker link in EB bindings compared to letter identity, and 
that  this  weakness  becomes  most  apparent  when  individual  checking 
disposition is high.  
 
3.3.1. Limitations and future research 
Two main limitations of the current experiments should be mentioned. Firstly, 
we did not manipulate checking per se but assume checking is responsible for 
poorer  WM  performance  as  opposed  to  general  distraction  caused  by  an 
intermediate probe. With respect to Experiment 3, however, if distraction was 
causal  then  impairment  would  be  expected  for  resolvable  trials,  whereas 
checkers performance is only attenuated on misleading trials. This allows us 
to argue that misleading trials are special for checkers whereby they check 
and compare it to each letter of the encoding set. General distraction is likely 
to underlie checkers poorer performance in resolvable and misleading trials in 
Experiment 4. However, for checkers misleading trials were particularly salient 
and difficult to shift attention from, suggesting that general distraction is not 
the whole story. Future research should directly manipulate checking within a 
WM paradigm, which is not easy to implement without confounding impact on 
the  complexity  of  primary  WM  task.  Secondly,  as  previously  suggested 
(Experiment 1 and 2) letters and locations have limited ecological validity to 
the specific symptoms of checkers, a criticism we deal with in subsequent 
Experiments 5, 6, 7, and 8.   
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4. Do high checkers’ actually check: An eye movement study. 
The  previous  experiments  have  helped  shed  some  light  on  the  cognitive 
processes which differentiate the WM performance of high from low checkers 
(Harkin & Kessler, 2009, 2011a; Harkin, Rutherford, & Kessler, 2011). In our 
original WM task (Harkin & Kessler, 2009) we employed a simple delayed-
match-to-sample paradigm, where participants had to encode 4 letters and 
their locations and then after a delay recall if one of the letters was correctly or 
incorrectly located. Our novel manipulation  was to present an intermediate 
probe – between encoding and the memory task – which asked participants to 
indicate the location of a letter that was either part (resolvable) or not part 
(misleading)  of  the  encoding  set.  We  found  that  only  high  checkers’  WM 
performance  (correct/incorrect  letter  location  task)  was  impaired  when 
preceded  by  a  misleading  but  not  a  resolvable  trial.  Considering  that  an 
intermediate probe is irrelevant to the performance of the memory test, we 
conclude that checkers are more distracted by a misleading probe as it is not 
part of the encoded set. Checkers either cannot suppress the distractor itself, 
or cannot suppress the urge to check triggered by the misleading distractor 
(cf. Harkin & Kessler, 2009). This is a process which we suggest is perhaps 
driven by impairment in inhibitory functioning specific to the checking but not 
the  washing  subtype  (Omori  et  al.,  2007).  We  propose  that  as  misleading 
trials are special to high checkers they check the contents of WM to verify if a 
misleading letter was present or not. This is consistent with Lind and Boschen 
(2009)  who  reported  that  intolerance  of  uncertainty  (i.e.,  raised  by  a 
misleading probe) mediated the propensity to check . However, as observed 
in the research discussed above (Radomsky & Alcolado, 2010), checking only 
serves  to  impair  the  veridicality  of  the  contents  of  WM  which  occurs,  we 
suggest, at the level of letter-location bindings maintained in the EB of WM  
(Baddeley, 2000).  
 
While  we  provided  a  more  precise  characterisation  of  the  relationship 
between inhibitory dysfunction and episodic short-term memory in checkers, 
we were aware that our conclusions were somewhat limited. Specifically, we 
could  not  determine  with  certainty  whether  the  presence  of  a  misleading 
probe  indeed  differentiated  the  manner  in  which  high  and  low  checkers  
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scanned the contents of their WM. Therefore, the present study addressed 
this  question  by  comparing  eye  movements  of  high  and  low  checkers 
specifically  during  the  presentation  of  the  misleading  distractors.  .While 
previously we had placed a time-constraint of 4000ms on the responses to the 
misleading distracters (henceforth called  ‘Probe-1’) (Harkin & Kessler, 2009) 
we  now  provided  participants  with  unlimited  time  to  make  their  Probe-1 
response (see fig. 15). We hypothesised that high checker’s responses would 
be slow, which would also allow us to investigate in detail their eye movement 
patterns  in  contrast  to  low  checking  controls.  Rotge  et  al.  (2008)  indeed 
reported that  OCD checkers took longer than OCD non-checkers for verifying 
WM probes. They concluded that increased response time for ‘choice making’ 
represented  the  degree  of  uncertainty  and  doubt  that  checkers had  at  the 
moment  of  choice.  Unsurprisingly,  in  trials  where  checkers  had  longer 
response  times  this  lead  to  more  overt  repetitive  checking  behaviors,  i.e., 
uncertainty motivated checking (Lind & Boschen, 2009; Tolin et al., 2003). 
Accordingly  we  expected  to  find  eye  movement  patterns  in  our  study  that 
would reflect the internal (i.e. mental) checking behaviours of high checkers. 
This  would  confirm  our  conclusion  based  on  our  previous  research  that 
misleading distractors triggered repeated mental checking of WM contents in 
high checkers only.  
 
Thus,  measuring  eye  movements  in  our  WM  task  (fig.  15)  allowed  us  to 
answer our own outstanding research question and to add substantially to the 
existing OCD eye movement research which has revealed mixed results at 
best (for reviews see Gooding & Basso, 2008; Jaafari et al., 2011; Sweeney, 
Levy,  &  Harris,  2002).  For  example,  in  a  recent  review  of  thirty-three  eye 
movement  studies  Jaafari  et  al.  (2011)  reported  that  OCD  patients  were 
characterised  only  by  rather  unspecific  deficits  in  form  of  smooth  pursuit 
impairments  and  longer  response  latencies  in  anti-saccade  tasks.  The 
majority  of  these  studies  concentrated  purely  on  the  functionality  of  the 
oculomotor system bearing little information on the cognitive and emotional 
deficits  in  compulsive  checking.  No  emphasis  has  been  put  so far  on  eye 
movements  during  more  complex  cognitive  or  memory  tasks,  thus,  the 
present study was likely to make a substantial contribution in this respect.   
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Figure 15. Schematic representation of Periods 1-5 for resolvable and misleading 
trials:  (1)  Period  1:  encoding  set  of  4  letters  presented  randomly  in  6  possible 
locations (2000ms), (2) Period 2: delay period (2000ms), (3) Period 3: probe letter 
(Probe-1) which was either part (resolvable = T) or not part (misleading = K) of the 
encoded  set,  (4)  Period  4:  probe  letter  (Probe-2)  which  was  wither  correctly  or 
incorrectly located with respect to the encoded set, which was actually the memory 
task, and (5) Period 5: confidence in the memory task was then indicated using a 
confidence and not confident response. The eye and/or behavioural measurements 
recorded and analysed in each period are also provided. Further explanations in the 
text. 
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Specifically, it has been argued that eye movements reflect both attention and 
rehearsal within WM making it a valid measure of differences in executive 
function between high and low checkers in the present study (for review see 
Theeuwes, Belopolsky, & Olivers, 2009). For example, it has been repeatedly 
observed  that  participants  tend  to  fixate  on  the  previous  location  of  an 
encoded item during delay, indicating that the contents of short-term memory 
guide attention which in turn guides eye movements (Altmann, 2004; Deubel 
&  Schneider,  1996;  Olivers,  Meijer,  &  Theeuwes,  2006).  An  assertion 
corroborated  by  Theeuwes,  Belopolsky  and  Olivers  (2009)  who  suggested 
that  attention  always  precedes  an  eye  movement,  and  that  attention  may 
serve as the vehicle by which information is stored in WM (Dehaene et al., 
2006; Dehaene, Sergent, & Changeux, 2003; B. K. Schmidt et al., 2002).  
 
In the present study we divided our WM task (see fig. 15) into three ‘periods of 
interest’  during  which  we  recorded  eye  movements.  We  concentrated  our 
analysis on number and duration of fixations, which were most likely to reflect 
internal checking behaviours, i.e., more and longer fixations reflecting internal 
checking. Period 1 was the 2000ms encoding period, where 4 letters were 
presented in 6 possible locations. Period 2 was the 2000ms delay period after 
encoding  and  before  the  presentation  of  the  intermediate  (resolvable  or 
misleading)  Probe-1.  Accordingly,  Period  3  refers  to  the  presentation  of  a 
resolvable or misleading intermediate Probe-1 trial. As shown in Figure 15, 
the  employed  WM  task  included  two  further  Periods,  referring  to  Probe  2 
presentation  and  indication  of  confidence,  respectively.  However,  eye 
movements were not recorded during these periods, hence, only behavioural 
data will be reported for each period (response times, accuracy and response 
confidence, respectively). 
 
It was an open question whether we would observe group differences in eye 
movements during Periods 1 or 2. Either checking as a cognitive style could 
already take place during encoding and during the undisturbed delay period, 
or  checkers  might  not  differ  from  non-checkers  unless  their  executive 
attention  deficit  was  explicitly  triggered  by  a  misleading  probe.  Conform  to 
previously  reported  findings,  the  latter  was  likely  under  conditions  of  low  
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memory load as employed here (Boldrini et al., 2005; Ciesielski et al., 2007; 
Harkin & Kessler, 2009, , 2011a; Henseler et al., 2008; Morein-Zamir et al., 
2010; Moritz et al., 2003; Purcell et al., 1998a, , 1998b; van der Wee et al., 
2003;  Zielinski,  Taylor,  &  Juzwin,  1991;  Zitterl  et  al.,  2001).  However,  in 
Period 3 we expected high checkers to make more and longer fixations in 
misleading compared to resolvable trials, as misleading trials specifically tap 
into the inhibitory impairments of high- but not of low checkers (see Harkin & 
Kessler,  2009)  fuelling  their  urge  to  overcome  uncertainty  by  means  of 
excessive  checking  (Veale  et  al.,  1996).  We  therefore  also  expected  high 
checkers  to  have  slower  response  times  on  Probe-1s  in  misleading  trials 
compared to low checkers. In contrast, for resolvable trials we did not expect 
to  observe  group  differences  for  eye  movements  or  response  times  if  our 
hypothesis was correct that the executive impairments of high checkers had 
to  be  specifically  triggered  by  a  misleading  Probe-1  (Omori  et  al.,  2007; 
Harkin & Kessler, 2009, 2011a, 2011b; Harkin, Rutherford, Kessler, 2011).  
 
Taking these arguments to a finer level of analysis we expected to observe 
that on misleading trials high checkers will spend longer examining the six 
locations  of  the  encoding  set  matrix  and  specifically  empty  encoded  set 
locations, in comparison to low checkers and resolvable trials. If supported, 
this  will  provide  an  exact  indication  that  checkers’  executive  impairments 
result  in  them  accessing  the  encoded  set  matrix  as  a  whole  and  that 
specifically  they  spend  longer  perseverating  on  empty  locations  where  no 
letter had been presented at all.   
 
Confirmation  of  these  hypotheses  will  provide  evidence  that  checkers’ 
inhibitory impairments do in fact lead them to check the contents of WM in a 
manner  which  is  unnecessary  (specifically  in  misleading  trials)  and 
uninformative  (empty  locations).  Checking  uninformative  locations  would 
require additional time and resources, possibly affecting -or at least delaying 
behavioural performance. 
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4.1. Experiment 5 
4.1.1. Method 
Participants 
35 student participants (mean 20.8 years: 18 males, 17 females) from the 
University of Glasgow gave written informed consents. British Psychological 
Society ethical requirements were met, including that of participant debriefing. 
The Vancouver Obsessional Compulsive Inventory (VOCI; Thordarson et al., 
2004)  was  employed  to  evaluate  all  participants  regarding  their  checking 
tendencies. The VOCI is a 55 item, self-report questionnaire for assessing the 
severity  of  OCD  symptoms.  Conform  to  our  previous  research  (Harkin  & 
Kessler,  2009,  2011a;  Harkin,  Rutherford  &  Kessler,  2011),  the  checking 
subscale was used in the present study to created obtain two groups: 17 low 
(mean: 0.71, SD: 0.92) and 18 high (mean: 12.67, SD: 5.78) ‘‘checkers’’. 
 
Eye Tracking 
Eye movements were recorded at a sampling rate of 1000 Hz with the SR 
Research Desktop-Mount EyeLink 2K eyetracker (with a chin/forehead-rest), 
which has an average gaze position error of about 0.25° , a spatial resolution 
of 0.01°  and a linear output over the range of the monitor used. Only the 
dominant eye of each participant was tracked although viewing was binocular. 
The experiment was implemented with E-prime®. Calibrations of eye fixations 
were conducted at the beginning of the experiment using a nine-point fixation 
procedure as implemented in the EyeLink API (c.f. EyeLink II User Manual: 
SR.Research.Ltd,  2002)  and  using  E-prime®  software.  Calibration  was 
validated with the EyeLink software and repeated when necessary until the 
optimal  calibration  criterion  was  reached.  At  the  beginning  of  each  trial, 
participants  were  instructed  to  fixate  a  dot  at  the  centre  of  the  screen  to 
perform  a  drift  correction.  If  the  drift  correction  was  more  than  1° ,  a  new 
calibration was launched to insure optimal recording quality. 
 
Procedure 
Participants sat 60cm from a 19’’ computer screen ran at 800x600 resolution 
with their head on a chin rest. Stimuli were capital letters in font Arial, size 18 
and  were  presented against  a  grey  background  within  a  2  (columns) by  3  
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(rows) matrix covering an area of 300x420 pixels, subtending 11.5 degrees 
horizontally of visual angle and  13.3 of visual angle vertically. After 1000 ms 
fixation, 4 letters were presented randomly in 4 of the 6 possible locations and 
participants had 2000 ms to encode the identity and the location of each letter 
(fig.  15).  After  2000  ms,  the  probe-1  question  requested  the  location  of  a 
specific letter which had been either part (hence, resolvable) or not (hence, 
misleading) of the encoded set. Participants indicated the location through a 
2x3 spatially mapped keypad and responded in their own time. Participants 
could ‘skip’ the intermediate probe by pressing the ‘0’ button on the number 
pad with their most dominant thumb at any time. This provided reaction times 
and ‘skip’ percentages specific to the termination of resolvable and misleading 
Probe-1 trials which we could then analyse statistically (see fig. 15, Period 3). 
This  differed  from  the  original  Harkin  and  Kessler  (2009)  procedure  which 
limited  the  probe-1  response  period  to  4000  ms.  In  a  baseline  condition 
probe-1 was omitted to measure WM performance on the primary task under 
ideal conditions. A 1000 ms interstimulus interval (ISI) separated probe-1 and 
probe-2. Since baseline trials did not include the intermediate probe-1 a grey 
screen was shown for 5000 ms between encoding and probe-2. Probe-2 was 
the actual memory test for each trial and required participants to indicate if a 
letter was correctly located with respect to the originally encoded set. In all 
trials the probe-2 letter had been part of the encoded set in terms of identity 
while the probe location was correct only on 50% of the trials. Finally, through 
a  binary  response option  participants  were  then prompted  to  indicate  their 
degree  of  confidence in  their probe-2  response  (1  =  confident  vs.  2  =  not 
confident). There were 190 trials in total, 10 of which (at the beginning) we 
practice  trials  including  resolvable  and  no-probe-1  trials  only.  The  main 
experiment  was  then  done  in  two  blocks  (with  5min  rest  period  between), 
each  comprising  of  60  misleading,  20  resolvable,  and  10  no-probe-1  trials 
presented  in  random  order.  This  asymmetric  trial  type  distribution  was 
adopted from Kessler and Harkin (2009). 
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4.1.2. Results 
Breakdown of individual Periods (1-5) 
We present our data analyses (eye movement and/or behavioural responses) 
in the same sequence in which the participant viewed and/or responded to 
each aspect of the experiment: Period 1 (encoding), Period 2 (2000ms delay), 
Period 3 (Probe-1), Period 4 (Probe-2) and Period 5 (confidence). We focused 
our  eye  movement  recordings  on  Periods  1,  2  and  3  as  these  were  the 
intervals of interest specifically related to our group hypotheses. 
 
Period 1: 2000ms encoding set presentation 
Independent-samples  t-tests  revealed  that  low  and  high  checkers  did  not 
statistically  differ  in  terms  of  fixation  durations  (t=1.32,  df=33,  p=0.19)  or 
number  of  fixations  (t=0.87,  df=33,  p=0.39)  they  made  during  the  2000ms 
presentation  period  of  the  encoding  set  (Period  1).  Conform  to  our 
expectations high and low checkers do not differ in their allocation of attention 
during early encoding.  
 
Period 2: 2000ms delay period 
Independent-samples  t-tests  revealed  that  low  and  high  checkers  did  not 
statistically differ in terms of fixations durations (t=1.76, df=33, p=0.088) or 
number  of  fixations  (t=1.71,  df=33,  p=0.09)  they  made  during  the  2000ms 
delay (Period 2) between the encoding set and intermediate Probe-1.  
 
Period 2b: 5000ms extended delay in no-probe-1 trials 
We conducted separate independent sample t-tests for no-probe-1 trials, due 
to them having a longer 5000ms delay period. In terms of fixation duration 
there was no statistical difference between low and high checkers (t=1.46, 
df=33,  p=0.16).  However,  we  did  find  that  high  checkers  (9.08)  made 
significantly less fixations than low checkers (10.97) (t=2.12, df=33, p=0.04). 
While this finding is surprising it actually serves to highlight the abnormality of 
high  checkers’  making  more  fixations  during  misleading  trials  in  our 
subsequent Period 3 analysis.  
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Period 3: misleading and resolvable intermediate Probe-1 
Response Times (RT) 
A two (Group: low checkers vs. high checkers) by two (trial-type: resolvable 
vs. misleading) mixed design was used with group as the between- and trial-
type as the within-subjects factors. There was a main effect for Trial-Type 
(F(1,33)=51.123,  p<0.000),  with  slower  RTs  for  resolvable  (2240.9ms) 
compared  to  misleading  (1807.7ms)  trials.  Critically,  there  was  a  Group  x 
Trial-Type  interaction  (F(1,33)=6.065,  p<0.02).  Analysis  of  the  simple 
comparisons revealed that there was no significant group difference in RTs for 
resolvable trials (LC = 2196.4ms vs. HC = 2285.5ms: F(1,33)=0.308, p=0.58), 
compared  to  a  significant  group  difference  for  misleading  trials  (LC  = 
1613.9ms  vs.  HC  =  2001.4ms:  F(1,33)=4.871,  p<0.04)  (see  fig.  16).  This 
suggests  that  both  low  and  high  checkers match a  resolvable  probe  to  its 
location within the encoded set. In contrast, on misleading trials, only high 
checkers appear to ‘check’ if a misleading probe “really” was there, whereas 
low  checkers  quickly  dismiss  it  and  quickly  terminate  the  presentation  of 
misleading probes. Critically, there was no difference between low and high 
checkers in their percentage of ‘Skip’ responses (LC: 97.9% vs. HC: 96.9%; 
p=0.28) on misleading trials. This indicates that despite high checkers taking 
longer to confirm that a misleading probe is absent they do so at the same 
ceiling level as low checkers.  
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Figure 16. Probe-1 RTs for Group (Low checkers vs. High checkers) for Trial-Type 
(resolvable and misleading).  
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Eye Measurements 
Period  3  is  the  most  critical  of  our  three  analyses,  specifically,  as  high 
checkers  had  slower  Probe-1  RTs  for  misleading  trials  (compared  to  low 
checkers; see Fig. 15). We expected that in Period 3 high checkers would 
also engage in more and longer fixations in misleading trials relative to low 
checkers. We employed a two (Group: low checkers vs. high checkers) by two 
(trial-type: resolvable vs. misleading) mixed design was used with group as 
the between- and trial-type as the within-subjects factors. Thus, we conducted 
a  2  x  2  ANOVA  design  for  fixation  duration  and  number  of  fixations 
separately. For fixation duration a main effect of Trial-Type (F(1,33)=71.98, 
p<0.000)  was  observed,  reflecting  shorter  fixation  durations  on  average  in 
misleading  (226.5ms)  compared  to  resolvable  trials  (250.5ms).  No  effects 
involving group reached significance (all p<0.17).  
 
For  the  number  of  fixations  a  main  effect  of  Trial-Type  (F(1,33)=10.19, 
p<0.004)  was  again  observed,  reflecting  fewer  fixations  in  misleading  (6) 
compared to resolvable trials (6.6). However, a significant Group x Trial-Type 
interaction (F(1,33)=5.69, p<0.023) was also observed. Most importantly, this 
was  the  result  of  high  checkers  executing  significantly  more fixations  (6.6) 
than low checkers (5.4) in misleading trials (F(1,33)=4.795, p<0.04), a pattern 
that was not present on resolvable trials (HC: 6.7 vs. LC: 6.5: F(1,33)=0.305, 
p=0.59) (see fig. 17). Thus, low checkers mirrored the previous interaction for 
Trial-Type  (less  fixations  for  misleading  compared  to  resolvable  trials), 
whereas  high  checkers  did  not.  Furthermore,  considering  that  misleading 
trials are the most common trial-type presented (66%) this did not result in 
high checkers having carry-over effects (i.e., based on expectations) which 
inflated eye movements during encoding (Period 1), maintenance (Period 2) 
or  for  resolvable  Probe-1s  (Period  3).  This  highlights  the  methodological 
relevance of measuring eye movements during Periods 1 and 2 and allows us 
to argue that high checkers do not seem to develop trial expectations (i.e., 
based upon the majority of trials being misleading) which influence how they 
either encode (Period 1) or maintain (Period 2) letters and their locations.  
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Fixations in encoding locations in Period 3 
Consistent with our first hypothesis, we had observed that during Period 3 
high checkers made more fixations during misleading trials compared to low 
checkers (see fig. 17). However, as these fixations were calculated from all 
possible screen locations of a misleading (and resolvable) probe, we cannot 
determine with certainty that high checkers actually access the encoded set or 
if they perhaps made more fixations to the Probe-1 prompt (misleading trials: 
“Where was K?”; fig. 15) relative to low checkers. 
 
Figure 17. Fixation number for Group x Trial-Type interaction plot. 
 
 
Based on our finer-grained hypotheses we expected that when presented with 
a  misleading  probe  high  checkers  examined  the  matrix  of  six  locations 
presented empty during Period 3 (see fig. 15). We further expected that they 
particularly perseverated on empty locations compared to low checkers and 
that these checking-related patterns would be observed in misleading but not 
in resolvable trials. This would provide evidence that,  when confronted with a 
misleading  letter  probe,  checkers  experience  a  particularly  high  degree  of 
uncertainty  regarding  the  presence  or  absence  of  the  probe,  which  they  
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attempt to negate by checking all locations even those where no letter had 
been  presented.  To  this  end,  we  re-coded  the  matrix  of  six  locations  - 
presented empty during Period 3 (see fig. 15) - according to their contents 
during encoding (Period 1). Specifically, we determined whether a particular 
location  had  contained  1)  the  target  (resolvable  trials  only),  2)  any  letter 
(resolvable and misleading trials) or 3) whether a location had been empty 
(see fig. 18). With this information we could then determine where participants 
specifically looked during Period 3, in terms of the ‘correct’ contents of WM, 
despite  the  2  x  3  matrix  being  empty.  In  concordance  with  our  re-coded 
locations we multiplied number of fixations by fixation duration to provide a 
“total fixation time” (TFT) on (1) target locations (resolvable trials only), (2) 
non-target letter locations, and (3) empty locations.  
  
Results for TFT 
For comparing misleading and resolvable trials we focused on total fixation 
time (TFT) measures for empty and non-target letter locations only (there was 
no  target  location  in  misleading  trials).  We    calculated  a  2  (Group:  high 
checkers  vs.  low  checkers)  x  2  (Trial-Type:  misleading,  resolvable)  x  2 
(Encoded Set Content: empty, letter) ANOVA, with Group as a between- and 
Trial-Type  and  Encoded  Set  Content  as  the  within-subjects  factors.  The 
number  of  fixations  and  fixation  duration  values  for  low  (LC)  and  high 
checkers (HC) which were combined to create the TFT values are provided in 
Table  2.  It  is  important  to  note  that  these  values  are  smaller  than  those 
previously reported in Figure 17 as we now focused our analysis on the six 
matrix locations as opposed to the whole intermediate probe screen (incl. the 
probe sentence “Where was K?”; see fig. 15).  
 
A significant group effect (F(1,33)=5.85, p<0.022) revealed that high checkers 
(443.8ms) spent longer overall looking at the locations (empty and letter) of 
the encoded set matrix compared to low checkers (315.2ms). The Group x 
Trial-Type  interaction  approached  significance  (F(1,33)=3.75,  p=0.06). 
Consistent with our hypothesis, this was driven by high checkers revealing 
significantly  longer  TFT  measures  in  misleading  trials  compared  to  low  
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checkers  (F(1,33)=7.62,  p<0.01),  whereas  no  group  differences  were 
observed in resolvable trials (F(1,33)=2.29, p=0.14). Critically, this supports 
our previous Group x Trial-Type interaction presented in Figure 17 and shows 
that when presented with a misleading probe high checkers access the six 
encoded set locations to a greater extent (TFT) than low checkers. 
 
Figure  18.  Breakdown  of  Period  3  analysis  for  resolvable  (top)  and  misleading 
(bottom) trials in terms of encoding set contents presented in Period 1.  
 
As we were interested in TFT at empty locations we conducted a 2 (Group: 
high  checkers  vs.  low  checkers)  x  2  (Trial-Type:  misleading,  resolvable) 
ANOVA. There was a marginal Group x Trial-Type interaction (F(1,33)=3.75, 
p=0.063)  (see  fig.  19;  left  plot).  Analysis  of  the  simple  group  comparisons 
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revealed  that,  in  comparison  to  low  checkers,  high  checkers  had  a 
significantly  longer  TFT  in  misleading  (LC:  493.3ms  vs.  HC:  732.7ms; 
F(1,33)=6.09, p<0.019) but not resolvable trials (F(1,33)=0.77, p<0.39). Thus, 
high checkers spent 239.4ms longer looking at empty locations relative to low 
checkers. This suggests that checkers’ inhibitory impairments for misleading 
trials result in them checking locations where no task-relevant information is 
present  and  may  reflect  an  attempt  to  negate  uncertainty,  i.e.,  “Was  that 
(misleading) letter there, I will check every possible location to be sure.” Also 
within group effects revealed that high checkers had a significantly larger TFT 
(F(1,33)=14.27,  p<0.0007)  on  misleading  compared  to  resolvable  trials,  a 
pattern not present on low checkers (F(1,33)=0.97, p<0.34). Importantly, there 
were no group effects for letter locations (see fig. 19; right plot) suggesting 
that the Group x Trial-Type interaction in the 3 way ANOVA was driven by 
high checkers perseverating on empty locations.  
 
 
 
Figure  19.  Group  (Low  Checker  vs.  High  Checker)  x  Trial-Type  (Resolvable, 
Misleading) x Encoding Set Content (Empty; left plot, Letter; right plot) Total Fixation 
Time (number of fixations x fixation duration = TFT) interaction plot for Period 3. 
Please note that * denotes p<0.0001 significance level and ** p<0.019. There were 
no other significant effects between or within the high and low checking groups. 
* 
**  
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Table 2. Number of Fixations and Fixation Durations (mean/stdev) for low (LC) and 
high checkers (HC) which were combined to create the Total Fixation Time (TFT) 
values  at  specific  encoding  content  locations  (see  interaction  plot  in  fig.  19).  For 
resolvable and misleading trials alike this included empty (E) and letter (L) locations, 
and specifically for resolvable trials a Probe-1 target letter location (T).  
Measure  Number of Fixations  Fixation Durations 
Trial-Type  Resolvable  Misleading  Resolvable  Misleading 
Encoding 
Content  E  L  T  E  L  E  L  T  E  L 
Mean  1.36  0.86  2.15  1.49  0.85  292.54  186.32  584.14  313.54  176.96  LC 
Std  0.50  0.20  0.52  0.41  0.20  97.66  56.70  207.68  79.33  66.55 
Mean  1.45  0.95  1.98  1.74  1.03  344.90  221.24  656.04  403.34  223.78  HC 
Std  0.41  0.33  0.79  0.43  0.45 
 
91.78  97.45  236.69  94.54  115.40 
 
 
Finally, high and low checkers did not significantly differ (p=0.64) in TFT to 
correct Probe-1 target-letter locations (resolvable trials only). This highlights 
that  high  checkers  are  not  impaired  in  their  ability  to  accurately  locate  an 
actual target letter based on their WM representations. Overall, on misleading 
trials high checkers focus significantly more on the six encoding set locations 
as a whole, and specifically longer at empty locations in comparison to low 
checkers and resolvable trials. 
 
Periods 4: (Probe-2 response times and accuracy  
A two (Group: low checkers vs. high checkers) by three (trial-type: resolvable, 
misleading,  no-probe1)  by  two  (probe-2  location:  correct,  incorrect)  mixed 
design  was  used  with  group  as  the  between-  and  trial-type  and  probe-2 
location as the within-subjects factors. Thus, ANOVAs for a 2 x 3 x 2 design 
were carried out on Probe-2 reaction times and accuracy. 
 
Response Times (RT) 
A main effect of Trial-Type (F(2,66)=11.20, p<0.000), reflected faster RTs for 
misleading (1896.8ms) compared to resolvable (2130.8ms) and no-probe-1 
trials  (2153.9ms).  Critically,  the  reaction  time  pattern  for  misleading  and 
resolvable  trials  was  reversed  to  that  which  we  observed  in  our  original 
experiment  (Misl:  1896.7ms  vs.  Resol:  1782ms;  Harkin  &  Kessler,  2009). 
Therefore, the between-experiment difference exists for resolvable trials.  We 
suggest  that  the  self-  versus  automatic-termination  of  the  preceding 
intermediate  Probe-1  in  our  present  and  original  experiment  (respectively) 
likely explains this. In the present experiment, participants had to provide the  
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actual location (i.e., corresponding button response within 2x3 matrix) of a 
resolvable Probe-1 letter. This deliberate response process was observed in 
significantly  slower  reaction  times  for  resolvable  compared  to  misleading 
Probe-1 responses, a pattern which appears to have carried-over into slower 
Probe-2 reaction times in the resolvable condition. In contrast, in the previous 
experiment, participants did not have to exogenously or endogenously locate 
a resolvable Probe-1 letter (i.e., it was up to them but the task did not demand 
it)  which  was  then  reflected  in  their  faster  (relative  to  current  experiment) 
Probe-2  responding  in  the  resolvable  condition.  A  main  effect  for  Probe-2 
Location (F(1,33)=70.39, p<0.000) revealed that RTs were overall faster for a 
correctly located (1919.5ms) compared to an incorrectly located (2183.5ms) 
letter.  There  was  a  significant  Group  x  Trial-Type  x  Probe-2  Location 
interaction, which was driven by different between-group response patterns in 
the correct and incorrect Probe-2 conditions. Specifically, the only between-
group  (LC  vs.  HC)  comparison  to  statistically  differ  in  the  correct  probe-2 
condition was for no-probe-1 trials (F(1,33)=4.77, p<0.004), whereas in the 
incorrect  probe-2  condition  the  group  difference  was  only  present  for 
misleading trials (F(1,33)=4.96, p<0.03).  
 
Accuracy (ACC) 
No main effects or interactions with or without group reached significance, the 
absence of group effects support our expectations. We suggest that allowing 
participants  to  self-terminate  the  presentation  of  the  intermediate  Probe-1 
allowed high checkers to compensate for existing executive impairments. This 
we  argued  possibly  removed  high  checkers’  WM  impairments  specific  to 
misleading  trials  which  we  previously  observed  when  Probe-1  terminated 
automatically (see Harkin & Kessler, 2009).  
 
Period 5: Confidence Responses (CR) 
Confidence (CR) was calculated as the individual percentage of responses 
(per  trial  type)  indicating  that  the  participant  was  not  confident  that  their 
response with respect to Probe-2 had been correct. CR data were subject to 
the same design and 2 x 3 x 2 ANOVA that were carried out in Period 5. A 
main effect for Trial-Type (F(2,62)=34.6, p<0.000) reflected less confidence  
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overall for misleading trials compared to resolvable (F(1,31) = 22.77, p<0.000) 
and  no-probe-1  trials  (F(1,31)  =  43.2,  p<0.000).  Further,  resolvable  trials 
resulted in less confidence than no-probe-1 trials (F(1,31) = 38.3, p<0.000). 
This  suggests  that  a  misleading  intermediate  probe  resulted  in  less 
confidence  for  all  participants.  No  effects  involving  group  reached 
significance. Two participants were removed from the confidence analysis due 
to an error in the data sampling.  
 
 
4.2. General Discussion 
Conform to our hypotheses checkers’ eye movements revealed that they were 
less able to ignore a misleading probe than non-checkers. Firstly, checkers 
made more fixations during the presentation of a misleading probe compared 
to low checkers, a group difference that was not observed for resolvable trials. 
This  group  by  trial-type  interaction  was  mirrored  in  response  times,  where 
checkers took significantly longer to ‘skip’  a misleading trial relative to low 
checkers; again a pattern not present for resolvable trials. Secondly, we used 
the contents of the encoding set (Period 1) to determine what was driving 
participants’ fixations, i.e. what types of information they preferably checked 
during the Probe-1 period (Period 3). This revealed that in misleading trials 
high checkers’ Total Fixations Times (TFT) were greater to the six locations of 
the encoding set matrix and specifically its empty locations, in comparison to 
low checkers and resolvable trials. No group effects were observed for letter 
locations  suggesting  that  high  checkers  greater  TFTs  to  the  encoding  set 
matrix as a whole were driven by group differences at empty locations. The 
specificity of this pattern argues against the idea that checkers simply made 
more fixations as the result of their longer manual Probe-1 RTs. If this was the 
case  then  checkers  would  not  show  such  a  specific  preference  for  empty 
locations in misleading trials. No similar group differences in eye movements 
were observed during Period 1 or 2, which indicates that checkers were not 
affected in their default mechanisms for how they either encode or maintain 
letters  in  locations  within  the  EB  of  WM  (Baddeley,  2000).  Further,  we 
observed that on the extended 5000ms delay period for no-probe-1 trials high 
checkers  actually  made  less  fixations  than  low  checkers,  which  serves  to  
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highlight the specificity and importance of the relationship between misleading 
probes and the greater eye movements of high checkers. In addition, the TFT 
to a resolvable target letter indicated that checkers were not impaired in their 
ability  to  correctly  locate  a  simple  letter  representation  within WM.  Rather, 
checkers’  inhibitory  impairments  only  impacted  on  behaviour  (eye 
movements) when they were challenged by a misleading probe. Therefore, 
conform to our current expectations and previous papers (Harkin & Kessler, 
2009, 2011a), misleading trials tap into checkers’ established impairments in 
inhibition (Olley, Malhi, & Sachdev, 2007; Omori et al., 2007) which results in 
them  engaging  in  excessive  checking  of  their  representations  in  WM, 
comparing these even against empty, uninformative locations.  
 
The abnormal ‘searching’ eye movements of high checkers during misleading 
trials are consistent with OCD patients having impairments in performance 
monitoring. Performance monitoring in OCD has been examined with event 
related  potentials  (ERP),  specifically  with  respect  to  the  so-called  ‘error 
related  negativity’  (ERN;  Gehring  et  al.,  1993)  produced  by  the  anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC). While the literature on the ERN is extensive, it reflects 
a  number  of  cognitive  functions  potentially  associated  with  obsessive-
compulsive  symptoms,  such  as  error  checking,  detection  of  conflicting 
responses/stimuli, monitoring of performance/conflict, “worse than expected 
outcomes”, strategy implementation, and uncertainty (Botvinick et al., 2001; 
Braver et al., 2001; Gehring et al., 1993; Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Ridderinkhof 
et al., 2004; van Veen et al., 2001). It is therefore unsurprising that enhanced 
ERN amplitudes have been observed in OCD and that these correlated with 
symptom severity (Ciesielski et al., 2011; Gehring, Himle, & Nisenson, 2000; 
Ursu et al., 2003). Also van der Wee et al. (2003) observed that in an n-back 
WM task OCD patients had greater ACC activity at all levels of task difficulty 
relative to controls. This was not interpreted as a deficit in WM capacity but 
rather  as  one  of  abnormal  performance  monitoring  and/or  compensatory 
executive processes. This is highly consistent with our current findings, where 
WM  performance  (Probe-2)  was  not  affected  in  checkers,  but  where  we 
observed  atypical  eye  movement  patterns  during  misleading  distractions, 
reflecting  inhibitory  deficits  and  compensatory  mechanisms  for  coping  with  
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enhanced uncertainty as a result (e.g. checking empty locations just “to make 
sure”). 
 
Enhanced  ERNs  have  also  been  observed  in  subclinical  high  scoring 
obsessive-compulsive participants (Hajcak & Simons, 2002), which highlights 
the  possible  quantitative  nature  of  inhibitory/performance  monitoring 
impairments across subclinical and clinical participants. This is consistent with 
the perspective that a subclinical analogue is a valid means of understanding 
a variety of features relevant to clinical OCD, especially as they are free from 
confounds such as medication, clinical state, or co-morbidity (Mataix-Cols et 
al.,  1997;  1999a).  Subclinical  checkers  may  therefore  provide  a  ‘purer’ 
indication  of  inhibitory  impairments  in  our  WM  task.  Specifically,  checkers’ 
inhibitory impairments reduced their ability to inhibit a misleading probe, which 
likely induced uncertainty and resulted in them checking the contents of WM 
at empty, uninformative locations. 
 
In a manner similar to Ciesielski et al. (2007) and Henseler et al. (2008) our 
findings reveal latent inhibitory impairments despite WM performance being 
intact. It is therefore important for us to explain why checkers did not show the 
same WM impairment (Period 4) when preceded by a misleading intermediate 
probe (Period 3) as we had previously reported (see Harkin & Kessler, 2009). 
In  our  previous  experiments,  the  intermediate  probe  was  terminated 
automatically after 4000ms. It can therefore be assumed that, in misleading 
trials, high checkers were unnecessarily searching the contents of WM when 
this process was terminated ‘mid-flow’. This, in turn, may have interfered with 
attention  to  bindings  maintained  in  the  EB,  thus  impairing  memory.  By 
contrast,  in  our  present  experiment,  participants  could  terminate  an 
intermediate  probe  in  their  own  time;  this  provided  high  checkers  with 
sufficient  time  to  achieve  their  elevated  threshold  of  satisfaction  (i.e., 
overcome uncertainty) before terminating a misleading trial. This is consistent 
with the observation that checkers take longer before making a choice in a 
situation of uncertainty (see Rotge et al., 2008), and that uncertainty per se 
motivates checking (Lind & Boschen, 2009; Rotge et al., 2008; Tolin et al., 
2003). In the current case self-pacing most likely allowed checkers to engage  
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and optimise their compensatory mechanism and search the contents of WM 
in a manner which did not interfere with episodic bindings, preserving their 
memory accuracy in this low load task. Indeed, the fact that on misleading 
trials there were no significant group differences on ‘Skip’ responses – and 
that both groups performed at an optimal level (both >96.9%) – is evidence 
that high checkers used the extra time to attain certainty (i.e., correctly skip 
misleading P1 in their own time) and preserve WM performance. 
 
4.3. Conclusion 
Using eye movement measures we show for the first time that high checkers’ 
inhibitory  impairments  for  misleading  information  results  in  them 
unnecessarily  searching  the  contents  of  WM  (four  letters  and  two  empty 
locations).  Behaviourally,  this  was  expressed  with  checkers  taking 
significantly  longer  to  terminate  a  misleading  intermediate  probe  in 
comparison  to  non-checkers  who  quickly  dismissed  it  as  misleading  and 
irresolvable. Furthermore, the fact that both groups were similarly excellent at 
correctly skipping a misleading probe suggests that while high checkers took 
longer to achieve certainty (i.e. that it was not there) self-termination allowed 
them  to  preserve  the  integrity  of  the  bindings  maintained  in  the  EB.  We 
concentrated  our  eye  movement  measures  on  number  and  duration  of 
fixations  which  were  the  best  candidates  for  reflecting  internal  checking 
behaviours.  Specifically,  during  the  presentation  of  misleading  probes,  not 
only did checkers execute more fixations, but they fixated longer on the six 
encoding  set  locations  and  specifically  at  locations  that  had  been  empty 
during encoding. Thus, not only do misleading trials trigger internal checking 
behaviours in checkers, but for these trials they are also more likely to search 
locations where no actual task relevant information had been presented. It 
would  appear  that  misleading  trials  specifically  tap  into  the  inhibitory 
impairments of checkers, inducing uncertainty which they try to overcome by 
means of excessive checking, searching even uninformative, empty locations.  
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5.  Using  ecologically  valid  stimuli  to  address  previous  experimental 
concerns 
Tasks (6 and 7) and experiments (8 and 9) address two central points with 
respect  to  our  previous  experiments  (1-5).  First,  while  we  previously 
concluded that checkers suffer from impairments in inhibitory functioning, we 
do  not provide  explicit  evidence of  this  impairment.  Second,  that  while  we 
reported robust and replicable effects using letters in locations (Experiments 1 
to 4; Harkin & Kessler, 2009, 2011a), it is apparent that such stimuli do not 
directly  relate  to  checking  compulsions  in  clinical  obsessive-compulsive 
disorder  (OCD).  We  therefore  provide  a  necessary  methodological  step 
forward by employing electrical kitchen appliances that are more concordant 
to checkers primary concerns (Rachman, 2002; Thordarson et al., 2004). As 
such we address our methodological concerns in two different experimental 
paradigms using the same electrical kitchen appliance stimuli. Task 6 and 7 
make  a  direct  attempt  to  determine  if  checkers  do  in  fact  have  executive 
impairments regarding Inhibition of Return (Posner & Cohen, 1984) effects. 
Then, Experiments 8 and 9 use our classic WM task with an intermediate 
spatial probe (i.e., Exp. 4; Harkin & Kessler, 2011a). As we use the same 
stimuli in both types of experiments, inhibitory (attenuated IOR) and memory 
impairment for the same stimulus features will provide a strong indication that 
executive  dysfunction  leads  to  memory  impairment  (Greisberg  &  McKay, 
2003). 
 
5.1.  Deficient  Inhibition-of-Return  in  checkers  only  when  attention  is 
directed to the threatening aspects of a stimulus  
In our original experiments (Exp. 1 and 2; Harkin & Kessler, 2009) considering 
that an intermediate probe is irrelevant to the performance of the memory test, 
we conclude that checkers are more distracted by a misleading probe as it is 
not part of the encoded set. Checkers either cannot suppress the distractor 
itself, and/or cannot suppress the urge to check triggered by the misleading 
distractor  (strong  hypothesis).  A  process  which  we  suggested  is  driven  by 
impairment  in  inhibitory  functioning  specific  to  the  checking  but  not  the 
washing subtype (Omori et al., 2007). However, in alignment with our weak  
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hypothesis our second series of experiments revealed that checkers suffered 
similar memory impairments for resolvable and misleading spatial probes (see 
Exp.  4;  Harkin  &  Kessler,  2011a).  Thus,  while  there  is  a  delicate  balance 
between  resolvability  (strong  hypothesis)  and  general  distraction  (weak 
hypothesis), in either case it appears that checkers’ poorer memory is due to 
an executive deficit of inhibitory functioning which impairs attention-dependent 
bindings  within  the  EB.  However,  while  we  concluded  that  checkers  suffer 
from impairments in inhibitory functioning, we did not provide explicit evidence 
of this impairment. Therefore, Tasks 5 and 6 are a direct attempt to determine 
if  checkers  do  in  fact  have  executive  impairments  regarding  Inhibition  of 
Return (IOR; Posner & Cohen, 1984) effects. Thus, if these experiments show 
that  checkers  do  in  fact  suffer  inhibitory  impairments  for  checking  specific 
stimuli then this will inform the inconsistent OCD literature on the need for 
symptom and stimulus specificity. 
 
5.2.  Inhibition  impairments  in  OCD  highlight  a  need  for  experimental-
symptom specificity 
Generally, it is argued in the literature that OCD has a common underlying 
trait: a reduced ability to selectively inhibit irrelevant external stimuli or internal 
thoughts  (e.g.,  “Did  I  leave  the  iron  ON?”),  which,  in  turn  may  trigger 
subsequent neutralizing compulsions (e.g., repeatedly checking that a switch 
is  turned  OFF)  and  memory  deficits  (Bannon,  Gonsalvez,  &  Croft,  2008; 
Harkin & Kessler, 2009, 2011a, 2011b). The centrality of impaired inhibitory 
control  is  further  underlined  by  it  being  proposed  as  a  possible  candidate 
endophenotypic marker of OCD (Chamberlain et al., 2005, 2007; Chamberlain 
& Menzies, 2009; Penades et al., 2007).  
 
However, not all paradigms of selective attention involving stimulus inhibition 
have consistently revealed deficits in OCD (for review see Muller & Roberts, 
2005). For example, word Stroop tasks have revealed both interference  and 
non-interference (Kampman et al., 2002; Kyrios & Iob, 1998; McNally et al., 
1994;  Moritz  et  al.,  2008)  effects  for  emotional  words  in  OCD.  These 
inconsistencies may in part be due the fact that words are not particularly  
    78 
relevant to the symptoms of those with OCD and as such fail to adequately 
and consistently interfere with attention (Moritz et al., 2008). Another measure 
of inhibitory functioning that has revealed inconsistent findings in OCD is the 
Inhibition of Return task. This paradigm presents an irrelevant cue to the left 
or  right  of  fixation  before  a  subsequent  target  appears  in  either  the  cued 
(valid) or in the uncued (invalid) location. It was found that response latencies 
to  targets  were  longer  to  a  previously  attended  location  (valid),  than  an 
unattended location (invalid). Thus, attending to a target in a previously cued, 
yet  irrelevant  location  was  slower  as  inhibition  impeded  attention  from 
returning to that location, i.e., IOR. Furthermore, it is now known that attention 
and inhibition are not purely space-based (Behrmann, Zemel, & Mozer, 1998; 
Grison et al., 2005; Jordan & Tipper, 1998; Kessler & Tipper, 2004; Tipper, 
Grison, & Kessler, 2003; Tipper, Jordan, & Weaver, 1999), but also occur in 
relation  to  objects  as  research  revealed  greater  IOR  after  the  cuing  of  an 
object compared to that of a ‘pure’ location (Jordan & Tipper, 1998; Tipper, 
Jordan, & Weaver, 1999). IOR is thought to be of adaptive value by biasing 
attention away from previously attended locations and objects to those that 
are  novel  and  unsearched  (Klein  &  MacInnes,  1999).  Impaired  IOR  could 
therefore result in perseverations on previously searched locations or objects, 
and  by  failing  to  attend  to  new  stimuli  the  individual  is  more  likely  to 
repeatedly revisit the same items/locations again and again (Tipper, Grison, & 
Kessler,  2003).  This  bears  a  striking  similarity  to  the  core  symptoms  of 
perseveration we observe during compulsive checking in OCD.  
 
Despite this theoretical overlap, however, IOR effects in OCD have revealed a 
mixed pattern of results. In one instance, OCD patients were generally slower 
for targets following cue images (for valid and invalid) that were relevant to 
OCD obsessions, whereas in other studies no group differences in inhibitory 
functioning were reported at all. Thus, in these studies it appears that while 
OCD patients were distracted by OCD relevant images IOR remained intact. 
Furthermore,  in  OCD  patients  inconsistent  findings  have  been  reported 
regarding visual fields, i.e., reduced IOR in the left visual field (LVF; Rankins 
et al., 2004) or in the right visual field (RVF: E. Nelson, Early, & Haller, 1993). 
Specifically, in the latter case IOR was even reversed into positive priming  
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(PP) in the RVF, while IOR was preserved (but decreased) in the LVF. These 
discrepancies  may  be  in  part due  to  differences  in IOR  methodology,  with 
some of the studies using the classic abstract IOR paradigm (Moritz & von 
Muhlenen, 2005; E. Nelson, Early, & Haller, 1993; Rankins et al., 2004) while 
others employed word- (Moritz & von Muehlenen, 2008) or image cues (Moritz 
et al., 2009) that are relevant to OCD symptomatology.  
 
In  order  to  resolve  these  discrepancies  the  present  studies  extend  the 
previous work on emotional IOR tasks (Moritz & von Muehlenen, 2008; Moritz 
et  al.,  2009).  We  believe  that  a  combination  of  stimulus  and  symptom 
specificity  within  the domain of  checking  may  be  required to  reveal  robust 
impairments of executive control and inhibitory functioning (Enright, Beech, & 
Claridge, 1995; Harkin & Kessler, 2011b; Omori et al., 2007). An assertion we 
justify with the following observations. First, in an extensive review of memory 
and attention in OCD, Muller and Roberts (2005) highlighted that OCD is a 
heterogeneous disorder comprised of multiple subtypes each with their own 
unique psychological markers (i.e., checkers vs. washers; see Omori et al., 
2007). Thus, Muller and Roberts recommended that attention and memory 
tasks may benefit from using stimuli that are specific to an individuals primary 
OCD  concerns.  For  example,  Amir,  Najmi and  Morrison  (2009) highlighted 
that high scoring OCD participants had an attentional bias to ideographically 
selected – therein threatening – word stimuli (versus neutral words) and that 
this bias correlated with symptom severity. This highlights that the tighter the 
symptom-stimuli concordance then this increases the likelihood of observing 
an  attentional  bias  specific  to  the  symptomatic  but  not  the  asymptomatic 
group.  Second,  in  our  previous  work  on  WM  deficits  in  high  checkers  we 
revealed that fragile multimodal integration of stimulus-identity and – location 
was  most  susceptible  to  distraction  (Harkin  &  Kessler,  2009,  ,  2011a). 
Suggesting  that  in  the  correct  experimental  circumstances  high  checkers’ 
attention can be distracted from the primary memory task.  
 
Specifically, in two IOR tasks we employed electrical kitchen appliances as 
stimuli that could be switched ‘ON’ or ‘OFF’. The two tasks were administered 
to  the  same  participants  within  the  same  session,  so  in  fact  were  two  
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experimental blocks, which we balanced in sequence. The two tasks differed 
in the way the unpredictive cues were administered. In Task 6 the cues were 
yellow coloured outlines around one of the two objects that were left and right 
of fixation (see fig. 20, left). Always, one appliance was ‘ON’ and the other 
one ‘OFF’. In Task 7 (see fig. 20, right) the irrelevant cue was administered by 
switching  one  of  the  two  appliances  ‘ON’  and  then  ‘OFF’  again.  The  two 
tasks/blocks were counterbalanced across two groups of participants in order 
to control for sequence effects. Thus, our tasks differ from previous OCD IOR 
studies in two critical ways. First, in both tasks ecologically valid stimuli are 
presented  throughout  the  task  as  opposed  to  the  brief  presentation  of 
unpredictive abstract cues (Moritz & von Muhlenen, 2005; E. Nelson, Early, & 
Haller,  1993;  Rankins  et  al.,  2004),  OCD  relevant  words  (Moritz  &  von 
Muehlenen, 2008) or ecologically valid images (Moritz et al., 2009) before the 
target. As a result, we suggest that our tasks bear greater similarity to the 
prolonged nature of checking, where they repeatedly check the content (i.e., 
ON/OFF switches) of ecologically valid stimuli (i.e., iron, kettle, stove) for the 
presence and/or absence of threat. Second, Task 7 provides a novel addition 
to  the  literature  by  explicitly  manipulating  the  content  of  ecologically  valid 
stimuli (OFF to ON) to act as the unpredictive cue.   
 
Therefore,  due  to  the  differences  between  the  tasks  we  arrived  at  two 
probable hypotheses. First, a general hypothesis applicable to high checkers 
performance in both tasks, where we predicted that ‘ON’ appliances in Task 6 
and  ‘ON’  cues  in  Task  7  would  grab  the  attention  of  high  checkers  and 
attenuate their IOR effect in both tasks. Second, a task-specific hypothesis 
where we predicted that focusing high checkers’ attention directly onto the 
electrical state of the appliances (OFF to ON) in Task 7 would attenuate IOR, 
while with an abstract cue (yellow outline in Task 6) the state of the appliance 
might  go  unnoticed,  thus  not  affecting  IOR.  An  outcome  conform  to  this 
second,  task-specific  prediction  would  help  explain  the  rather  fragile  and 
inconsistent  IOR  findings  in  the  literature  and  highlight  the  need  for 
ecologically valid stimuli in this research.    
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5.3. Tasks 6 and 7 
5.3.1. Methods general to Tasks 6 and 7 
Participants 
102  participants  (mean  age:  23.44  years;  32  males,  70  females)  from  the 
University of Glasgow gave written informed consents. British Psychological 
Society ethical requirements were met, including that of participant debriefing.  
 
We  counterbalanced  the  two  task-related  blocks  across  two  groups  of 
participants and used their checking scores on the VOCI to create a low and 
high  checking  group  within  each  sequence.  As  we  wanted  to  measure 
inhibitory functioning in relation to checking related stimuli we used a stringent 
cut-off criterion using the checking subscale of the VOCI to create two distinct 
groups: (1) <=1 for low checkers and (2) >=7 for high checkers. For sequence 
1 this resulted in mean checking scores for low (n = 24) and high checkers (n 
= 25) of 0.33 (SD: 0.48) and 14.6 (SD: 6.23), respectively. For sequence 2 
this resulted in mean checking scores for low (n = 26) and high checkers (n = 
27)  of  0.29  (SD:  0.47)  and  12.96  (SD:  4.86),  respectively.  Thus,  both  low 
checking  groups  (Sequence  1  and  2)  scored  within  the  range  of  healthy 
community  adults  and  so  likely  had  little  or  no  issues  with  checking.  In 
comparison, both high checking groups (Sequence 1 and 2) scored in the 
clinical checking range for OCD patients (see  Thordarson et al., 2004). This 
underlines that they do in fact have a problem with repeated checking and 
that this checking is for appliances, ON/OFF switches, etc (cf. VOCI-items on 
the checking subscale), justifying the use of such stimuli/manipulations in our 
tasks. It is important to note that we observed no statistical differences in the 
age (p=0.81) or gender distribution (p=0.2) between low and high checkers.  
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Figure  20. Schematic  representation  of  the  procedures  used  in Task  6  (left)  and 
Task 7 (right). Further explanations in the text. 
 
Stimuli 
We  employed  ecologically  valid  stimuli  that  were  concordant  with 
checking/OCD  symptomatology.  For  example,  the  Vancouver  Obsessional-
Compulsive  Inventory  (VOCI;  Thordarson  et  al.,  2004),  and  the  checking 
subscale specifically, ask respondents to indicate if they repeatedly check and 
recheck things like “switches, faucets, appliances, and doors” and “that the 
stove is turned off” (Thordarson et al., 2004). Additionally, Rachman (2002) 
highlighted the specific nature of perseverations: “Yes, I remember that I did 
check the stove but I cannot remember if I checked it satisfactorily. Was the 
switch  fully  turned  off?  I  cannot  remember  if  it  is  safe”  (p.  631).  In 
concordance with this symptomatology, we used images of electric kitchen 
appliances  (fryer,  iron,  kettle,  toaster,  coffee  machine,  hob,  microwave, 
sandwich maker) as stimuli and manipulated their “ON” and “OFF” states in 
Target = Blue Box 
Task 6: 
Cue = Yellow Box 
Task 7: 
Cue = Appliance ‘ON’
Target = Blue Box 
CUE = Change 
in State from 
‘OFF’ to ‘ON 
and then OFF 
 again’ 
CUE  CUE 
TARGET  TARGET  CUE-TARGET 
SOA: 500ms 
or 1000ms
FIXATION  FIXATION  ‘ON’
‘OFF’
‘OFF’
‘OFF’ 
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two object-based variations of the IOR task in Tasks 6 and 7, respectively. 
Due to the different cueing procedures in the two tasks the designs were not 
directly comparable; hence, we conducted separate ANOVA analyses. We will 
therefore report the two tasks separately. 
 
5.4. Task 6 
5.4.1. Method 
Procedure 
Participants sat in front of a computer screen set to 1680x1050 resolution with 
their head on a chin rest at 60 cm viewing distance. An experimental trial was 
initiated  by  the  participant  pressing  the  space  bar;  this  revealed  a  kitchen 
countertop with two kitchen appliances for 2000ms. One of these appliances 
was always ‘ON’ and the other ‘OFF’ (see fig. 20, left schematic). A fixation 
cross was then presented between the two appliances and the presentation 
time of this was varied (600ms, 800ms, 1000ms) to prevent the build up of 
temporal cue expectancies, which are known to influence the orientation of 
attention (Posner & Snyder, 1975). A yellow cue square was then flashed for 
100ms  around  one  of  the  appliances;  participants  were  instructed  not  to 
respond to this. Then, after a delay (SOA) of either 500ms or 1000ms, a blue 
target square was flashed for 100ms around one of the appliances as the 
target.  Participants  indicated  if  it  had  been  presented  around  the  left  (left 
index finger, ‘X’ key) or right appliance (right index finger, ‘M’ key). In addition 
to these experimental cue-target trials we also added target-only filler trials, 
where the blue target was presented right away during the time interval where 
usually  the  yellow  cue  would  appear.  This  manipulation  was  intended  to 
maintain participants’ attention during the cueing interval of the trial. 
 
Appliance state and visual field (‘ON’ left or ‘ON’ right), side of cue (left or 
right), target validity (valid/cued or invalid/uncued) and SOA (500, 1000ms) 
were all counterbalanced. There were 166 trials in total, including 6 practice, 
80 valid and, 80 invalid cue trials. RTs were the main dependent variable. RTs 
were  discarded  when  less  than  150ms  (anticipations)  and  greater  than 
1500ms (misses).   
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Design 
RT data were submitted to a 6-way mixed ANOVA with Group (low vs. high) 
and Sequence (Task 5 first vs. Task 5 second) as between-subjects factors 
and  SOA  (500ms  vs.  1000ms),  Target  State  (ON  vs.  OFF),  Validity 
(valid/cued  vs.  invalid/uncued)  and  Visual  Field  (left  vs.  right)  as  within-
subjects factors. We employed median RTs as individual statistics to reduce 
the influence of variance inherent in using sub-clinical sample.  
 
5.4.2. Results 
Importantly  Validity  reached  significance  (F(1,  98)  89.94,  p<  0.001):  valid 
(347.1ms) were slower than invalid trials (312.9ms), indicating a typical IOR 
effect. Sequence revealed a main effect (F(1, 98) 6.09, p< 0.02): Task 6 first 
(349.7ms) was slower than Task 5 second (310.4ms), indicating a possible 
practice effect for Task 5 when it was performed second in sequence. There 
was a main effect for Stimulus Onset Asynchrony (SOA) (F(1, 98) 32.6, p< 
0.000) which reflected faster responding for 1000 SOA (324.8ms) compared 
to 500 SOA (335.3ms). The SOA x Sequence interaction was significant (F(1, 
98) 5.06, p< 0.03). This appeared to reflect a greater difference between an 
SOA  of  500  and  1000  when  Task  6  was  performed  second  (317.7ms  – 
303.1ms = 14.6ms) compared to first (352.8ms – 346.5ms = 6.3ms). 
 
Two higher order interactions involving Group reached significance. Group x 
Validity x Target x Visual Field reached significance (F(1, 98) 5.33, p< 0.03). 
This  appeared  to  reflect  two  main  data  patterns:  (1)  greater  IOR  for  high 
checkers  in  the  left  visual  field  for  ON  compared  to  OFF  targets  and  (2) 
greater IOR for high checkers in the left compared to the right VF. Group x 
Validity x SOA x VF x Sequence reached significance (F(1, 98) 4.46, p< 0.04). 
This  appeared  to  reflect  two  main  data  patterns:  (1)  greater  IOR  for  high 
checkers in the left visual field at 500 SOA in Sequence 2 (Task 1 performed 
second) compared to Sequence 1 (Task 6 performed first) and (2) greater 
IOR  for  checkers  in  the  right  visual  field  at  1000  SOA  in  Sequence  2 
compared  to  Sequence  1.  While  these  two  higher  order  interactions  are 
complex and difficult to interpret, we suggest that the primary finding is that 
IOR functioning is intact (if slightly enhanced in certain conditions) for high  
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checkers in Task 6, possibly reflecting the complex IOR pattern in relation to 
visual fields observed in previous studies. This is important when considered 
alongside the abnormal IOR response pattern of this group in Task 7.  
 
Table 3.  Task 6: Mean and StDev RTs for Group (low LC vs. high HC checkers) x 
SOA x Target State x Validity. 
 
  SOA  500  500  500  500  1000  1000  1000  1000 
 
Target 
State  OFF  OFF  ON  ON  OFF  OFF  ON  ON 
  Validity  Invalid  Valid  Invalid  Valid  Invalid  Valid  Invalid  Valid 
Mean  312.54  347.83  311.34  347.88  304.09  339.95  301.57  338.88  LC  Stdev  90.11  92.90  91.68  91.08  92.43  98.72  87.79  100.70 
                   
Mean  326.28  350.78  321.88  358.00  311.82  346.67  307.23  341.11  HC  Stdev  84.61  85.97  85.85  87.74  80.71  92.79  86.99  92.66 
 
5.5. Task 7 
5.5.1. Method 
As  before,  pressing  the  spacebar  revealed  a  kitchen  countertop  with  two 
kitchen appliances, however in this task both appliances were ‘OFF’ (see fig. 
20, right schematic). After a variable delay (1600ms, 1800ms, 2000ms) one of 
the appliances flashed ‘ON’ (for 300ms) then ‘OFF’ again. Then, after a delay 
(SOA)  of  500ms  or  1000ms,  a  blue  target  square  was  flashed  for  100ms 
around one of the appliances.  
 
The  side  of  cue  (‘ON’  left  vs.  ‘ON’  right),  target  validity  (valid/cued  vs. 
invalid/uncued) and SOA (500 vs. 1000ms) were all counterbalanced. There 
were 160 trials in total, including 80 valid and 80 invalid cue trials. RTs were 
the main dependent variable. RTs were subject to outlier rejection based upon 
being greater than 150ms (anticipations) and less than 1500ms (misses). 
 
Design 
RT data were submitted to a 5-way mixed MANOVA with Group (low vs. high) 
and Sequence (Task 7 first vs. Task 7 second) as between-subjects factors 
and  SOA  (500ms  vs.  1000ms), Validity  (valid/cued  vs.  invalid/uncued)  and 
Visual Field (left vs. right) as within-subjects factors.  
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5.5.2. Results 
SOA reached significance (F(1, 98) 94.2, p< 0.000): RTs were slower at 500 
ms SOA (327.7ms) compared to 1000 ms SOA (309.9ms). Validity reached 
significance  (F(1,  98)  19.81,  p<  0.001):  valid  (322.9ms)  were  slower  than 
invalid  trials  (314.7ms),  indicating  a  typical  IOR  effect.  The  Group  x  SOA 
interaction was significant (F(1, 98) 10.4, p< 0.002). This appeared to reflect 
marginally  significantly  different  RTs  for  high  (323.7ms)  compared  to  low 
checkers (323.7ms – 296.2ms = 27.5ms) at 1000 SOA (p=0.07) compared to 
more similar RTs (335.5ms – 319.9ms = 15.6ms) at 500 SOA (p=0.3). 
 
Importantly the Group x Validity interaction was significant (F(1, 98) 10.09, p< 
0.002): Low checkers had faster RTs for invalid (301.1 ms) compared to valid 
trials  (314.9  ms)  an  effect  which  was  small  but  highly  consistent  reaching 
significance  (F(1,  98)  38.53,  p<  0.000).  In  comparison,  there  was  little 
numerical difference for high checkers' RTs between invalid (328.4ms) and 
valid  trials  (330.8ms)  which  was  reflected  in  it  failing  to  reach  significance 
(F(1, 98) 0.83, p= 0.37). Thus, the low scoring group showed a typical IOR 
pattern (invalid – valid = -13.8 ms), whereas the high scoring group showed 
an abnormally attenuated IOR pattern -2.4 ms) (see fig. 21). The robustness 
of  this  Group  x  Validity  interaction  was  further  reflected  in  its  significance 
when Task 6 was performed by different groups of low and high checkers 
either first (F(1, 51) 4.63, p< 0.037: LC: -14.8 vs. HC: -4.6) or second  (F(1, 
51) 5.9, p< 0.02: LC: -13.2 vs. HC: -1.9) in sequence. Analysis of the validity 
effects for  each  sequence  separately  revealed that  in  either  sequence  low 
checkers  had  typical  IOR  effects  (both  p<0.000),  while  IOR  effects  were 
attenuated for high checkers in either sequence (both p>0.4). The fact that 
different groups of low and high checkers performed Task 7 in Sequence 1 
and  2  shows  that  this  effect  is  specific  to  high  checkers  and  to  the 
experimental cue manipulation (i.e., switch ON and OFF) as opposed to an 
effect related to a specific task sequence and/or sub-group of individuals. 
 
No other higher order interactions with or without group reached significance 
in Task 7. This is important as it may suggest that the complex interactions 
involving group observed in Task 6 may have been due to the more complex  
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design (i.e., cued appliance ON/OFF as well as target appliance ON/OFF) 
and the resulting smaller trial numbers per cell.  
 
Figure 21. Group IOR Effects in Task 6. The high checking group showed attenuated 
and almost absent IOR compared to the typical IOR effect of the low checking group.  
 
Table  4.  Task  7:  Mean  and  StDev  RTs  for  Group  (low  checkers:  LC  vs.  high 
checerks: HC) x SOA x Validity 
 
  SOA  500  500  1000  1000 
  Validity  Invalid  Valid  Invalid  Valid 
Mean  310.57  328.91  291.34  300.85  LC  Stdev  71.03  74.93  71.67  74.23 
           
Mean  335.49  336.58  322.18  325.76  HC  Stdev  88.76  84.30  87.63  90.01 
 
5.6. General Discussion 
Conform to our second, task-specific hypothesis, we attenuated IOR for high 
checkers  when  the  cue  involved  an  explicit  manipulation  of  the  state  of  a 
kitchen appliance, i.e., ‘off’-‘ON’-‘off’ (Task 7). In comparison, typical IOR was 
observed for high checkers in the more classic IOR task, where the cue was 
an irrelevant yellow box flashing around an appliance (Task 6). This suggests 
that  high  checkers  did  not  have  a  global  impairment  of  attentional 
disengagement  and  subsequent  inhibition  (i.e.,  IOR  intact  in  Task  6)  but 
rather that their attentional functioning was impaired when the task directly 
engaged  existing  attentional  biases  for  threatening  stimuli  (Task  7).  This 
reveals  the  rather  fragile  nature  of  atypical  IOR  patterns  in  high  scoring 
Task 7: Overall Group IOR Effect (Invalid-Valid) 
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checkers, hence, shedding some light on the variability of findings reported in 
the literature so far.  
 
For  example,  Moritz  et  al.  (2009)  found  that  OCD  patients  were  generally 
slower in responding to a target (dot) when the cue was an image relevant to 
OCD symptomatology (e.g., for checking: fire; for washing: dirty toilet). As this 
effect  failed  to  interact  with  cue  validity  or  SOA  they  concluded  that  OCD 
patients were generally more distracted by OCD-related visual images. In line 
with their previous research (Moritz & von Muehlenen, 2008; Moritz &  von 
Muhlenen, 2005) they proposed that OCD patients did not exhibit generally 
impaired  inhibitory  functioning.  Tapping  into  such  impairments may  require 
stimuli  that  elicit  negative  and  more  acute  responses  in  those  with  OCD 
(Harkin & Kessler, 2009; Moritz et al., 2009), which may explain the divergent 
results for our high checkers across the two tasks (IOR in Task 6, attenuated 
IOR in Task 7) and generally within the research so far. Specifically, in Task 
1,  the  mere  presence  of  an  ‘ON’  appliance  failed  to  interfere  with  the 
disengagement of attention after an irrelevant yellow box cue. As a result, we 
found a typical IOR effect in both groups. On the other hand, the explicit use 
of an appliance’s state as a cue (Task 7: switching between ‘OFF’ - ‘ON’ - 
‘OFF’) was sufficient to interfere with the normal functioning of attention in the 
high but not the low checking group. In other words, switching an appliance 
‘ON’ as a cue was sufficiently salient to override normal disengagement and 
re-orienting of attention to the centre followed by inhibition of the just attended 
irrelevant  object/location  (Grison  et  al.,  2005;  Jordan  &  Tipper,  1998).  In 
contrast, for the low checking group switching ‘ON’ an appliance merely acted 
as an irrelevant cue, again producing typical IOR.  
 
As  attentional  biases  to  threat  play  a  central  role  in  the  etiology  and 
maintenance  of  anxiety  disorders  (Mathews  &  MacLeod,  2002;  Mogg  & 
Bradley,  1998;  Williams  et  al.,  1997),  our  research  may  be  particularly 
informative  to  potential  interventions  which  target  attentional  processes  in 
checking/OCD  (Wells,  1990;  2000)  conform  to  interventions  proposed  for 
other  anxiety  disorders.  For  instance,  the  so-called  attentional  modification 
training  (AMT)  proposed  by  MacLeod  et  al.  (2002)  attempts  to  improve  
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attentional  efficiency  by  targeting  and  directing  attention  away  from 
threat/anxiety  inducing  information  to  less  threatening  information  not 
associated with anxiety by using a dot-probe discrimination task. MacLeod et 
al. (2002) simultaneously presented a threatening and a neutral word followed 
by  a  visual  (dot)  probe.  The  primary  task  was  to  indicate  as  quickly  as 
possible the location of this dot-probe. The key manipulation was to randomly 
assign participants to one of two conditions where there was either a strong 
contingency between the location of the probe and a threat-related word or a 
neutral word. Participants in the attend-threat condition had faster response 
latencies to threat-words and had higher levels of negative mood when they 
performed  a  stressful  task  compared  to  participants  in  the  attend-neutral 
condition.  Despite  their  results  being  limited  to  non-clinical  mildly  anxious 
students  they  proposed  that  AMT  may  provide  an  appropriate  means  of 
treating clinical anxiety. A suggestion corroborated by Amir et al. (2009) who 
trained  (8  sessions  over  4-weeks)  individuals  with  generalized  anxiety 
disorder (GAD) to selectively attend to the location of a non-threat word in one 
group (AMT) but not in another group (i.e., no contingency between probe 
location and word-type). GAD participants in the AMT condition reported a 
decrease  in  their  attentional  bias  to  threat  words  and  a  decrease  in  their 
anxiety. The authors concluded that attention is central to the etiology and 
maintenance of GAD symptoms as retraining attention reduced anxiety. The 
robustness of AMT in the dot-probe is further substantiated by two studies 
which  reported  a  similar  attenuation  in  symptoms  and  anxiety  levels  using 
face stimuli (i.e., disgust versus neutral) for groups with high anxiety (Eldar & 
Bar-Haim,  2010)  and  generalized  social  phobia  disorder  (Schmidt  et  al., 
2009).  Therefore,  not  only  has  AMT  shown  that  attentional  biases  are 
malleable to intervention but also that systematically directing attention away 
from threat reduces anxiety, i.e., attention moderates symptoms.  
 
Thus,  while  little  (if  any)  research  has  been  conducted  into  AMT  and 
checking/OCD so far, the similarities between the dot-probe and the present 
IOR task point towards attention training as a possible means for attenuating 
the attentional bias and symptoms of high checkers. Firstly, could the dot-
probe be systematically applied (i.e., similar to Amir et al.) to high checkers’  
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attentional  bias  to  ‘ON’  states  which  would  then  restore  normal  inhibitory 
functioning for ‘ON’ cues in the IOR task? Secondly, if AMT could reverse 
high checkers’ attentional bias for ‘ON’ states and generally to threatening 
stimuli/features, would this then translate to improved memory performance 
for these stimuli/features?  
 
Critically, we subsequently report (Exp. 8) that high checkers have a robust 
impairment in their ability to recall if a kitchen appliance was either ‘ON’ or 
‘OFF’ (Harkin, Rutherford, & Kessler, 2011). Based on our theory (Harkin & 
Kessler,  2009,  2011b)  we  take  this  as  evidence  for  a  strong  interaction 
between  executive  functioning  (selective  attention)  and  WM  processes 
(binding within the ‘EB’, cf. Baddeley, (Baddeley, 2000)). We proposed that 
attention to the threatening feature of an appliance (i.e., its ON/OFF state) 
hampered the binding of the state to the actual appliance and its location (see 
Harkin, Rutherford & Kessler, 2011) by either directly interfering in form of an 
exogenous distractor and/or by initiating repetitive detrimental checks of WM 
contents in form of an endogenous distraction. This argument is explored in 
more detail in Experiment 8. This is important as Salkovskis, Forrester and 
Richards  (1998)  pointed  out  that  OCD  is  characterised  by  endogenous 
distractions in form of “intrusive thoughts”. Accordingly, it has been found that 
high  checkers’  memory  performance  is  improved  when  attentional  focus  is 
shifted away from the actual memory task (Radomsky, Ashbaugh, & Gelfand, 
2007). This suggests that contrary to the checkers’ intuition, a relaxing, non-
checking attentional focus actually improves memory performance particularly 
when  combined  with  reduced  attention  to  intrusive  thoughts.  Therefore, 
training  selective  attention  with  respect  to  exogenous  distractors  only  (e.g. 
AMT) might not be most effective intervention for OCD in the long run. Wells 
(Wells,  2000)  proposed  an  attention-based  intervention  specific  to  the 
intrusive  thinking  of  OCD.  This  attentional  training  (ATT)  method  aims  to 
enhance  executive  control  over  attention  and  cognitive  processes  through 
selective attention, attention switching and divided attention exercises. ATT 
treats  spontaneously  occurring  intrusive  thoughts  as  “noise”  that  does  not 
require attention but suppression. However, in one of the few studies of ATT 
in relation to OCD, Watson and Purdon (2008) failed to show that it improved  
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symptoms beyond those of thought replacement, distraction or no intervention 
control conditions. In this case, it may have been that the single ATT session 
was insufficient to improve symptoms beyond a placebo effect. Alternatively, 
considering the specificity of our IOR group-effects in Task 7, it is possible 
that  the  effectiveness  of  ATT  could  have  been  enhanced  by  tailoring  the 
attentional aspects of the intervention to the symptoms of specific subgroups 
(i.e.,  ‘ON’  states  for  checkers)  or  individual  patients  (i.e.,  ideographic 
selection).  Taking  all  these  consideration  into  account,  we  propose  that 
training of exogenous as well as endogenous selective attention within the 
wider  context  of WM  processing,  aiming  to  specifically  attenuate  repetitive 
checking  of WM  contents  (Harkin  &  Kessler,  2009,  2011a,  2011b;  Harkin, 
Rutherford,  &  Kessler,  2011)  may  be  most  effective  for  improving  a  wider 
range of OCD symptoms in the long term.  
 
5.7. Conclusion 
In  conclusion,  we  have  confirmed  our  second,  task-specific  hypothesis 
regarding  IOR  being  affected  in  high  checkers.  For  high  checkers,  IOR 
mechanisms were basically intact (Task 6) and only affected when attention 
was  drawn  to  a  threatening  aspect  of  ecologically  valid  stimuli  (Task  7: 
switching ON an electric appliance). This is an essential piece of evidence 
that  potentially  explains  why  IOR  effects  in  OCD  are  rather  fragile  and 
somewhat  inconsistent  in  the  literature.  Not  only  does  this  highlight  the 
necessity of symptom- and stimulus-specificity but it directs future research to 
measuring IOR effects for other OCD subtypes using stimuli specific to their 
symptoms.  A  limitation  of  this  study  is  that  participants  were  not  asked  to 
subjectively appraise the threat of our stimuli and so we cannot determine 
how  threatening  our  stimuli  were  for  high  compared  to  low  checkers. 
However, as our group effects were specific to Task 7 this indicates that the 
presence of an unpredictive ON cue was sufficiently threatening to grab the 
attention of high checkers at the cost of normal IOR functioning. Indeed, these 
effects occurred by using stimuli that were general (i.e., present on checking 
subscale  of  VOCI)  to  the  symptoms  of  checking  despite  them  not  being 
idiographically  selected  or  appraised  (in  contrast  to  Amir  et  al.,  2009).  
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Suggesting that if we had allowed individual high checkers to select visual 
stimuli relevant to their unique symptoms we may have observed a greater 
attenuation of IOR effects than presently observed. Alternatively, we would 
have expected larger effects if we had used checkers whose concerns were 
only for electrical appliances.  
 
Regardless,  our  findings  corroborate  the  notion  that  distractions  that  are 
salient to OCD symptomatology cannot be easily ignored by those with clinical 
and  subclinical  expressions  of  checking/OCD.  As  we  have  argued  in  our 
recent  research  on  WM  impairments  in  subclinical  checkers,  deficits  in 
attentional  selection  and  suppression  could  be  the  essential  factors  for 
episodic  memories  being  affected  in  the  short-  and  long-term.  Episodic 
representations are inherently multimodal, hence, fragile and susceptible to 
persistent  interference  by  irrelevant  external  stimuli  (an  iron  left  ‘ON’)  or 
internal  thoughts  (‘Did  I  leave  the  iron  ON?’)  that  cannot  be  efficiently 
suppressed (Harkin & Kessler, 2009, , 2011a, , 2011b; Harkin, Rutherford, & 
Kessler, 2011).  
 
Another possible limitation of the present study was that in using a subclinical 
group  this  raises  the  issue  of  their  relevance  as  an  analogue  to  a  clinical 
group.  We  agree,  however,  with  Mataix-Cols  et  al.  (1997,1999a)  that 
subclinical  OCD  groups  are  a  valid  means  of  determining  which  cognitive 
factors  play  a  role  in  clinically  defined  OCD,  particularly  considering  their 
reduced medication and potential for co-morbidities. We therefore expect that 
the  pattern  observed  here  with  subclinical  checkers  could  be  more 
pronounced using clinical OCD patients, yet, also more variable. We conclude 
that  drawing  attention  to  the  threatening  aspect  of  an  ecologically  valid 
stimulus is the most promising candidate to reveal deficient disengagement of 
attention, yielding attenuated IOR. 
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5.8. Impaired executive functioning in checkers with ecologically valid 
stimuli reveals novel and classic working memory impairments 
Experiments 8 and 9 use the same ecologically valid stimuli that were used in 
the previous IOR tasks where high checkers showed attenuation in normal 
inhibitory functioning for electrical appliances when they were cued with an 
‘ON’ state. Therefore, Experiments 8 and 9 in using such stimuli addressed 
two central issues to our research: (1) Our previous WM experiments (1-4) 
used letters in locations which have little validity with respect to the primary 
concerns of high checkers, and (2) if high checkers showed attenuated IOR 
for ‘ON’ cues will they show a related memory impairment for the same and/or 
associated  features?  Thus,  we  presented  4  electrical  kitchen  appliances 
located in 6 possible locations, of which two were ‘ON’ (electrical light was 
bright red) and two were ‘OFF’ (electrical light was dark red). The primary 
memory task (probe-2) required the participants to recall if an appliance had 
been ‘ON’ or ‘OFF’ (Exp. 8) or if an appliance was correctly located (Exp. 9) 
as shown in Figure 22. In both experiments, we used an intermediate spatial-
location probe similar to Experiment 4 of Harkin and Kessler (2011a), where it 
had  produced  stable  group  effects  (i.e.,  low  standard  deviations)  and 
substantial  memory  impairments  in  high  compared  to  low  checkers.  This 
intermediate probe was presented at a location where an appliance had either 
been present (resolvable) or at a location that had been completely empty 
(misleading), participants had to indicate if the appliance at that location had 
been ‘ON’ or ‘OFF’. An additional yet critical development of our methodology 
related  to  trial-type  ratio.  In  our  previous  experiments  we  presented  two 
blocks, one with predominantly misleading trials (66%) and a counterbalanced 
block of resolvable trials as a result we could not exclude the influence that 
this had upon checkers’ WM performance. Therefore, we currently used an 
equal  trial-ratio  (33%  resolvable,  33%  misleading,  33%  no-probe-1)  which 
allowed us to develop a clearer understanding of the specific effect(s) of trial-
type and/or group on memory performance (probe-2). We predict that using 
such stimuli and probing the spatial location of threatening aspects of them 
may  potentially  enhance  executive  dysfunction,  impair  attention-dependent 
bindings (i.e., Exp. 7: state to appliance or Exp. 8: appliance to location) and  
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perhaps produce novel memory and metacognitive impairments compared to 
our previous work. 
 
5.9. Experiment 8 
5.9.1. Method 
Participants 
40 Participants (mean 20.8 years: 12 males, 28 females) from the University 
of  Glasgow  gave  written  informed  consents.  British  Psychological  Society 
ethical  requirements  were  met,  including  that  of  participant  debriefing.  We 
used the checking subscale of the VOCI and used a median split of checking 
scores to obtain two groups: 20 low (mean: 0.5, SD: 0.61) and high (mean: 
13.85, SD: 4.12) ‘‘checkers’’. Further, no statistical differences between the 
low  and  high  groups  were  revealed  in  gender  distribution  (p=0.72)  or  age 
(p=0.27).  
 
Procedure 
Participants sat 60cm from a computer screen with their head on a chin rest. 
At the beginning of each trial a fixation cross was presented for 2000ms. A 
kitchen countertop was then presented for 6000ms with 4 electrical kitchen 
appliances presented randomly in 6 possible locations as shown in Figure 22. 
Two of these appliances were ‘ON’ as indicated by a red light and two were 
shown  to  be  ‘OFF’  with  no  accompanying  light.  After  this  a  mask  was 
presented for 1000ms, this was to reduce the influence that possible image 
retention  may  have  played  in  subsequent  retrieval  (i.e.,  distinct  appliances 
and/or their ‘ON’ states), thus isolating disturbances in later memory-probe 
performance to those of WM. After this a probe-1 question asked if a device at 
a specific location was either ‘ON’ or ‘OFF.’ As in our previous research (Exp. 
2; Harkin & Kessler, 2011a) this probe was presented (3000ms) at a location 
where there had been (resolvable) or had not been (misleading) a device in 
the original encoding set. Participants were asked to indicate if the device at 
this location (resolvable or misleading) was either ‘ON’ (left index finger of 
right hand) of ‘OFF’ (middle index finger of right hand). This probe previously 
produced stable group effects (i.e., low standard deviations) and substantial 
memory impairments in high compared to low checkers. Additionally, using  
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such  an  intermediate  probe  was  motivated  by  our  recent  findings  that  an 
explicit,  yet  task  irrelevant  ‘ON’  cue  interfered  with  normal  inhibitory 
functioning (i.e., Inhibition of Return; Posner & Cohen, 1984) of high but not 
low checkers (Task 2; Harkin & Kessler, in press). Thus, for high checkers 
drawing  attention  to  the  functional  and  threatening  aspects  of  electrical 
appliances and probing empty locations may resonate with the established 
executive impairments of high checkers in inhibiting irrelevant thoughts and/or 
stimuli  (Olley,  Malhi,  &  Sachdev,  2007;  Omori  et  al.,  2007;  Savage  et  al., 
2000). Baseline trials were also included; these presented an empty kitchen 
countertop (i.e., no probe-1) designed to measure WM under ideal conditions. 
A mask was again presented (1000ms) before the actual memory task. In 
Experiment 8, probe-2 simply presented a single electrical appliance at the 
centre of the screen, the participant had to indicate if they recalled it as being 
‘ON’ (right index finger) or ‘OFF’ (right middle index finger) with respect to the 
original  encoded  set.  Finally,  participants  were  asked  to  indicate  their 
confidence in their probe-2 decision as indicated simply by a ‘Confident’ (right 
index finger) or ‘Not Confident’ (right middle index finger) response.  
 
There were 156 trials in total, 12 of which (at the beginning) were practice 
including  resolvable  and  no-probe-1  trials  only.  The  main  experiment  was 
then done in two blocks (with 5min rest period between), each comprising 24 
resolvable, 24 misleading and 24 no-probe-1 trials presented in random order. 
Importantly,  we  employed  an  equal  ratio  of  trial  type  in  the  current 
experiments: 33% resolvable, 33% misleading, 33% no-probe-1, while in our 
previous studies we had employed at least one block with 66% misleading 
trials  (-  and  a  counterbalanced  block  of  predominantly  resolvable  probe-1 
trials, cf. Harkin & Kessler, 2009, 2011). We did this to remove the influence 
of trial-type ratio which had to be counter-balanced across 2 blocks in our 
previous  experimental  designs.  This  allowed  us  to  develop  a  clearer 
understanding of the specific effect(s) of trial-type and/or group on memory 
performance  (probe-2).  For  example,  in  our  original  experiment  (Harkin  & 
Kessler,  2009)  it  is  possible  that  high  checkers’  poor  performance  on 
misleading trials was driven by the novelty/surprise caused by an unfamiliar 
trial type.  
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Figure 22: Procedure and stimuli in Experiments 8 and 9. The Experiments differed 
only on Probe-2. Please note that appliances were only ever presented in the top 2 
(vertical) x 3 (horizontal) countertop locations. 
 
 
Design 
A  two  (Group:  low  vs.  high  checkers)  by  three  (Probe-1:  resolvable, 
misleading, no-probe-1) by two (Probe-2 State: ON, OFF) mixed design was 
employed with group as the between- and probe-1 and probe-2 state as the 
within-subjects factors.  
 
5.9.2. Results and Discussion of Experiment 8 
MANOVAs for a 2 x 3 x 2 design were carried out for reaction times, accuracy 
and  confidence  on  probe-2  responses  due  to  violations  of  the  sphericity 
assumption (Mauchley’s tests). 
 
 
Encoding  
Probe-1: Resolvable or Misleading 
Was the device: 
‘ON’ or ‘OFF’? 
Was the device in this 
location: ‘Yes’ or ‘No’? 
Probe-2: Exp.8  Probe-2: Exp.9 
Mask 
Mask 
Was the device at this 
location ‘ON’ or ‘OFF’? 
OR  
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Probe-2 Response Latencies 
The  MANOVA  (2  x  3  x  2)  for  probe-2  latencies  revealed  a  main  effect  of 
group, high checkers (1898.4ms) were significantly slower in responding than 
the  low  group  (1573.4ms)  (F(1,38)  =  10.65,  p<0.05)  (see  fig.  23).  A  main 
effect for trial type (F(2,76) = 5.59, p<0.006), reflected slower RTs overall for 
misleading trials compared to resolvable (F(1,38) = 9.32, p<0.005) and no-
probe-1 trials (F(1,38) = 9.20, p<0.005). This suggests that for all participants 
making a probe-2 location decision is particularly sensitive to a misleading 
intermediate  probe:  encouraging  participants  to  examine  the  state  of  an 
appliance at a location where there is none slows subsequent location based 
responding. 
 
A significant main effect for probe-2 state (F(1,38) = 24.7, p<0.001) revealed 
that all participants were slower in responding to an appliance that was ‘OFF’ 
(1847.6ms) compared to ‘ON’ (1624.2ms) in the encoded set.  
 
Figure 23. Probe-2 response latencies: High checkers (1898.4ms) were significantly 
slower  overall  than  low  checkers  (1573.4ms)  in  making  their  probe-2  responses 
(p<0.05). Vertical bars denote standard errors. 
 
 
Probe-2 Accuracy 
The MANOVA (2 x 3 x 2) for probe-2 accuracy revealed a main effect of group 
(F(1,38)  =  4.27,  p<0.05),  with  high  checkers  (87.3%)  significantly  less 
Exp. 8: Group Reaction Times 
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accurate  than  the  low  group  (94.1%)  (see  fig.  24).  Importantly,  as  high 
checkers were significantly slower in making their responses, we can rule out 
a  speed-accuracy  trade-off  as  an  explanation  for  their  poorer  accuracy.  A 
main effect for trial type (F(2,76) = 4.08, p<0.05), reflected no-probe-1 trials 
were more accurate than resolvable (F(1,38) = 5.93, p<0.02) or misleading 
trials (F(1,38) = 6.70, p<0.05). Therefore, for all participants an intermediate 
probe resulted in poorer probe-2 state accuracy compared to trials with no 
intermediate probe.  
 
Figure  24.  Probe-2  accuracy  (ACC%)  for  group:  High  checkers  (87.3%)  were 
significantly  less  accurate  overall  in  making  their  probe-2  responses  than  low 
checkers (94.1%) (p<0.05). Vertical bars denote standard errors. 
 
 
Confidence Responses   
The MANOVA (2 x 3 x 2) for confidence responses concentrated upon the 
total ‘not-confident’ responses of each participant in each condition. A main 
effect for trial type (F(2,76) = 7.99, p<0.003) reflected lower confidence for all 
participants  for  misleading  trials  compared  to  resolvable  (F(1,38)  =  4.60, 
p<0.04) and no-probe-1 trials (F(1,38) = 10.27, p<0.003). Also a main effect of 
probe-2 state (F(1,38) = 26.68, p<0.001) indicated that all participants had 
less confidence for an electrical appliance that had been ‘OFF’ than ‘ON’. No 
effects involving group reached significance.  
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To sum up, we found a general accuracy deficit for high checkers that could 
reflect  general  capacity  issues.  However,  based  on  our  previous  research 
(Harkin & Kessler, 2009; 2011 and research reported by others (Ciesielski et 
al., 2007; Henseler et al., 2008), we did not believe this to be the case. In 
contrast,  we  hypothesised  that  the  employed  probe-2  may  have  focused 
checkers’  attention  too  strongly  on  the  threatening  aspect  of  the  stimuli 
(electric  on/off  status),  hence  introducing  a  generally  higher  level  of 
interference during encoding, maintenance, and/or retrieval fuelled by anxiety.  
 
Hence,  we  devised  a  second  Experiment  that  differed  from  Experiment  8 
regarding  the  feature  dimension  of  the  memory  test  (probe-2).  Instead  of 
probing the state of an appliance (on vs. off) we probed its location (correct 
vs. incorrect). We expected a more differentiated pattern across conditions 
with a special role for misleading trials. 
 
 
5.10. Experiment 9 
5.10.1. Method 
Participants 
40 Participants (mean 21.85 years: 13 males, 27 females) from the University 
of  Glasgow  gave  written  informed  consents.  British  Psychological  Society 
ethical  requirements  were  met,  including  that  of  participant  debriefing.  As 
before, the checking subscale was used to obtain two groups: 20 low (mean: 
0.0,  SD:  0.0)  and  high  (mean:  13.75,  SD:  6.16)  ‘‘checkers’’.  Further,  no 
statistical  differences  between  the  low  and  high  groups  were  revealed  in 
gender distribution (p=0.31) or age (p=0.58).  
 
Procedure 
Experiment 8 was identical to Experiment 9 with two exceptions. (1) Probe-2: 
We presented an electrical appliance either at the correct (50%) or incorrect 
(50%)  location  with  respect  to  the  encoding  set  and  asked  participants  to 
indicate if it was correctly or incorrectly located (see fig. 22). (2) Confidence: 
We asked participants to indicate their confidence on a sliding scale from 0 
(no confidence at all) to 100 (complete confidence). We expected this scale to  
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be more sensitive in detecting between-group differences in meta-cognition 
than the binary response option employed in Experiment 8. 
 
There  were  156  practice  trials  in  total,  12  of  which  were  practice  trials 
including  resolvable  and  no-probe-1  trials  only.  The  main  experiment  was 
then done in two blocks (with 5min rest period between), each comprising of 
24 resolvable, 24 misleading and 24 no-probe-1 trials presented in random 
order. As in Experiment 7 an equal ratio of misleading, resolvable and no-
probe-1 trials were used. 
 
Design 
A  two  (Group:  low  vs.  high  checkers)  by  three  (Probe-1:  resolvable, 
misleading, no-probe-1) by two (Probe-2 Location: Correct, Incorrect) mixed 
design was employed with group as the between- and probe-1 and probe-2 
location as the within-subjects factors.  
 
5.11. Results and Discussion of Experiment 9 
MANOVAs for a 2 x 3 x 2 design were carried out for reaction times, accuracy 
and  confidence  on  probe-2  responses  due  to  violations  of  the  sphericity 
assumption (Mauchley’s tests). 
 
Probe-2 Response Latencies 
A  main  effect  of  trial  type  (F(2,76)  =  4.01,  p<0.023)  reflected  the  linear 
increase  in  RTs  across  resolvable  (1847.4ms),  misleading  (1943.9ms)  and 
no-probe-1  trials  (2019.9ms).  We  suggest  that  the  presence  of  an 
intermediate  probe  (resolvable  or  misleading)  may  focus  the  attention  of 
checkers to responding which primes them to subsequent responding, leading 
to faster responding in these conditions compared to when no intermediate 
probe (i.e., no response priming) is presented. This pattern was previously 
observed in our original experiments, which when considered in relation to the 
different probe-1 RTs of Experiment 1 (Misleading > Resolvable = No-Probe-
1) indicates that the relationship between probe-1 and the specificity of probe-
2 is sufficient to influence RTs. A main effect of probe-2 location (F(1,38) =  
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39.31, p<0.001) showed that participants responded slower to an appliance 
that  was  correctly  located  (2067.8ms)  with  respect  to  the  encoded  set 
compared to one that was incorrectly located (1806.4ms). 
 
Probe-2 Accuracy 
The main effect  of probe-2  location  reached  significance  (F(1,38)  =  42.86, 
p<0.001), which reflected poorer accuracy for correctly (79.4%) compared to 
incorrectly located appliances (94.5%). When considered alongside the RT 
main  effect  for  probe-2  this  suggests  that  correctly  located  appliances  are 
more difficult to resolve which is reflected in slower RTs. In explanation, an 
incorrect  location  can  be  disproved  by  at  least  two  partial  representations 
such as remembering which object actually had been in the probe location or 
by remembering the correct location of the probe object. This is not the case 
for  correct  probes  where  this  particular  object-location  binding  has  to  be 
received veridically. The group x trial type interaction was significant (F(1,38) 
= 3.42, p<0.04). Analysis of the simple main effects for group at each level of 
trial-type revealed a significant group difference (low=90.5% vs. high=82.3%) 
for  misleading  trials  (F(1,38)  =  7.52,  p=0.009)  (see  fig.  25),  whereas,  for 
resolvable  and  no-probe-1  trials  no  statistically  significant  group  difference 
was observed (p=0.084 and p=0.366, respectively). However, we are aware 
that  the  lack  of  significant  differences  does  not  necessarily  equate  to  a 
demonstration  of  similarity  but  rather  could  be  explained  by  a  lack  of 
sensitivity. We further analysed the simple main effects within each group to 
determine  the  locus  of  between-condition performance  differences.  For  the 
low group, no differences were reported between resolvable, misleading or 
no-probe-1  trials  (i.e.,  all  p>0.3).  On  the  other  hand,  for  high  checkers, 
responses  were  less  accurate  for  misleading  trials  than  no-probe-1  trials 
(F(1,38) = 5.99, p<0.02), but responses for resolvable and no-probe-1 trials 
were  similarly  accurate  (p=0.361).  Thus,  despite  the  visually  attenuated 
performance  of  high  checkers  across  trials,  the  significant  group  x  trial 
interaction is due to the special role of misleading trials which is then reflected 
with a significant group difference specific to this condition. 
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Figure 25. Probe-2 accuracy (ACC%) for group (low vs. high) at each level of trial 
type  (resolvable,  misleading,  no-probe-1).  *  Denotes  significance  at  p<0.01  level. 
Vertical bars denote standard errors. 
 
Confidence Ratings  
A main effect of group revealed (F(1,38) = 5.30, p<0.028) that high checkers 
(70.67) had poorer confidence overall compared to low checkers (80.71) (see 
fig. 26). Trial-type reached significance (F(2,76) = 5.87, p<0.005), which was 
driven  by  poorer  confidence  on  misleading  trials  compared  to  resolvable 
(F(1,38) = 4.67, p=0.037) and no-probe-1 trials (F(1,38) = 8.15, p<0.008). This 
suggests  that  a  misleading  intermediate  probe  was  sufficient  to  reduce 
confidence in all participants. Probe-2 location reached significance (F(1,38) = 
20.51,  p<0.001)  and  reflected  less  confidence  for  correctly  compared  to 
incorrectly  located  appliances.  Poorer  confidence  for  a  correctly  located 
appliance  reflected  the  poorer  accuracy  that  all  participants  had  in  this 
condition. The group x probe-2 location interaction approached significance 
(F(1,38)  =  3.65,  p=0.064),  with  group  differences  observed  for  incorrectly 
(F(1,38) = 8.31, p=0.006) but not correctly located appliances (F(1,38) = 2.23, 
p=0.144). Thus, the low checkers mirrored the general trend of the probe-2 
location  main  effect  (i.e.,  poorer  performance  for  correct  than  incorrect), 
whereas the high group had poorer confidence across both conditions.  
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Figure 26. Confidence (0-100) for group: High checkers (70.7) had significantly less 
confidence overall than low checkers (80.7) (p<0.05). Vertical bars denote standard 
errors. 
 
Correlations  between  accuracy  and  confidence  were  conducted  for  each 
group and both groups showed significant relationships (low group: r=0.56, 
n=20,  p=0.01;  high  group:  r=0.71,  n=20,  p=0.000)  indicating  that  for  all 
participants confidence mirrors accuracy. In a further analysis we subtracted 
confidence  scores  from  accuracy  scores  for  each  participant  in  each 
condition,  which  produced  what  we  termed  a  discrepancy  score.  A 
discrepancy score of zero indicates that accuracy and confidence mirror each 
other, whereas an increasing discrepancy score indicates that confidence is 
numerically  less  than  preceding  accuracy.  We  were  primarily  interested  in 
group  differences  in  discrepancy  scores  across  trial-types,  as  this  could 
indicate conditions, where confidence and accuracy might only diverge in high 
checkers, revealing a metacognitive deficit. 
 
In  a  MANOVA  analysis  of  the  discrepancy  scores  the  interaction  between 
group x trial-type reached significance (F(1,38) = 3.14, p=0.049, η
2
p=.076). 
Analysis  of  the  simple  main  effects  for  group  at  each  level  of  trial-type 
revealed a significant group difference (LC=6.42 vs. HC=14.18) for no-probe-
1  trials  (F(1,38)  =  5.42,  p=0.025)  but  not  for  resolvable  (F(1,38)  =  0.60, 
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p=0.442) or misleading trials (F(1,38) = 0.76, p=0.389). This indicates that low 
and  high  checkers  confidence-accuracy  discrepancy  is  similarly  inflated  in 
trials  when  there  is  an  intermediate  probe:  accuracy  is  greater  than 
confidence. However, in no-probe-1 trials low checkers accuracy-confidence 
is  more  concordant  (6.42)  compared  to  high  checkers  whose  discrepancy 
score (14.18) is similar to that observed in resolvable (12.47) and misleading 
trials  (14.04).  We  interpret  that  high  checkers  suffer  a  task  independent 
impairment in their metacognitive functioning which is expressed here as less 
confidence in their accuracy on no-probe-1 trials.  
 
5.12. General Discussion 
The  present  experiments  used  electrical  kitchen  appliances  that  were 
concordant  with  the  symptomatology  of  those  afflicted  with  obsessive-
compulsive checking (Rachman, 2002; Thordarson et al., 2004). We did this 
in an attempt to address a primary criticism of our previous research (Harkin & 
Kessler, 2009, 2011a) that letters in locations do not resonate with the primary 
concerns of checkers. We predicted that for high checkers using episodically 
rich stimuli and questioning a threatening aspect of them (i.e., ‘ON/OFF’ state 
of  probe-1)  would  provide  a  greater  challenge  to  the  attention-dependent 
bindings required for accurate memory recall.  
 
We observed that group effects differed between experiments, a finding we 
attribute to employing ecologically valid stimuli and probing different features 
of the memory in Experiment 8 (electric state on/off) compared to Experiment 
8  (location).  Experiment  8  supported  our  claim  that  our  stimuli  were 
compatible  with  OCD/checking  symptomatology  by  revealing  a  main  group 
effect in reaction times and accuracy. However, reaction times and accuracy 
data  also  indicated  that  the  particular  manipulations  in  Experiment  8  may 
have  resulted  in  a  degree  of  interference  in  all  participants.  Specifically, 
probe-2  reaction  times  were  slower  after  a  misleading  intermediate  probe, 
suggesting  that  this  experiment  encouraged  all  participants  to  access  the 
‘ON/OFF’ states of the appliances which then slowed subsequent responding 
to a state-based probe-2 question. Memory decisions regarding appliances’  
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‘ON’ or ‘OFF’ states (probe-2) were significantly slower for all participants in 
misleading  compared  to  resolvable  or  no-probe-1  trials.  Memory  accuracy 
was significantly poorer after resolvable and misleading trials compared to no-
probe-1 trials. So for all participants continually focusing on ON/OFF states 
appears  to  have  come  at  the  cost  to  their  performance.  Together,  the 
strengths of these general effects could have been sufficient to obscure group 
effects  but  this  proved  not  to  be  the  case:  High  checkers  were  generally 
slower and poorer at recalling the state of an electric appliance compared to 
low checkers (weak hypothesis). 
 
As we did not include an independent cognitive index of WM functioning, high 
checkers’ poorer accuracy overall (compared to low scoring checkers) could 
be interpreted as impaired WM capacity. However, we argue against this for a 
number  of  reasons  (for  a  review  see  Harkin  &  Kessler,  2011b).  Firstly,  if 
checkers  have  a  general  WM  capacity  impairment  then  this  would  have 
influenced our previous results (Harkin & Kessler, 2009, 2011a). A general 
impairment  would  negatively  affect  WM  performance  irrespective  of  the 
content of the encoded set, i.e., similar no-probe-1 impairment for letters and 
electrical  appliances.  Secondly,  if  checkers  suffered  from  basic  capacity 
impairment, then memory would not be influenced by the specificity of the 
probe-2 question, whereby they would necessarily have impaired appliance-
location  (Exp.  9)  memory  in  the  no-probe-1  condition.  Thirdly,  there  is  a 
convergence of evidence showing that basic WM capacity is intact (Ciesielski 
et al., 2007; Henseler et al., 2008) with impairment only observed at high load 
levels  when  tasks  stress  dysfunctional  components  of  executive  control  in 
OCD patients (Boldrini et al., 2005; Morein-Zamir et al., 2010; Moritz et al., 
2003;  Purcell  et  al.,  1998a,  ,  1998b;  van  der  Wee  et  al.,  2003;  Zielinski, 
Taylor, & Juzwin, 1991; Zitterl et al., 2001). Finally, considering that in simple 
memory tasks subclinical checkers have outperformed OCD patients (Tuna, 
Tekcan, & Topcuoglu, 2005) and controls (Irak & Flament, 2009), it is unlikely 
that our group of subclinical checkers had anomalous capacity issues. Rather, 
it is likely that they have executive impairments analogous to those observed 
in clinical OCD (Mataix-Cols et al., 1999a; Mataix-Cols et al., 1997; Omori et 
al.,  2007),  which  interferes  with  efficient  state-appliance-location  bindings  
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during  encoding  and/or  maintenance.  This  is  in  agreement  with  the 
perspective  that  memory  impairments  in  OCD  are  secondary  to  executive 
dysfunction (Greisberg & McKay, 2003) and it is further in agreement with the 
metacognitive deficit revealed in Experiment 9. 
 
The differences between low and high checkers were somewhat more subtle, 
yet even more revealing in Experiment 9: (1) Performance of high checkers 
was  significantly  affected  on  misleading  trials  compared  to  baseline  (no-
probe1  trials).  (2)  The  misleading  condition  revealed  the  strongest  group 
difference with the best performance for low- and the worst performance for 
high checkers across all trial conditions. (3) In contrast to Experiment 8, high 
checkers’ performance on no-probe-1 trials did not significantly differ from the 
performance of low checkers. Finally, there was a statistical trend for a group 
difference  on  the  resolvable  trials  that  was  reminiscent  of  the  significant 
differences we had observed before with a spatial probe and abstract stimuli 
(letters in locations, Expt. 4 in Harkin and Kessler, 2011a). There, a spatial 
probe had been generally distracting for high checkers. Here however, when 
the  stimuli  were  relevant  to  checkers’  symptoms  (electric  appliances  with 
switches) a misleading probe provides additional impairment to that caused 
by  an  intermediate  spatial  probe  resulting  in  the  main,  statistically  reliable 
difference. This is corroborated by the significant interaction between group 
and trial type and further detailed analysis which revealed that high checkers 
performed significantly worse on misleading compared to baseline trials while 
performance  on  resolvable  compared to  baseline  trials  did not  significantly 
differ (supporting the strong hypothesis). In contrast, the performance of low 
checkers did not significantly differ for any trial-type comparison.  
 
In explanation, based on the findings from Task 6 we argue that checkers’ 
attention is generally biased toward the threatening aspects of the appliances. 
In Experiment 9 this is moderated by the emphasis on spatial locations of 
probe-2,  but  may  still  provide  high  checkers  with  a  slight  advantage  in 
accessing the state of an appliance at a resolvable compared to a misleading 
location  during  probe-1.  This  may  explain  why  the  group  difference  for 
resolvable trials did not reach significance while it did for misleading trials. We  
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argue  that  our  explanation  in  terms  of  attention  biased  by  the  threatening 
aspects  of  the  stimuli  may  be  particularly  true  when  locations  are  being 
challenged  during  probe  2  (cf.  Exp.  9)  rather  than  if  stimuli  identities  are 
challenged. This proposal  is  supported  by our  previous findings (Exp.  1-4) 
which  showed  that  high  checkers  exhibited  memory  impairments  when 
questioned about the location of a certain stimulus, but not when questioned 
about the identity of a stimulus at a certain location. That is, maintaining the 
correct location of an appliance in WM depends more strongly on sustained 
attention  than  maintaining  the  identity  of  the  appliance.  Indeed,  identity 
representations  may  be  harder  to  disrupt  than  location  representations 
because the identity of a stimulus is based on concepts stored in long-term 
memory (LTM), whereas the location of a stimulus is arbitrary and specific to 
the experimental context. Also as we proposed in relation to the findings of 
Experiment 4 (Harkin & Kesssler, 2011a), cross-modal stimuli (i.e., binding 
across the ventral and dorsal streams) require greater attentional resources 
than  those  processed  within  one  stream  (i.e.,  contrast:  impaired  object-
location  binding;  Elsley  &  Parmentier,  2009  versus  intact  object-feature 
binding; Allen, Baddeley, & Hitch, 2006). As a result, location-identity bindings 
are particularly vulnerable to interference as sustained attention is necessary 
to their veridicality in WM. In contrast to our previous studies, however, we 
employed  an  equal  ratio  of  misleading,  resolvable  and  no-probe-1  trials 
throughout our two experiments (in contrast to counter-balanced ratios across 
two  blocks  in  Harkin  &  Kessler,  2009,  2011a)  which  further  underpins  the 
robustness of our findings with ecologically valid scenarios.  
 
Finally,  we  suggest  that  high  checkers’  intact  no-probe-1  performance  in 
Experiment 9, in contrast to generally impaired performance in Experiment 8, 
is due to task differences regarding the memory probe (probe 2). Specifically, 
Experiment 8 required the accurate recall of the appliances’ ‘ON/OFF’ status 
while Experiment 9 probed the correct location of an appliance. As this no-
probe-1  impairment  was  neither  previously  reported  (Exp  1  to  4;  Harkin  & 
Kessler, 2009, 2011a) nor was it observed in Experiment 9, the locus of the 
difference  must  be  specific  to  the  probe-2  task  in  Experiment  8  where 
attention was again focused on the threatening aspects of the stimuli (electric  
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on/off status). We propose that this may have in turn affected the encoding, 
maintenance and/or retrieval of multimodal bindings in Experiment 8 in form of 
interference  fuelled  by  anxiety.  In  fact  we  regard  the  group  main  effect  in 
Experiment 8 as confirmation of the ecological validity of our stimuli.  
 
Specifically,  our  findings  from  Experiment  8  are  not  only  supported  by 
checkers  specific  attenuations  of  normal  IOR  functioning  (Task  6)  for 
threatening  aspects  (Task  7)  of  stimuli  but  are  also  in  agreement  with 
Attentional Control Theory of Eysenck et al. (2007; Eysenck & Derakshan, 
2011).  This  theory  proposed  that  stimuli  which  evoke  anxiety  (i.e.,  those 
relevant to checkers symptoms) divert attention from the goal-directed (i.e., 
maintenance of bindings in EB) to the stimulus-specific (i.e., ‘ON/OFF’ states) 
attentional system. This theory explains why anxiety is particularly interfering 
to memory that is reliant upon bindings of features to locations. For example, 
Lavric, Rippon, and Gray (2003) observed that threat-evoked anxiety impaired 
performance  in  a  spatial  but  not  a  verbal  n-back  WM  task.  The  authors 
proposed  that  anxiety  interfered  with  executive  functioning,  which  impaired 
spatial WM as it more reliant upon sustained attention than verbal WM (for 
review see Harkin & Kessler, 2011b).  This agrees with attenuated IOR effects 
we saw for high checkers when their attention was drawn to threatening ‘ON’ 
cues (Task 7). In short, this means that high scorers’ attention perseveres on 
a threatening stimulus once it was drawn to it, underpinning the ecological 
validity of our stimuli.  Thus, it is possible that as ‘ON/OFF’ states are salient 
to the symptoms of checkers they attend to them at the cost of their binding to 
the appliance. Thus, we provide tentative evidence which concurs with Omori 
et  al.  (2007)  that  checkers  likely  have  executive  impairments  of  inhibition 
which interferes with the veridicality of bindings maintained within the EB.    
 
While group differences in confidence were not observed in Experiment 8, 
Experiment 9 revealed a group main effect for a lack of confidence in high 
scorers. This highlights that a continuous confidence scale (Exp. 9) is not only 
more sensitive for detecting group effects but it also lends itself to a wider 
range of statistical analyses compared to the binary forced-choice (Exp. 8). 
The main effect in Experiment 9 indicates that high checkers have a global  
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(trial-type independent) impairment in confidence compared to low checkers. 
That is, although correlations where high between accuracy and confidence 
for both groups, only high checkers showed a significant discrepancy for the 
no-probe1  trials.  This  dissociation  between  performance  and  confidence  in 
the baseline condition in particular, suggests a metacognitive deficit in form of 
impaired performance monitoring that is present in high- but absent in low 
checkers.   
 
5.12.1. Conclusions 
The  current  findings  confirm  that  checkers’  memory  impairments  are 
secondary to executive dysfunction, especially when ecologically valid stimuli 
are  employed.  The  different  accuracy  patterns  of  high  compared  to  low 
checkers  between  Experiment  8  and  9  allow  us  to  make  the  following 
conclusions. In Experiment 8, we observed a novel finding with high checkers 
showing a robust impairment in their ability to accurately recall the state (‘ON’ 
or ‘OFF’) of an electrical appliance (weak hypothesis). A group effect which 
was  surprisingly  not  influenced  by  trial  type  (resolvable,  misleading,  no-
probe). While superficially this appears to indicate a general impairment in 
WM  capacity,  we  have  highlighted  a  number  of  reasons  why  this  is  an 
unsatisfactory explanation. We conclude that this novel, general impairment is 
rather  specific  to  the  memory  task  (probe-2)  in  Experiment  8  that  biased 
subclinical  checkers  towards  the  threatening  electric  on/off  status  of  the 
appliances (Harkin & Kessler, in press), which in turn generally interfered with 
multimodal  bindings  in  the  EB.  In  contrast,  Experiment  9  revealed  the 
expected,  more  differentiated  pattern  with  a  special  status  for  misleading 
trials: Performance of high checkers was significantly affected on misleading 
trials  compared  to  baseline  trials  and  the  strongest  group  difference  was 
observed in the misleading condition (strong hypothesis).  
 
In Experiment 9 we successfully employed a continuous confidence scale that 
allowed us to calculate discrepancy scores between accuracy and confidence 
for each participant in each condition. The main result was that while there 
overall strong correlations between accuracy and confidence in both groups, 
only  the  high  checkers  revealed  a  significant  discrepancy  in  the  baseline  
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condition.  Although  they  reached  their  highest  performance  levels  in  this 
condition, their confidence did not improve, which we interpret as supporting a 
metacognitive  deficit  that  is  absent  in  low  checkers.  The  importance  of 
memory and metacognitive impairments in OCD is corroborated by reports 
that poor memory and checking influences the severity of obsessional thinking 
(Park et al., 2006; Purcell et al., 1998a). 
 
5.12.2. Limitations 
The following limitations of our study have to be considered. Firstly, using a 
subclinical group always raises the issue of their relevance as an analogue to 
a clinical group. We agree, however, with Mataix-Cols et al. (1997; 1999a) 
that subclinical OCD groups are a valid means of determining which cognitive 
factors  play  a  role  in  clinically  defined  OCD,  particularly  considering  their 
reduced medication and potential for co-morbidities. We therefore expect that 
the  pattern  observed  here  with  subclinical  checkers  could  be  more 
pronounced using clinical OCD patients, yet, also more variable. Secondly, 
despite the claim that a subclinical group provides a ‘purer’ indication of the 
cognitive impairments specific to this subtype; we did not control for anxiety or 
depression  nor  did  we  provide  an  independent  cognitive  index  of  WM 
functioning  and  so  cannot  exclude  possible  group  differences.  Thirdly, 
subjects  were  not  explicitly  matched  for  education;  however,  they  were 
selected  from  an  undergraduate  population,  thus,  ensuring  a  homogenous 
educational background for all participants, which is yet another advantage of 
a  subclinical  sample.  However,  future  research  with  clinical  patients  could 
examine in more detail the relationship between severity of symptoms and 
completion of formative school which may then influence general intelligence. 
Fourthly, we did not counterbalance the keys for the forced-choice confidence 
responses in Experiment 7 and so cannot determine if a lateralization bias 
influenced  participants’  responding  and  possibly  masking  existing  group 
differences.  
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6.  The  role  of  working  memory  in  compulsive  checking  and  OCD:  A 
systematic classification of 58 experimental findings 
The importance of memory in checking/OCD is not only evident in the present 
thesis  but  is  also  reflected  in  a  number  of  reviews  covering  the  topic,  for 
example,  Coles  and  Heimberg  (2002),  Woods  et  al.  (2002),  Kuelz  et  al. 
(2004),  Muller  and  Roberts  (2005)  and  Cuttler  and  Graf  (2009).  However, 
despite this large body of research the evidence for memory impairments in 
OCD is described as mixed at best (Hermans et al., 2008). For example, there 
are inconsistent findings regarding a general mnestic deficit (e.g. Tallis, 1997 
vs. MacDonald et al., 1997; McNally & Kohlbeck, 1993), verbal memory (e.g., 
intact: Henseler et al., 2008 versus deficit: Tuna, Tekcan, & Topcuoglu, 2005) 
and generally affected visuospatial memory (Hermans et al., 2008; Mataix-
Cols et al., 1999a; Muller & Roberts, 2005). 
 
We attribute this to the traditional pursuit of OCD memory impairment as one 
of  the  general  capacity  and/or  domain  specific  deficits  (visuospatial  vs. 
verbal). In contrast, a body of research indicates a more subtle relationship, 
with memory impairments secondary to executive dysfunction (Greisberg & 
McKay,  2003).  If  a  memory  task  taps  into  a  dysfunctional  component  of 
executive  functioning  (see  Table  5),  attenuated  memory  impairment  will 
follow. In this understanding, it is executive deficits in conjunction with task 
requirements  that  differentiate  memory  functioning  in  OCD  from  controls 
(Olley, Malhi, & Sachdev, 2007). This review provides a more precise level of 
explanation:  EB functionality  (binding)  is  vulnerable  to  interference  through 
executive  dysfunction.    In  other  words,  interference  from  executive 
dysfunction  reduces  the  veridicality  of  multimodal  bindings  within  the  EB, 
attenuating OCD memory performance. Irrespective of the exact mechanism 
for  binding  multimodal  features  together  into  a  representation,  researchers 
tend  to  agree  that  attentional  effort  is  required  for  their  generation  and 
maintenance  (i.e.,  Hyun,  Woodman,  &  Luck,  2009).  Therefore,  memory 
impairments  occur  if  distraction  is  sufficient  to  interfere  with  attention-
dependent bindings. For example, Fougnie and Marois (2009) hypothesized 
that attention iteratively refreshes multimodal representations in WM: it is only 
when a distractor sufficiently interferes with attention that there is a failure to  
    112 
maintain features in a bound manner (e.g., Harkin & Kessler, 2009, 2011a; 
Harkin, Rutherford, & Kessler, 2011; Kessler & Kiefer, 2005). This dove-tails 
nicely  with  findings  showing  that  the  more  emotionally  engaging  a  given 
distractor is to an individual (or group) the more it interferes with attention-
dependent bindings (Mather et al., 2006).  
 
The present review therefore concentrates on identifying the mechanisms and 
parameters underlying executive-memory impairment in OCD, i.e., disrupted 
attention-dependent bindings in the EB. To this end, we provide a synthesis of 
our research which has concentrated on checking in WM performance (Harkin 
& Kessler, 2009, 2011b; Harkin, Rutherford, & Kessler, 2011). Basically, our 
novel paradigm aimed at the ‘EB’ component of WM (Baddeley, 2000). During 
the delay period of a WM task (i.e., between memory-set: letters in locations & 
memory  task:  “Where  was  letter?”)  participants  were  presented  with 
misleading information which was detrimental to high checkers’ memory more 
than  for  low.  Checkers,  it  appears,  are  poorer  at  inhibiting  irrelevant  and 
misleading information (i.e., executive dysfunction) which interfered with the 
maintenance of bindings (letter in locations) in the EB. From this, we identify 
three  common  factors  (EBL:  Executive-functioning  efficiency,  Binding 
complexity, and memory Load) that we generalise to 58 experimental findings 
from 46 OCD memory studies and explain otherwise inconsistent research, 
e.g., intact versus deficient verbal memory.   
 
Table 5. Studies reporting executive deficits in OCD. 
Study  Test/Task  Executive 
Function  OCD Impairment 
Head et al. (1989) 
Roh et al . (2005) 
Sanz et al. (2001) 
Wisconsin Card 
Sorting Test 
(WCST) 
Set-Shifting  More perseverative 
errors 
Bohne et al. (2005)  WCST  --  Poorer at learning 
from feedback 
Goodwin & Sher (1992) 
Harvey(1987) 
Head et al. (1989) 
Hymas et al. (1991) 
Sanz et al. (2001) 
WCST  --  Completed less 
categories 
Chamberlain et al. 
(2006) 
Purcell et al. (1998a)  
Veale et al. (1996)  
Watkins et al. (2005)  
Intra-Dimensional/ 
Extra-Dimensional 
(ID/ED) Task 
Selective attention 
and set-shifting 
Stuck in previous 
attentional 
set/impaired in 
switching cognitive 
set  
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Elliot et al. (1995) 
Fenger et al. (2005) 
Veale et al. (1996) 
Enright & Beech (1993) 
Enright et al. (1995) 
Hoenig et al. (2002) 
Negative Priming  Inhibition 
Preattentive deficit 
in cognitive 
inhibition 
Moritz et al. (2009)  Inhibition of Return 
(IOR)  Inhibition 
Slower RTs when 
targets preceded 
with threat stimuli 
Harkin & Kessler (in 
press)  IOR  -- 
Normal inhibition 
overcome by 
attention to threat 
Omori et al. (2007) 
Stroop Test, Trail 
Making Test, 
Go/No Go Task 
Category Fluency 
Inhibition, cognitive 
flexibility, and multi-
tasking 
Only checkers (not 
washers) was 
inhibition 
impairments 
correlated with poor 
episodic memory 
Bannon et al. (2006) 
Bannon et al. (2008)  
Go/No Go Task 
Stroop  Selective attention 
Deficit (while OCD 
symptoms were 
reduced) 
Kim et al. (2002) 
Penades et al. (2005) 
Roh et al. (2005) 
Trail-Making Task 
(TMT)  Organization 
Consistently slower 
on Part 
A(organization 
impairment) and B 
(set-shifting) 
Fenger et al. (2005)  Figural Fluency 
Task (FFT)  -- 
Impaired in 
organizing spatial 
information 
 
6.1. A working-memory explanation 
Baddeley’s original model (1986) included a central executive, phonological 
loop and visuospatial sketchpad and was deemed separate from long-term 
memory  (LTM).  While  this  simple  model  explained  a  range  of  data  (e.g., 
phonological  similarity,  word-length  effect),  it  could  not  account  for  all 
experimental  phenomena.  For  example,  the  visuospatial  sketchpad,  a 
capacity  limit  of  4  units  was  observed  for  the  maintenance  of  individual 
features (colors or orientations) as well as for integrated objects with colors 
and orientations (Luck & Vogel, 1997). The so-called “binding problem” (e.g., 
Treisman, 1996) refers to the fact that information presented in visual scenes 
rarely consists of isolated features. Rather, features pertain to objects, objects 
to locations, and objects are further embedded into episodes together with a 
plethora of contextual information. A parallel processing architecture like the 
human brain needs mechanisms for tracking “what goes with what” in order to 
generate  and  maintain  bindings  between  multiple  features  (Hinton, 
McClelland, & Rumelhart, 1986). Therefore, accurate memory (WM and LTM)  
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requires the encoding, maintenance and retrieval of bindings between various 
aspects of a multimodal episode (Allen, Baddeley, & Hitch, 2006). Baddeley 
(2000), therefore, extended his classic 1986 WM model to include an “EB” 
that allowed for multimodal, temporarily integrated representations and served 
as an interface with episodic LTM. Based on this development, we proposed 
(Harkin & Kessler, 2009) that an executive dysfunction (e.g., unsuppressed 
intrusive thoughts/stimuli) interferes with fragile multimodal bindings in the EB, 
resulting in the consolidation of affected episodes into WM and LTM.  
 
6.2. Empirical evidence from high checkers’ memory performance 
With these points in mind, our recent experiments (Harkin & Kessler, 2009, 
2011b;  Harkin,  Rutherford  &  Kessler, 2011)  set  out  to:  (1)  engage  the EB 
using  stimuli  that  required  multimodal  conjunctions  between  various  object 
features  and  spatial  locations  and  to  (2)  hamper  EB  functionality  by 
confronting  high  and  low  checkers  with  misleading/irresolvable  information 
during the WM retention interval. In Harkin and Kessler (2009), we employed 
this  novel  paradigm  for  the  first  time.  We  presented  4  letters  (see  fig.  2) 
randomly in 6 possible locations and asked participants to indicate 4 seconds 
later if a test letter was in the correct (50%) or incorrect (50%) location. The 
novel manipulation that was meant to induce checking was presented as an 
additional  probe  between  the  encoding-set  and  the  actual  test  letter.  This 
intermediate probe (probe-1) was either resolvable (e.g., “Where was T”) or 
misleading (e.g., “Where was K”) referring to its presence or absence in the 
encoding-set, respectively (see fig. 2). Misleading trials were hypothesized to 
induce  frustrating  and  unnecessary  checking  in  those  with  such  a 
predisposition  as  no correct  answer  was  possible  but  in  order  to  proceed, 
suppression  of  the  misleading  information  and  of  the  urge  to  check  was 
required.  
 
Conforming to our expectations, high scoring checkers’ memory performance 
was attenuated compared to low checkers when interfered with by misleading 
information,  yet,  performance  was  not  statistically  different  when  the 
distracting intermediate probe was resolvable or absent. Importantly and in  
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agreement with previous findings (e.g., Ciesielski et al., 2007; Henseler et al., 
2008),  this  further  underpins  that  there  is  no  general  difference  in  WM 
capacity per se between high and low checkers.  
 
We  extended  these  experiments  in  Harkin  and  Kessler  (Harkin  &  Kessler, 
2011a)  to  include  the  same  4  letters  in  6  locations  but  with  an  additional 
feature dimension (color) in one experiment and a different distractor probe 
(spatial) in another. Adding color enhanced the memory load in the EB and 
resulted  in overall  reduced  performance  but  not  in a  specifically  enhanced 
deficit  for  checkers.  Thus,  we  may  have  induced  a  greater  degree  of 
checking/uncertainty in all participants. This further emphasises how careful 
one must consider the requirements of a task in order to obtain a checker-
specific performance deficit. Employing a spatial probe as the intermediate 
distractor, however, had the desired effect regarding a checker-specific deficit, 
although WM load per se was not increased. We asked which letter had been 
presented at a particular location where there either had (resolvable) or had 
not  been  a  letter  (misleading).  This  spatial  distractor  manipulation  boosted 
group differences, as it tapped into more specific executive deficits of high 
checkers  (i.e.,  suppression  of  distraction)  while  low  checkers  were  not 
challenged  by  this  modification.  Furthermore,  the  use  of  eye  tracking 
measures in our WM task revealed that high checkers made more fixations 
during  misleading  trials  to  primarily  empty  encoded  set  locations  (Exp.  5). 
Indicating that impairments in their ability to inhibit misleading stimuli induced 
a degree of uncertainty which motivated checkers to search the contents of 
WM  at  empty  locations  where  no  additional  task-relevant  information  was 
present (Harkin, Miellet, & Kessler, subm). 
 
While we reported robust and replicable effects in the aforementioned studies 
we were aware of the limitations of using letters in locations, as it is unlikely 
that they evoke a strong emotional response in checkers (see Moritz et al., 
2008).  Our  third  series  of  experiments,  therefore,  used  ecologically  valid 
stimuli  in  the  form  of  electrical  kitchen  appliances  (Harkin,  Rutherford  & 
Kessler, 2011). We presented 4 kitchen appliances in 6 possible locations on 
a kitchen countertop: two appliances were ‘ON’ and two were ‘OFF.’ Again,  
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we  used  an  intermediate  spatial  probe  asking  if  the  appliance  at  a  cued 
location  had  been  ‘ON’  or  ‘OFF’  (an  appliance  had  either  been  there  = 
resolvable,  or  not  =  misleading).  When  the  primary  WM  task  required 
remembering  the  correct  location  of  an  appliance  we  found  a  very  similar 
pattern of group differences as we previously had with letters, yet, statistically 
and experimentally more robust (stronger effect sizes with fewer trials) and, 
most importantly, accompanied by a metacognitive deficit in high checkers, 
reflected in reduced confidence even when performance was at ceiling and 
did not differ statistically from the low checking group, i.e., in the baseline 
condition without a distracting probe. 
 
6.3.  The  EBL  (Executive-Functioning,  Binding  Complexity,  Memory 
Load) classification system 
Our synthesis so far leads us to conclude that checkers’ memory impairment 
results  from  a  complex  interaction  between  (1)  executive  dysfunction  in 
encoding organization, multimodal integration, selective attention (inhibition), 
maintenance  control, and  set-shifting  and  (2)  the  task  components  of  load 
(e.g.,  high  load,  requiring  chunking),  multimodality  (e.g., 
location+identity+color),  distraction  (e.g.,  dual  task  paradigm),  retrieval 
dimension (e.g., location), and stimulus salience (e.g. electric switches). We 
proposed  that  the  likely  locus  where  these  deficits  interact  and  potentially 
augment each other is the EB and we have reviewed supporting findings and 
arguments. In conclusion, we further propose that there are etiological and 
explanatory factors common to OCD, which can be summarised along the 
following  three  dimensions  that  serve  as  our  basis  for  predicting  and 
classifying WM deficits in compulsive checking and OCD:  
 
(1)  Executive  Function  Efficiency  (E):  Checking  (Cha  et  al.,  2008), 
rumination (Exner, Martin, & Rief, 2009), and disinhibition (Omori et al., 2007) 
are  all  associated  with  poorer  memory  in  OCD,  implying  that  if  these 
impairments of executive function are present or induced by a task then OCD 
patients will experience a detriment in memory functioning relative to controls. 
We  follow  Wolters  and  Raffone’s  (2008)  tri-partite  definition  of  executive  
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functioning consisting of (1) Attentional Control: top-down selective activation 
of task-relevant representations and suppression of task-irrelevant stimuli and 
responses,  (2)  Maintenance:  holding  task-relevant  information  in  an  active 
state,  and  (3)  Integration:  flexibly  bind  and  manipulate  information  from 
multimodal  sources,  in  the  service  of  controlling  task  execution.  Efficient 
executive  functioning  can  improve  performance  by  reducing  outside 
interference  and  by  selecting  mnemonic  strategies  such  as  chunking  of 
information  based  on  long-term-memory  knowledge  (Miller,  1956).  In  this 
understanding,  OCD  memory  impairment  occurs  when:  (1)  Experimental 
manipulations aggravate existing impairments in executive functioning which 
interfere with attention-dependent bindings. For example, when the encoding-
set is concordant with OCD symptomatology it may divide attention between 
threat  and  encoding  (Coles  &  Heimberg,  2002),  which  reduces  quality  of 
attention to bindings, impairing memory performance. (2) Inappropriate use of 
executive strategies decreases binding efficiency and/or the overall load of a 
given memory representation. We will discuss that an inability to appropriately 
structure and organize stimulus input is typical of OCD (Kuelz, Hohagen, & 
Voderholzer, 2004). 
 
(2)  Binding  Complexity  (B):  Binding  different  (multimodal)  features 
together and maintaining these representations over time impose a challenge 
that  increases  with  the  number  of  features  and  their  multimodality.  We 
propose that the executive function deficit ‘allows’ distracting information to 
affect  the  fragile  complex  bindings  in  OCD.  The  inherently  greater  binding 
complexities of visuospatial tasks (e.g., multiple objects-to-location bindings) 
are  more  likely  to  reveal  OCD  impairments  than  verbal  tasks.  Complex 
bindings are susceptible to interference and place greater strain upon correct 
executive control – especially when multimodal bindings are involved (Harkin 
& Kessler, 2009, 2011b; Harkin, Rutherford & Kessler, 2011; Olley, Malhi, & 
Sachdev,  2007).  Verbal  deficits,  however,  will  occur  if  the  task  relies  to  a 
similar  extent  upon  the  maintenance  of  complex  bindings  (e.g.  position  of 
letters in space or sequence). This places memory impairment primarily as an 
outcome of disrupted multimodal bindings and secondarily as one of memory 
domain.  It  just  so  happens  that  linguistic/verbal  material  is  usually  more  
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strongly subserved by LTM concepts (if not artificially scrambled, e.g. non-
words),  thus,  providing  semantic/lexical  knowledge  that  facilitates  complex 
bindings. We expect Binding Complexity to play a predominant role during 
maintenance,  when  attention  is  required  to  ensure  veridicality  of  WM 
representations over time.  
 
(3)  Memory  Load  (L):  Assuming  that  there  is  no  basic  capacity  issue 
involved in OCD (e.g., Ciesielski et al., 2007; Henseler et al., 2008; Harkin & 
Kessler,  2009,  2011a;  Harkin,  Rutherford  &  Kessler,  2011),  performance 
deficits under high load would crucially depend on executive strategies (van 
der Wee et al., 2003): An increase in load (i.e., number of chunks to retain) 
places  greater  stress  upon  the  correct  implementation  of  organization 
strategies  (chunking),  updating,  and  overall  task-management  (Smith  & 
Jonides,  1999).  Efficient  executive  control  reduces  the  overall  complexity 
and/or load of a representation that is subsequently maintained in WM. For 
example, when recalling a sequence of unrelated words, performance drops 
when the number of words exceeds five or six as it is beyond the functional 
capacity of the phonological loop. But, if the words create a sentence, then 
span can reach as high as sixteen, far exceeding loop capacity (Baddeley, 
1987).  Hence,  chunking  improves  efficiency  as  items  are  not  individually 
maintained (Miller, 1956). Therefore, verbal tasks that benefit from semantic 
clustering could reveal OCD impairments as they fail to efficiently chunk and 
reduce the load of the encoding-set. Memory impairment in OCD is not an 
issue  of  basic  WM  capacity  (e.g.,  Harkin  &  Kessler,  2009)  but  rather  of 
creating appropriate mnemonic associations and hierarchical groupings using 
existing knowledge that alleviates the burden on WM (see Ericsson, Chase, & 
Faloon, 1980).  So,  while  poorer  performance  is  expected for  ‘everyone’  at 
high loads, we provide an explanation for when and how people with OCD are 
particularly affected (e.g., van der Wee et al., 2003).  
 
6.3.1. The role of anxiety in executive function efficiency (E) 
In our model (Harkin & Kessler, 2009) as well as in our EBL classification 
system we focus on the cognitive mechanisms that mediate specific forms of 
information  processing  that  have  been  found  to  be  deficient  in  OCD.  We  
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would  like  to  emphasise  that  the  emotional  state  associated  with  specific 
stimuli  and  situations  may  boost  these  deficiencies:  Anxiety  and  lack  of 
confidence in their ability to control a given situation (Rachman, 2002) may 
further attenuate existent cognitive deficiencies in OCD.  In other words, we 
are  careful  to  state  that  anxiety/lack  of  confidence  is  sufficient  but  not 
necessary for executive-memory impairment to occur. For example, we report 
findings from two studies (Roh et al., 2005; Rao et al., 2008) where resolution 
of OCD symptoms (and anxiety; Rao et al., 2008) was not associated with 
improvements  in  WM  functioning.  While  it  could  be  that  some  executive 
deficiencies  are  part  of  the  OCD  endophenotype  it  is  likely  that  cognitive 
functions may either become deficient as a consequence of a futile attempt to 
counteract anxiety by ‘over-using' specific executive functions - e.g., memory 
retrieval may turn into compulsive memory checking (Harkin & Kessler, 2009, 
2011a) – or cognitive functions may become progressively impeded due to 
constant  insecurity  fueled  by  anxiety,  manifesting  itself  as  hampered 
executive selection between stimuli, goals, and actions (Harkin, Rutherford, & 
Kessler, 2011). Thus, anxiety is likely to act in a manner similar to a dual-task 
paradigm  (Baddeley,  1986)  by  reducing  the  amount  of  attention  on  the 
primary memory task (see Tasks 6 & 7; Harkin & Kessler, in press). In the 
following,  we  implicitly  assume  a  4
th  dimension  as  the  level  of  induced 
anxiety/insecurity and we propose that this implicit dimension predominantly 
affects executive functioning and is therefore inherent to the E-dimension of 
the  EBL  system.  Specifically,  we  assume  that  the  more  threatening  the 
employed  stimuli  (e.g.  switches,  electric  appliances)  or  procedures  (e.g., 
pressure, distraction, misleading information) are in a given study, the more 
likely  executive  functioning  will  be  modulated,  with  knock-on  effects  for 
memory  performance.  Paradoxically,  memorized  threatening  items  might 
even  improve  performance  by  biasing  attention  toward  these  items  during 
encoding.  
 
6.4. Applying the EBL classification system to 58 experimental findings 
Figure 27 explains where we do and do not expect to observe OCD memory 
impairments relative to controls; this we suggest is influenced by the degree  
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of executive function efficiency (E), binding complexity (B) and memory load 
(L) within any given neuropsychological task. First, we do not expect memory 
performance to differ between OCD patients and controls for tasks that are 
low  in  executive  demand,  binding  and  load  (see:  white  region  in  top-left 
quadrant of fig. 27). Second, likelihood for OCD-specific deficits increases as 
a  combination  of  high  load,  binding  complexity,  and  executive  function 
requirements  (increasingly  black  area  in  the  bottom-right  quadrant).  But 
finally, as we move toward the extreme end of the EBL continuum, memory 
impairment reduces in magnitude and eventually disappears because due to 
a  simple  floor  effect  operating  for  OCD  patients  and  controls  alike.  We 
suggest  that  task  requirements  must  be  sufficient  to  tap  into  executive 
dysfunction but at the same time not be so extreme to reduce all participants’ 
performance (i.e., controls and OCD) thus obscuring OCD impairments. 
 
Figure 27. The EBL Classification System.  
In light of this, we suggest that differences in the EBL scores of verbal and 
visuospatial tasks make OCD memory impairments more likely in the latter, 
especially if spatial locations are relevant to the task. We shall see that verbal 
tasks, generally, present verbal information in a format (stories, word lists) 
that is high in load but low in binding complexity. In this case, performance is 
benefited by efficient executive processes that utilize existing representations 
in LTM, i.e. chunking according to categories, that reduces load (see fig. 28A). 
LOW 
BINDING 
REQUIREMENT 
(UNIMODAL) 
(B) 
HIGH 
BINDING 
REQUIREMENT 
(MULTIMODAL) 
(B) 
HIGH 
LOAD 
(L) 
LOW 
LOAD 
(L) 
LOW 
EXECUTIVE 
DEMAND 
(E) 
HIGH 
EXECUTIVE 
DEMAND 
(E) 
KEY: LOCATION AND SEVERITY OF OCD MEMORY 
DEFICIT COMPARED TO CONTROLS 
Increased chance for OCD-specific Memory 
Deficit 
No OCD-specific Memory Deficit compared 
to Controls  
    121 
Thus, verbal impairments in OCD are due to poor executive functioning failing 
to reduce the load of verbal stimuli and so they operate primarily within the 
dimensions  of  E  and  L.  In  contrast,  visuospatial  tasks  inherently  have  a 
greater  binding  demand,  where  successful  performance  depends  on  the 
veridical  binding  of  multimodal  features  (spatial  +  visual).  Generally,  if 
visuospatial tasks employ multimodal stimuli that cannot be directly linked to a 
LTM concept (letters or words can) that could support the chunking of WM 
representations,  then  memory  performance  in  OCD  depends  on  the 
bidirectional  relationship  between  executive  organization  strategies  (E)  and 
multimodal binding complexity (B) which strongly influences the actual load 
(L) of all representations in the EB. In certain instances, tasks that steadily 
increase load within a visuospatial domain (e.g., n-back, corsi-block) will see a 
detriment in OCD memory performance at higher levels, as it is at this point 
their executive inefficiencies fail to match task demands, impairing memory 
relative  to  controls.  In  sum,  we  expect  that  OCD  visuospatial  memory 
impairments  will  be  more  evenly  distributed  between  the  three  EBL 
dimensions  as  depicted  in  Figure  28B.  We  propose  that  it  is  the  EBL 
requirement (high scores – but not too high – on all three dimensions) of a 
task that determines if verbal or visuospatial memory impairments in OCD are 
observed rather than the domain per se.  
 
In  the  following  we  will  examine  studies  that  investigated  OCD  memory 
performance  and  locate  each  study’s  methodology  within  the  EBL 
classification system. It is important to stress that it is impossible to exactly 
quantify the ‘scores’ we allocate for a particular study on each dimension. We 
will  explain  to  the  best  of  our  knowledge  why  there  are  good  reasons  to 
believe that a given study scores highly or lowly on the three EBL dimensions 
based  on  its  task  requirements  and  by  comparing  it  to  other  studies.  We 
believe that these virtual scores will help the research community to gain a 
clear  overview  of  the  major  findings  in  the  field  and  allow  explaining  and 
predicting under which circumstances memory deficits in OCD do occur and 
under which they do not. Our analysis will break down the literature into the 
classic distinction between verbal and visuospatial memory and will discuss 
for each domain separately why memory functioning remained intact in some  
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studies and then why and which studies did reveal deficits. 
 
6.5. Verbal Memory 
The  literature  paints  an  inconsistent  picture  with  respect  to  OCD  verbal 
memory performance. We argue that this is due to the manner in which tests 
of verbal memory differ in their executive-functioning, binding complexity and 
memory load scores.  
 
Figure 28. The contribution of EBL factors for verbal (A) and visuospatial (B) OCD memory 
performance and their respective locations of impairment within EBL dimensional space.   
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6.5.1. Intact verbal memory in OCD 
Studies  (see  Table  6)  showing  intact  verbal  memory  invariably  share  the 
same  characteristics:  (1)  low  executive  demands  (minimal  strategy  and/or 
attention  allocation  necessary),  (2)  low  binding  complexity  and  (3)  low 
memory load, i.e., within phonological loop capacity (6 items). On the other 
hand,  an  extremely  difficult  task  that  impairs  all  participants  to  the  same 
extent is likely to mask any OCD-specific memory impairment. 
 
Table 6. Studies reporting no verbal memory deficits in OCD.  
Authors  Method 
Task 
Requirement
s 
Groups Compared  Behavioural 
Findings 
Henseler 
et al. 
(2008) 
Delayed Match to 
Sample (WM task) 
Encode 4 letters, 
identify if probe 
letter was in 4 
11 OCD patients 
(YBOCS; 21.0) vs. 11 
controls 
No differences 
Foa et al. 
(1997) 
Sentence 
Recognition 
Contamination vs. 
neutral sentences 
presented in 3 
levels of noise 
15 OCD patients (YBOC: 
24.7) vs. 15 controls (2.8)  No differences 
Martin et 
al. (1995) 
Self-paced word 
selection task 
Always select a 
different word 
18 OCD patients (DSM-
III-R criteria) vs. 18 
controls 
No differences  
MacDonald 
et al. 
(1997) 
Verbal recall & 
recognition 
Memorize 48 
words presented 
for 1 sec each 
10 OCD checkers (≥ 4 on 
checking MOCI) & 10 OCD 
non-checkers  (<4 on 
checking MOCI) vs. 10 
controls 
No differences 
Rubenstein 
et al. 
(1993; 
Exp. 2) 
Verbal recall 
Memorize 50 
words presented 
for 4 seconds 
each 
20 subclinical checkers (≥ 
4 checking MOCI) vs. 
controls (≤2) 
No differences 
 
In a simple (encode: 4 letters and memory task: same/different single letter) 
delayed-match-to-sample task (DMTS), Henseler et al. (2008) failed to report 
any  significant  group  differences  as  OCD  patients  (92.6%)  performed  at  a 
similar ceiling level to controls (93.5%). This task called minimally upon the 
EBL  factors:  there  were  no  distractors  to  suppress,  the  stimuli  were  non-
threatening, and binding requirement was minimal as successful performance 
required the remembrance of 4 individual letters (within loop limits) not letter-
to-location bindings. On a self-paced test (recall and recognition) of verbal 
WM, Martin et al. (1995) presented participants with 16 words on a page, in a 
book  of  16  pages.  The  only  measure  that  revealed  a  significant  group 
differences  was  total  time  taken,  with  OCD  patients  taking  longer  than 
controls  to  make  16  successive  choices.  As  this  task  is  predominantly  
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visuospatial in nature (locate different words in spatial locations), we argue 
(based  on  the  findings  reported  in  Chapter  3)  that  this  is  evidence  of 
organizational impairments (i.e., ‘E’: executive functioning efficiency) slowing 
OCD patients’ processing of each page. If this is the case, we predict that if 
individuals with OCD require longer to process a piece of information to their 
satisfaction  relative  to  controls,  interrupting  this  mid-flow  will  interfere  with 
their ability to efficiently encode words, thus, highlighting that an executive 
impairment  must  be  sufficiently  operant  to  impair  memory.  As  another 
example, Foa et al. (1997) reported that checkers’ memory for contamination 
and  neutral  words  was  intact  despite  showing  a  concurrent  perceptual 
distractibility (i.e., rated background noise as louder than controls). According 
to the EBL system we would not expect OCD memory impairments in this 
case as the disruption is not task-related and the task itself does not impose 
high EBL requirements.  
 
In a classic study, often cited as evidence for lack of verbal deficits in OCD, 
MacDonald  et  al.  (1997)  investigated  verbal  recall  and  recognition.  The 
experiment  consisted  of  the  following  phases:  (i)  Study  Phase  1,  (ii) 
Distraction Phase 1, (iii) Recall Test, (iv) Study Phase 2, (v) Distraction Phase 
2, and (vi) Recognition Memory Test. Specifically, (i) forty-eight words were 
presented, each for 1 second with 750 ms between each word, (ii) then a 7 
minute distractor task was administered between the 48
th word and the (iii) 
beginning of the free recall period. Then, after (iv) study phase 2 (identical in 
format  to  the  first  but  with  different  words),  there  was  a  (v)  10  minute 
distractor  task  followed  by  a  (vi)  recognition  task  which  presented  single 
words requiring participants to indicate if they had (old judgment) or had not 
(new  judgment)  been  presented  in  study  phase  2  (iv).    Considering  this 
methodology in the EBL system presentation of a word for 1 second calls 
upon  WM  resources  (i.e.,  executive-attention,  phonological  rehearsal)  and 
LTM  word  representations  (Cowan,  1999). Successful  recall  requires  quick 
consolidation into verbal LTM, before presentation of the next word in 750 ms. 
An  encoded  word  will  experience  primacy  and  recency  interference  from 
previous and subsequent words, respectively (Murdock, 1962), in addition to 
the  substantial  interference  from  the  distractor  tasks.  This  threatens  
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veridicality of a word within early encoding, which likely impairs subsequent 
recall  and  recognition.  In  sum,  this  very  difficult  task  obscures  group 
differences by inducing a floor effect in all participants, an assertion supported 
by the very low recall proportion for checkers, non-checkers and controls of 
0.179,  0.142,  and  0.188,  respectively.  Furthermore,  in  a  task  of  similar 
difficulty (Exp. 2; 50 words – 4secs each – from 5 categories), Rubenstein et 
al.  (1993)  failed  to  report  any  differences  in  memory  of  checkers  (47%) 
compared to controls (49.6%). In these experiments, extant OCD/checkers’ 
executive-memory impairments would need to be extremely acute to impact 
memory performance and significantly differentiate them from controls. 
 
Summary: Intact verbal memory in OCD 
For the aforementioned studies, ceiling (e.g., Henseler et al., 2007) or floor 
effects (MacDonald et al., 1997; Exp. 2: Rubenstein et al., 1997) may underlie 
lack of verbal deficits. However, we are aware that the low group numbers of 
11, 15, and 10 of Henseler et al. (2008), Foa et al. (1997), and MacDonald et 
al.  (1997),  respectively,  may  have  resulted  in  these  studies  being 
underpowered. However, we see below that studies with similar group sizes 
(e.g., van der Wee et al., 2003, 2007; Tallis et al., 1999; Simpson et al., 2006) 
reported significant group effects suggesting that OCD performance is better 
explained by scores on the EBL dimensions as opposed to group size (see fig 
27).   
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Figure 29. Location of intact verbal memory studies within the EBL Classification of 
OCD Memory Deficits. 
 
6.5.2. Deficient verbal memory in OCD 
Verbal  memory  impairment  in  OCD  is  invariably  seen  in  studies  that  use 
words/sentences  that  benefit  from  organization  according  to  implicit 
categories (see Table 7). Due to inefficiencies in their executive functioning, 
OCD  patients fail  to use mnemonic  strategies  (e.g.,  chunking according  to 
categories) which reduces their memory performance relative to controls.  
 
Table 7. Studies reporting verbal memory deficits in OCD. 
Authors  Method  Task 
Requirements 
Groups 
Compared 
Behavioural 
Findings 
Sher et al. 
(1984) 
Logical 
Method 
subtest of 
WMS 
Listen to short story, 
recall & recognition 
requires semantic linking 
Frequent vs. 
occasional vs. 
infrequent checkers 
vs. controls (MOCI) 
Checkers deficit in 
recalling 
meaningfully linked 
sequences 
 
Tuna, 
Tekcan, and 
Topcuoglu 
(2005) 
 
Cued word 
recall and 
recognition 
Memorize 48 word pairs 
presented for 3 secs: 24 
neutral-neutral & 24 
neutral-threat 
17 OCD patients 
(YBOCS: 22.3) vs. 
16 subclinical 
checkers & 15 
controls (MOCI) 
OCD patients had 
poorer recall & 
recognition for all 
word pair types = 
general memory 
deficit 
Irak & 
Flament 
(2009) 
Focused, 
Divided & 
Passive 
Attention 
Attend to words (threat 
vs. neutral) in a range of 
conditions. Various recall 
& Recognition tasks at 
end. 
24 subclinical 
checkers (>4 
checking MOCI) vs. 
22 controls (0-1) 
Subclinical-
checkers had 
attentional bias and 
better recall & 
recognition for 
threat stimuli 
compared to 
controls. 
OCD 
Deficit in 
Memory 
No OCD 
Deficit in 
Memory 
Single Word Recall & 
Recognition 
Word 
Categorization 
DMTS – 
Simple 
Letters 
Complex Sentences 
& Background Noise 
Self Ordered 
Pointing Task – 
Self-Paced – Words 
HIGH 
EXECUTIVE 
ROLE 
(E) 
LOW 
EXECUTIVE 
ROLE 
(E) 
LOW 
LOAD 
(L) 
HIGH 
LOAD 
(L) 
LOW 
BINDING 
REQUIREMENT 
(B) 
HIGH 
BINDING 
REQUIREMENT 
(B) 
= Henseler et al. (2008) 
= Foa et al. (1997) 
= Martin et al. (1995) 
= Rubenstein et al. (Exp. 2: 1993) 
= MacDonald et al. (1997) 
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Rubenstein 
et al. (Exp. 
3: 1993) 
Cued word 
recognition 
Memorize 60 word pairs 
presented for 5 secs. 
Identify study words 
among 60 lures 
20 subclinical 
checkers vs. 20 
controls 
Advantage for 
checkers 
De Geus et 
al. (2007) 
California 
Verbal 
Learning 
Task 
(CVLT) 
Recall (short & long 
term), recognition, 
semantic clustering, 
attention. 
39 Chronic therapy 
resistant OCD 
patients (YBOCS: 
27.3) vs. 26 controls 
OCD patients had 
poorer 1
st trial recall 
& learned less 
words over 5 trials 
Savage et al. 
(2000)  CVLT 
Recall (short & long 
term), recognition, 
semantic clustering, 
attention. 
33 OCD patients 
(YBOCS: 19.5) vs. 
30 controls 
OCD patients 
poorer recall, 
recognition, and 
semantic clustering 
Deckersbach 
et al. (2004)  CVLT 
Recall (short & long 
term), recognition, 
semantic clustering, 
attention. 
30 OCD patients 
(YBOCS: 19.3) vs. 
30 Bipolar Disorder 
vs. 30 controls 
OCD patients were 
poorer organizing 
word lists. OCD’s 
long-delayed free 
recall mediated by 
semantic clustering 
during encoding 
Deckersbach 
et al. (2005)  CVLT 
Recall (short & long 
term), recognition, 
semantic clustering, 
attention. 
20 OCD patients 
(YBOCS: 22.5) vs. 
20 Bipolar Disorder 
vs. 20 controls 
Improved semantic 
clustering when 
directed to group 
words to category 
Zielinski et 
al. (1991)  CVLT 
Recall (short & long 
term), recognition, 
semantic clustering, 
attention. 
OCD patients 
(DSM-III-R/MOCI) 
vs. controls 
OCD patients 
poorer only on 
intrusions measure 
Segalas et 
al. (2008) 
Spain-
Compluten
ase Verbal 
Learning 
Task 
(modified 
CVLT) 
Recall (short & long 
term), recognition, 
semantic clustering, 
attention. 
50 OCD patients 
(YBOCS: 20.2) vs. 
50 controls 
OCD patients 
poorer recall, 
recognition not 
moderated by org 
strategies 
Cabrera et 
al. (2001) 
Complex 
sentences 
Content extraction and 
recognition 
21 OCD patients 
(DSM-IV) vs. 21 
controls 
OCD patients poor 
semantic integration 
no difference in 
recognition 
Sawamura 
et al. (2005) 
Modified 
version of 
Iddon et 
al’s (1998) 
verbal 
strategy 
task 
Recall of 20 words 
presented for 1 min. 
Recognize these 20 
words among 20 
distractors. Semantic 
categorization. 
16 OCD patients 
(YBOCS: 14.6) vs. 
16 controls (MOCI-
J) 
OCD patients had 
poorer recall & 
recognition. Slower 
to semantically 
categorise words. 
 
Sher, Mann, and Frost (1984) examined a range of verbal (and visuospatial) 
memory  tests  but  only  found  verbal  deficits  for  checkers  in  the  Logical 
Memory subtest of the Wechsler Memory Scale (WMS; Wechsler & Stone, 
1945). A short story is read to the participant with recall occurring immediately 
and  then  after  30  min.  This  is  one  of  the  earliest  studies  to  highlight  the 
importance of encoding impairments (i.e., in organizing meaningful episodic 
information) which we propose would occur in the EB (failure of E to reduce B 
and L) and so explain checker’s poorer memory.  
 
Tuna, Tekcan, and Topcuoglu (2005) tested recall and recognition for neutral- 
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neutral  word  pairs  (e.g.,  “shirt”-“book”)  and  neutral-threat  word  pairs  (e.g., 
“music”-“fire”). OCD patients had poorer recall and recognition than subclinical 
checkers and controls for both neutral and threat-relevant stimuli, which was 
taken as evidence of a general mnestic deficit not influenced by memory task 
(recall  vs.  recognition)  or  emotional  valence  (neutral  vs.  contamination  vs. 
threat).  The  performance  advantage of  subclinical  checkers for  threatening 
words over neutral was also observed in a study that used three attentional 
tasks (focused, divided, and passive) that measured recall and recognition 
memory  (Irak  &  Flament,  2009).  The  stability  of  this  effect  was  further 
substantiated  by  Rubenstein  et  al.  (Exp.3:  1993)  who  reported  a  similar 
advantage for checkers in word-pair recall and recognition. Revealingly, in the 
same study, checkers had impaired memory for actions (Exp. 1A; discussed 
below in deficient visuospatial memory section 6.6.3.), leading the authors to 
conclude that differences in schematic organization may have differentiated 
their memory performance from controls. We argue that word-pair and action 
tasks likely stressed different cognitive resources: simple rehearsal within the 
phonological  loop  vs.  visuospatial  maintenance  involving  executive 
organization,  complex  binding,  and  high  load.  Therefore,  in  these 
experiments,  checkers’  perseveration/attentional  biases  may  provide  a 
memory advantage (vs. OCD patients; Tuna et al., 2005 or controls; Irak & 
Flament,  2009;  Rubenstein  et  al.,  1993)  for  stimuli  that  have  a  low 
classification score across the EBL dimensions, i.e., over-rehearsal increases 
the strength of words maintained and subsequently retrieved from memory. 
This is in agreement with the evolutionary basis of OCD, where OCD can be 
imagined  on  the  extreme  end  of  a  continuum  of  fitness-promoting  and/or 
avoidance strategies (Bruene, 2006). However, as observed in OCD generally 
and this EBL system this cognitive style may cause more harm than intended 
good. 
 
A frequent measure of verbal memory and learning in OCD is the California 
Verbal  Learning  Test  (CVLT;  Delis  et  al.,  1988).  The  CVLT  is  usually 
administered in the following manner. First, 16 words are presented orally for 
5  trials  with  free  recall  occurring  after  each  trial.  An  interference  list  is 
presented after the 5
th trial. Second, a test of short- and long-delayed (20/30  
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min) free  recall  is  administered. Third,  a delayed  recognition  test  requiring 
participants to identify previously presented words among distractors. As a 
result the CVLT measures: (1) attention and WM (recall after first trial), (2) 
short and long term free recall, (3) semantic clustering (ability to categorize 
words over trials 1-5), and (4) recognition. De Geus et al. (2007) reported 
reduced trial-1 recall accuracy for therapy resistant OCD patients relative to 
controls, no differences were observed for trials 2 through 5 indicating intact 
verbal memory capacity. Trial 1 is more a measure of attention (immediate 
span) than memory per se and as such, group differences are attributable to 
an  inability  to  correctly  attend  to  each  word.  The  consistency  of  this 
impairment  across  studies  (e.g.,  Deckersbach  et  al.,  2004;  Savage  et  al., 
2000;  Segalas  et  al.,  2008)  indicates  that  poor  initial  attention  is  a  stable 
deficit in OCD CVLT performance. Savage et al. (2000) reported that OCD 
patients: (1) memorized less information during encoding (trial 1), (2) used 
less efficient organizational strategies, and (3) had no deficit in capacity for 
verbal information over short and long delays. Indeed, when given category 
cues, OCD patients showed a disproportionate improvement in long-delayed 
recall  where  performance  was  now  normal,  a  pattern  also  observed  by 
Deckerbach et al. ( 2005). However, it is important to note that several CVLT 
studies (Deckersbach et al., 2004; Segalas et al., 2008; Zielinski, Taylor, & 
Juzwin, 1991) and two using complex verbal material (Cabrera, McNally, & 
Savage, 2001; Sawamura et al., 2005) have reported similar, additional, and 
different performance profiles for OCD (see Table 7 for more details). 
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Figure  30.  Positioning  of  deficient  verbal  memory  studies  within  the  EBL 
Classification. The scale has been adjusted to allow clearer representation of verbal 
memory studies. Observe that verbal memory impairments cluster around inefficient 
executive functioning (E) and memory load (L) as proposed in the distinction we draw 
between verbal and visuospatial memory impairments in OCD (see fig. 28A vs. 28B). 
 
Summary: Deficient verbal memory in OCD 
Generally, OCD deficits in verbal memory occur when the task benefits from 
some form of input organization, which was evident in story recall (Sher et al., 
1984),  word  list  categorisation  (Sawamura  et  al.,  2005),  and  CVLT 
performance  (e.g.,  Savage  et  al.,  2000).  We  saw  that  in  the  CVLT  task 
impairment  was  influenced  by  the  specific  cognitive  profile  of  each  OCD 
group:  Efficient  or  inefficient  executive  functioning  (E)  will  increase  or 
decrease memory load (L), respectively (see fig. 28A), which influences the 
DEFICIENT VERBAL OCD MEMORY 
= Sher et al. (1984) 
= Sawamura et al. (2005) 
= Tuna et al. (2005) 
= Savage et al. (2000) & Deckersbach et 
al. (2005) 
= Zelinski et al. (1991) & De Geus et al. (2007) 
= Cabrera et al. (2001) 
= Deckersbach et al. (2004); Segalas et al. 
(2004); Savage et al. (2000); Deckersbach et 
al. (2005) 
= Irak & Flament (2001)  No 
Deficit 
in OCD 
Memory 
HIGH  
BINDING 
REQUIREMENT 
(B) 
LOW  
EXECUTIV
E ROLE 
(E) 
HIGH 
EXECUTIVE 
ROLE 
(E) 
HIGH 
LOAD 
(L) 
LOW  
LOAD 
(L) 
LOW 
BINDING 
REQUIREMENT 
(B) 
CVLT (Encoding 
Deficit) 
Complex 
Sentences 
CVLT: 
Organizational 
Strategy = 
Improved 
Performance 
CVLT: Encoding, 
Recall, Recognition 
Deficit 
Word 
Word Pairs: 
OCD Patients 
Logical 
subtest of 
Word Pairs: 
Advantage Sub-clinical 
Checkers vs. Controls & 
OCD Patients 
Threat Words: 
Advantage Sub-clinical 
Checkers vs. Controls  
Deficit in 
OCD 
Memory  
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magnitude  and  type  (e.g.,  trial-1  vs.  semantic  clustering)  of  memory 
impairment  observed.  OCD  patients  compared  to  sub-clinical  checkers 
showed impaired and enhanced word-pair memory performance, respectively 
(Tuna, Tekcan, & Topcuoglu, 2005; Irak & Flament, 2009), which leads us to 
propose  that  executive  functioning  differs  between  these  two  groups.  For 
example,  sub-clinical  checkers  may  over-rehearse  (e.g.,  Tuna,  Tekcan,  & 
Topcuoglu, 2005) and/or have attentional biases (e.g., Irak & Flament, 2009) 
which strengthen the representation of simple stimuli in memory (see fig. 30). 
In  addition,  co-morbidities  in  patients  (e.g.  depression)  might  amplify  their 
executive deficits compared to subclinical checkers (cf. Moritz et al., 2003; 
Rampacher et al., 2010). 
 
6.6. Visuospatial Memory 
Visuospatial  memory  impairments  are  most  commonly  observed  in  OCD, 
however,  when  visuospatial  tasks  are  low  on  all  EBL  dimensions  then  no 
impairments  in  memory  should  occur.  In  addition,  we  expect  studies  that 
varied load to report intact and deficient OCD memory for lower and higher 
load levels, respectively, which we attribute to executive functioning failing to 
meet increasing task demands.   
 
6.6.1. Intact visuospatial memory in OCD 
Studies  that  score  low  on  the  EBL  dimensions  invariably  report  intact 
visuospatial memory as they are: (1) within visuospatial sketchpad capacity 
(i.e.,  low  memory  load),  (2)  low  executive  requirements  (successful 
maintenance requires low attention and/or organization if undisturbed (e.g., 
Kessler & Kiefer, 2005) and (3) low binding requirement (see Table 8).  
 
Table 8. Studies reporting intact non-verbal memory in OCD. 
Authors  Method  Task 
Requirements 
Groups 
Compared 
Behavioural 
Findings 
Henseler et 
al. (2008) 
Delayed Match 
to Sample 
(WM task) 
Encode 5 x 5 matrix with 4 
squares filled. Indicate if a 
probe is correctly located 
11 OCD patients 
(YBOCS: 21.0) 
vs. 11 controls 
No differences 
Ciesielski et 
al. (2007) 
Delayed Match 
to Sample 
(WM task) 
Encode 3 x 3 matrix with 2 
squares filled. Choose 
correct probe from 2 
choices  
8 OCD patients 
(YBOCS: 25.6) 
vs. 8 controls 
No difference for 
simple DMTS or 
distractor DMTS 
Roth et al.  Self-Ordered  Self-paced abstract  30 OCD patients  No differences  
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(2004)  Pointing Task  selection task  (YBOCS: 28.1) 
vs. 24 controls 
Martin et al. 
(1995) 
Self-paced 
selection of  
drawings of 
animals and 
nonsense 
objects  
Always select a different 
animal/object/word 
18 OCD patients 
(DCM-III-R) vs. 
18 controls 
No differences  
 
 
Two  simple  delayed-match-to-sample  (DMTS)  tasks  failed  to  report  any 
difference in OCD memory performance relative to controls (Henseler et al., 
2008; Ciesielski et al., 2007) due to low scores on all EBL dimensions. Roth et 
al.  (2004)  mainly  used  the  Self-Ordered  Pointing  Task  (SOPT;  Petrides  & 
Milner, 1982) as a measure for executive WM requiring the ability to generate 
and monitor a sequence of responses. On each page of a booklet with 12 
pages several abstract designs were presented. On page 1, participants were 
asked to select a design by pointing at it, then to turn to page 2 and point to a 
different  design  until  they  completed  the  full  12  page  booklet.  Participants 
were instructed not to choose the same design more than once and not to 
choose  designs  in  the  same  spatial  location  on  two  consecutive  pages 
(designs  and  locations  were  randmized  across  pages).  There  were  no 
differences between OCD patients and controls in terms of errors, time taken, 
likelihood  of  using  an  organizational  strategy,  and  specific  organizational 
strategy  used.  One  potential  explanation  for  these  null  findings  is  the 
observation that on average all participants took approximately 20 seconds 
per  page  which  may  have  been  sufficient  to  allow  OCD  patients  to 
compensate for extant executive dysfunction (see also Martin et al., 1995).  
 
Summary of intact visuospatial memory 
Low load tasks (e.g., Henseler et al., 2008; Ciesielski et al., 2007; Rotge et 
al., 2008) with minimal executive, binding and load requirements are unlikely 
to produce OCD memory deficits. In addition, self-pacing appears to prevent 
performance deficits in OCD patients (e.g., Martin et al., 1995; Roth et al., 
2004) by allowing individuals to attain higher threshold of certainty or to satisfy 
their obsessions and/or compulsions to some degree (see fig. 31). Following 
this logic, limiting decision-making time curtails some or all of these strategies 
which may put OCD patients’ central executive sufficiently under pressure to  
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impair their memory.  
 
Figure 31. Positioning of intact verbal memory studies within the EBL Classification. 
 
 
6.6.2. Intact and deficient visuospatial memory within the same study 
The following are examples of intact and deficient visuospatial memory within 
the  same  study  (see  Table  9)  they  highlight  the  delicate  manner  in  which 
executive-functioning,  binding  complexity  and  load  interact  to  negate  or 
produce visuospatial memory deficits.  
 
Table 9. Studies reporting intact and deficient non-verbal memory in OCD. Please 
observe that we include a study by Morein-Zamir et al., (2010) * in this section which 
failed to show OCD spatial memory impairment in the SWM task (i.e., as used by 
Purcell et al. (1998a, 1998b), as they did report memory impairment in another spatial 
task (Paired Association Learning). 
Authors  Method  Task 
Requirements 
Groups 
Compared 
Behavioural 
Findings 
Van der Wee 
et al. (2003) 
n-back 
(0,1,2,3 load 
levels) 
Continual monitoring 
and updating of 
information in WM 
11 OCD patients 
(YBOCS: 25.8) vs. 
11 matched controls 
No diff at 0, 1, 2 n-
back.  
Diff for 3 n-back 
task 
Van der Wee 
et al. (2007) 
n-back 
(0,1,2,3 load 
levels). 
Before & 
Continual monitoring 
and updating of 
information in WM 
14 psychotropic free 
OCD patients. 7 
Responders 
(YBOCS: 24.4) vs. 
Improvement at 3-
back level only for 
responders 
LOW  
BINDING 
REQUIREMENT 
(B) 
Deficit in 
OCD 
Memory 
No Deficit 
in OCD 
Memory 
= Henseler et al. (2008) & Rotge et 
al. (2008) 
= Martin et al. (1995) & Roth 
et al. (2004)  DMTS – Simple 
Visuospatial 
INTACT VISUOSPATIAL OCD MEMORY 
STUDIES 
Self-Ordered 
Pointing Task – 
Self-Paced  HIGH 
BINDING 
REQUIREMENT 
(B) 
LOW 
LOAD 
(L) 
HIGH 
LOAD 
(L) 
LOW 
EXECUTIVE 
ROLE 
(E) 
HIGH 
EXECUTIVE 
ROLE 
(E) 
DMTS – Simple 
Visuospatial & 
Distractor 
= Ciesielski et al. (2007  
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after 
pharmacolog
ical 
intervention 
7 Non-Responders 
(24.7) 
Purcell et al. 
(1998a)  Spatial WM  Spatial search task in 
spatial locations. 
23 OCD patients 
(YBOCS: 22.4) vs. 
23 matched controls 
No diff for 2, 3, 4 
(low difficulty).  
Diff for 6 & 8 (high 
difficulty)  
Purcell et al. 
(1998b)  Spatial WM  Spatial search task in 
spatial locations. 
30 OCD patients 
(YBOCS: 24.1) vs. 
30 matched controls 
No diff for 2, 3, 4 
(low difficulty).  
Diff for 6 & 8 (high 
difficulty) 
Morein-Zamir 
et al. (2010) *  Spatial WM  Spatial search task in 
spatial locations. 
18 OCD patients 
(DSM-IV-TR) vs. 18 
matched controls 
No diff on between-
search errors or 
strategy scores  
Morein-Zamir 
et al. (2010) * 
Paired 
Association 
learning 
Learning associations 
between geometric 
patterns and spatial 
locations 
18 OCD patients 
(DSM-IV-TR) vs. 18 
matched controls 
No diff level 3 (low 
difficulty) Diff for 6 & 
8 (high difficulty) 
Zielinski et al. 
(1991) 
Corsi Block-
Tapping Test 
Spatial span & 
number of correct 
repeated sequences 
OCD patients 
(DSM-III-R/MOCI) 
vs. controls 
OCD patients 
poorer span & 
correct sequences 
Zitterl et al. 
(2001) 
intermediate 
(Lern- und 
Gedachtnist
est; LGT-3) 
and 
immediate 
(Corsi Block-
Tapping 
Test)  
Spatial span & 
number of correct 
repeated sequences 
27 non-depressed 
OCD patients 
(YBOCS: >16) vs. 
27 controls 
OCD patients 
poorer on 
intermediate and 
immediate 
measures 
Moritz et al. 
(2003) 
Corsi Block-
Tapping Test 
Spatial span & 
number of correct 
repeated sequences 
32 OCD patients 
(YBOCS: 23.52) vs. 
20 controls. 
OCD patients 
poorer at corsi block 
tapping 
Boldrini et al. 
(2005) 
Corsi Block-
Tapping Test  Span and Supraspan 
25 OCD patients 
(YBOCS: 22.7) vs. 
15 Panic vs. 15 
Controls 
OCD patients 
impaired on Span 
and Supra span 
 
Van der Wee et al. (2003) used a spatial variant of the n-back WM task with 
four levels of load. OCD individuals and controls had equivalent performance 
for 0-, 1-, and 2-back indicating that OCD spatial WM capacity was intact. It 
was only at the 3-back load level that patients with OCD significantly differed 
from controls with errors of 48% versus 25%, respectively. Further, van der 
Wee et al. (2007) reported that OCD patients which responded favourably to 
pharmacological  treatment  showed  improvement  only  in  their  3-back 
performance.  Thus,  poor  OCD  3-back  performance  is  attributable  to 
dysfunctional executive control (E) failing to provide efficient strategies in the 
face of attention-dependent multimodal bindings (B) and increased memory 
load  (L)  (see fig.  28B),  with  improvements  in  memory  likely  attributable  to 
improvements  in  executive  functioning  at  the  level  of  organization  and/or 
suppression.  
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Stability of OCD impairment at higher load levels is supported across a range 
of tasks. For example, the Paired Association Learning task (PAL; Sahakian 
et al., 1988) which required the binding and maintenance of shapes to spatial 
locations in memory across increasing levels of load and so scored highly in 
the  EBL  classification  system.  Morein-Zamir  et  al.  (2010)  attributed  the 
impairment of the OCD group (at more demanding load levels 6 and 8) to a 
dysfunction in nonspatial associative learning. However, they did report intact 
performance in a test of spatial WM (SWM) at low and high load levels, which 
was  interesting  as  another  group  reported  impaired  OCD  performance  at 
higher load levels (see Purcell et al., 1998a, 1998b). Purcell and colleagues 
observed  that  OCD  patients  were  more  likely  to  return  to  a  previously 
searched box at higher load levels (i.e., 6 and 8 boxes), which was indicative 
of impairment in adopting a systematic search strategy (E: organization) and 
inability  to  correctly  manipulate  internal  WM  representations.  Critically  we 
suggest that absence (Morein-Zamir et al., 2010) and presence (Purcell et al., 
1998a, 1998b) of OCD memory impairment in this SWM task suggest that the 
specificity  of  executive  dysfunction  (E)  between  OCD-groups  may  differ 
between studies. Further evidence for OCD memory impairment at higher (not 
lower)  load  levels  is  supported  by  their  performance  on  the  Corsi  block-
tapping test (see Table 5: Boldrini et al., 2005; Moritz et al., 2003; Zielinski, 
Taylor, & Juzwin, 1991; Zitterl et al., 2001).  
 
Summary of intact and deficient visuospatial memory within the same study 
In all these tasks (n-back, SWM, PAL, Corsi-block) we saw that increasing 
load in the SWM domain differentiates OCD patients from controls; it is only 
when  executive  functioning  is  stressed  at  high  loads  that  the  contents  of 
memory become unmanageable, i.e., inefficient executive functioning (E) fails 
to reduce memory load (L) (see fig. 32). Van der Wee et al. (2007) proposed 
that  OCD  performance  on  the  n-back  was  state  dependent,  as  treatment 
responders showed significantly less errors in 3-back performance compared 
to non-responders.   
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Figure 32. Positioning of intact and deficient visuospatial memory studies within the 
EBL Classification.  
 
6.6.3. Deficient visuospatial memory 
Studies  that  show  deficits  in  visuospatial  memory  invariably  share  the 
following characteristics: (1) they exceed visuospatial sketchpad capacity (>6 
items),  (2)  have  high  executive  requirements,  and  (3)  are  high  in  binding 
complexity (see Table 10). In essence these are the same characteristics as 
for the high load conditions in the studies reviewed in the previous section 
(see fig. 32).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
= Purcell et al. (1998a) 
AUGMENTATION TASKS: Intact & Deficient Memory 
= Van der Wee et al. (2003) 
= Van der Wee et al. (2007) 
= Zelinski et al. (1991), Zitterl et al. (2001), Boldrini et al. (2005), 
Moritz et al., (2003) 
No Deficit 
in OCD 
Memory 
HIGH  
BINDING 
REQUIREMENT 
(B) 
Deficit in 
OCD 
Memory 
n-
n-1 
n-2 
n-3 
Improvement with  
Pharmacological 
treatment 
2 
3 
4 
6 
8 
LOW  
EXECUTIVE 
ROLE 
(E) 
HIGH 
EXECUTIVE 
ROLE 
(E) 
HIGH 
LOAD 
(L) 
LOW  
LOAD 
(L) 
LOW 
BINDING 
REQUIREMENT 
(B) 
Low 
High  n-
Task 
Low 
High 
Corsi  
PAL 
Block  
WM 
Spatial  
 Task 
n-3 
= Morein-Zamir et al. (2010) (PAL = Paired Associative Learning)  
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Table 10. Studies reporting deficient non-verbal memory in OCD 
Author
s  Method  Task 
Requirements 
Groups 
Compared 
Behavioural 
Findings 
OCD MEMORY IMPAIRMENTS IN SINGLE METHODOLOGIES 
Rubenstein 
et al. (Exp. 
1A: 1993) 
Write, 
observe, or 
perform 90 
actions 
After completing 90 actions 
write down all actions they 
could remember  
20 subclinical 
checkers (MOCI- 
checking: 
unknown) vs. 20 
controls (MOCI-
checking: ≤ 2) 
Checkers 
remembered fewer 
actions and greater 
errors vs. controls 
Purcell et 
al. (1998a)  DMTS 
Maintain complex 
visuospatial stimulus and 
select it from 3 close 
alternatives 
23 OCD patients 
(YBOCS: 22.39) 
vs. 23 matched 
controls 
OCD patients 
poorer DMTS 
selection vs. 
controls 
Tallis et al. 
(1999) 
Recurring 
Figures Task 
Maintain previously copied 
abstract figure and recall 
immediately & after 30 
mins 
12 OCD patients 
(primarily 
checkers: Pauda: 
72.6) vs. 12 
matched controls 
OCD patients 
poorer than controls 
on RFT  
Zielinski et 
al. (1991) 
Recurring 
Figures Task 
Maintain previously copied 
abstract figure and recall 
immediately & after 30 
mins 
OCD patients 
(DSM-III-R/MOCI) 
vs. controls 
OCD patients 
impaired on 
immediate and 
delayed 
components of RFT 
Simpson et 
al. (2006) 
Benton 
Visuospatial 
Retention 
Test 
View abstract design then 
recall from memory 
15 Comorbid OCD 
(YBOCS: 26) vs. 
Current OCD 
(19.5) vs. History-
of-OCD (9.8) vs. 
Controls (0.34) 
OCD patients less 
correct responses 
 
OCD RCFT PERFORMANCE IMPAIRMENT STUDIES 
Martionot 
et al. 
(1990) 
Rey 
Complex 
Figure Task 
(RCFT) 
Overall memory score and 
completion time 
16 nondepressed 
OCD patients 
(MOCI:16.9) vs. 8 
controls 
OCD patients 
impaired in memory 
score and slower 
Savage et 
al. (1999)  RCFT 
Copying of abstract figure, 
immediate, delayed recall, 
recognition, and 
organization 
20 OCD patients 
(YBOCS: 20.9) vs. 
20 Controls (0.4) 
OCD patients 
impaired immediate 
and delayed recall. 
Immediate recall 
mediated by org 
strat during copy. 
Savage et 
al. (2000)  RCFT 
Copying of abstract figure, 
immediate, delayed recall, 
recognition, and 
organization 
33 OCD patients 
(YBOCS: 19.5) vs. 
30 Controls 
OCD patients 
impaired immediate 
recall, copy to 
immediate recall 
and copy 
organization 
Deckersba
ch et al. 
(2000) 
RCFT 
(Reliability 
and Validity 
of Scoring) 
Copying of abstract figure, 
immediate, delayed recall, 
recognition, and 
organization 
71 OCD Patients 
(YBOCS: 21.2) vs. 
55 Controls 
OCD patients 
impaired in 
organization, copy 
accuracy, copy 
organization. 
Segalas et 
al. (2008)  RCFT 
Copying of abstract figure, 
immediate, delayed recall, 
recognition, and 
organization 
50 OCD patients 
(YBOCS: 20.2) vs. 
50 Controls 
OCD patients 
impaired on 
immediate, delayed 
recall and 
recognition 
Boldrini et 
al. (2005)  RCFT  Copying of abstract figure 
and recall 
25 OCD patients 
(YBOCS: 22.7) vs. 
15 Panic vs. 15 
Controls 
OCD patients 
impaired on copy 
and overall recall 
Penades et 
al. (2005)  RCFT 
Copying of abstract figure, 
immediate, delayed recall, 
recognition, and 
35 OCD patients 
(YBOCS: 29.3) vs. 
33 Controls 
OCD patients 
impaired immediate 
recall and copy  
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organization  organization 
Shin et al. 
(2004)  RCFT 
Qualitative analysis of 
copy, immediate, delayed, 
recognition and 
organization 
30 OCD patients 
(MOCI: 14.5) vs. 
30 Controls (3.5) 
OCD patients 
impaired immediate 
recall and copy 
organization. 
Qualitative analysis: 
copy = poorer 
planning & 
fragmentation 
Rampache
r et al. 
(2010) 
RCFT 
Copying of abstract figure, 
delayed recall, and 
organization 
40 OCD patients 
(YBOCS: 20.9; 
BDI: 15) vs. 20 
Major 
Depressives 
(YBOCS: 0; BDI; 
16.3) vs. 40 
Controls 
OCD patients 
impaired on copy 
but not organization 
compared to MDD 
patients. Only OCD 
severity correlated 
with visuospatial 
organization. 
Jang et al. 
(2010)  RCFT 
Copying of abstract figure, 
delayed recall, and 
organization 
144 OCD patients 
(YBOCS: 23.1; 
BDI 17.95; BAI: 
19.67) vs. 144 
Controls 
OCD patients 
impaired in recall 
and organization 
which correlated 
with 
obsession/checking 
and 
symmetry/ordering 
dimensions 
 
SPLIT OCD GROUP BY AGE OF ONSET OR PRIMARY SYMPTOM 
Hwang et 
al. (2007)  RCFT 
Copying of abstract figure, 
immediate, delayed recall, 
recognition, and 
organization 
24 early-onset (≤ 
17 years: YBOCS: 
22.2) OCD vs. 24 
late-onset (≥ 21: 
YBOCS: 23.4) vs. 
24 controls 
 Late-onset 
impaired on 
immediate and 
delayed recall 
Roth et al. 
(2005)  RCFT 
Copying of abstract figure, 
immediate, delayed recall, 
recognition, and 
organization 
21 early-onset (≤ 
12 years: YBOCS: 
23.4) OCD vs. 13 
late-onset (≥ 24.8: 
YBOCS: 23.4) vs. 
24 controls 
Late-onset impaired 
on delayed recall 
Cha et al. 
(2008)  RCFT 
Copying of abstract figure, 
immediate, delayed recall, 
recognition, and 
organization 
24 checking-OCD 
(25.4) vs. 23 
cleaning-OCD 
(24.7) vs. 20 
controls 
Checkers 
significantly 
impaired in 
immediate and 
delayed recall vs. 
cleaners and 
controls. No 
difference in copy 
accuracy. 
 
NO OCD RCFT IMPAIRMENTS FOUND 
Simpson et 
al. (2006)  RCFT 
Copying of abstract figure, 
immediate, delayed recall, 
recognition, and 
organization 
15 Comorbid OCD 
(YBOCS: 26) vs. 
Current OCD 
(19.5) vs. History-
of-OCD (9.8) vs. 
Controls (0.34) 
OCD patients did 
not differ from 
controls on any 
RCFT measure 
Bohne et 
al. (2005)  RCFT 
Copying of abstract figure, 
immediate, delayed recall, 
recognition, and 
organization 
21 OCD patients 
(YBOCS: 16.9) vs. 
23 trichotillomania 
vs. 26 controls  
OCD and TTM did 
not differ from 
controls 
Moritz et 
al. (2003)  RCFT 
Copying of abstract figure, 
immediate, delayed recall, 
recognition, and 
organization – Controlling 
for depression 
32 OCD patients 
(YBOCS: 23.52) 
vs. 20 controls. 
OCD patients did 
not differ from 
controls on any 
RCFT measure  
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RECOVERED OCD PATIENTS – RCFT IMPAIRMENTS REMAIN 
Rao et al. 
(2008)  RCFT 
Copying of abstract figure, 
immediate, delayed recall, 
recognition, and 
organization  
30 Recovered 
OCD patients 
(YBOCS: 2.57) vs. 
30 controls (2) 
Recovered OCD 
patients remained 
impaired on 
Immediate and 
Delayed Recall 
 
OCD RCFT THERAPY STUDIES 
Kim et al. 
(2002) 
RCFT- 
Pharmacolo
gical 
Intervention 
Baseline vs. 4 month 
comparison. 
Pharmacological 
intervention. 
39 OCD patients 
(YBOCS at 
baseline: 25.4) vs. 
31 Controls (0.2) 
OCD patients 
immediate and 
delayed 
impairments still 
after 4 months 
Roh et al. 
(2005) 
RCFT- 
Pharmacolo
gical 
Intervention 
Baseline vs. 4 month vs. 1 
year follow up. 
Pharmacological 
intervention. 
21 OCD patients 
(YBOCS at 
baseline: 26.9) vs. 
20 Controls 
OCD patients 
immediate and 
delayed 
impairments still 
after 1 year 
Kuelz et al. 
(2006) 
RCFT-
Cognitive 
Behavioral 
Therapy 
Baseline vs. 3 month 
follow-up. Cognitive-
Behavioral Treatment 
30 OCD patients 
(YBOCS at 
baseline: 24.2) vs. 
39 Controls (0.5) 
OCD patients 
immediate and 
delayed 
improvements, 
specific to major 
responders 
Buhlmann 
et al. 
(2006) 
RCFT- 
Cognitive 
Training 
Organization training vs. no 
training 
35 OCD patients 
(YBOCS at 
baseline: 20.1) vs. 
36 Controls  
Training improved 
organization during 
encoding. 
Immediate and 
delayed recall still 
impaired 
Park et al. 
(2006) 
RCFT-
Cognitive 
Training 
Before vs. After: Cognitive 
Training for 5 weeks 
Baseline: 15 
Treatment OCD 
patients 
(YBOCS:21.1) vs. 
15 No-treatment 
OCD (18.7) 
Treatment group 
improved: copy, 
immediate, delayed, 
organization and 
symptoms 
 
Rubenstein et al. (Exp. 1a: 1993) examined sub-clinical checkers’ ability to 
recall if they had written, observed, or performed an action they had heard. 
They had unlimited time to complete the memory tasks. Subclinical checkers 
remembered  fewer  actions  (56.2  vs.  66.1),  were  more  likely  to  confuse 
whether they had written, observed or performed a given action (1.2 vs. 0.4) 
and made more errors of commission compared to controls (0.5 vs. 0.1). This 
shows that checkers are poorer at recalling their own actions in general and 
deficient in recalling details of their actions specifically. No group differences 
in a control condition (memory for cartoons) suggests that impairments are a 
property of actions not memory capacity per se. Remembering actions in their 
situational context taps into the EB deficits in terms of attention-demanding 
multimodal bindings described in Section 6.4. 
 
In a DMTS task, Purcell et al. (1998b) presented a complex target stimulus  
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(rectangle  with  different  internal  arrangements  of  color  and  shape)  for  4 
seconds.  The  participant  then  had  to  select  the  correct  target  from  three 
distractors.  OCD  patients  were  significantly  less  accurate  than  controls 
(85.11% vs. 90.43%), which is interesting as the DMTS tasks of Henseler et 
al.  (2007)  and  Ciesielski  et  al.  (2007)  failed  to  report  group  differences. 
Overall, accuracy was high for all three studies suggesting low overall load 
(all>85%).  However  there  are  two  features  of  the  particular  methodology 
employed by Purcell et al (1998b) that may explain the memory impairment in 
OCD patients. First, binding requirements were much higher as an arbitrary 
shape,  color  and  location  had  to  be  integrated  requiring  more  executive 
control during encoding and maintenance than the other two studies. Second, 
the employed recall probe was more complex with 4 options being presented 
and where two of these were partially correct (in shape or colour). Thus, the 4 
options  at  recall  may  have  been  particularly  distracting  for  OCD  patients’ 
already challenged executive control, hence, interfering with correct retrieval. 
Taken  together,  executive  control  was  much  more  challenged  during 
encoding, maintenance and retrieval in the Purcell et al. task, leading to the 
observed group differences.  
 
Figures Recall, Recurring Figures Task and Benton Visual Retention Task 
Tallis,  Pratt,  and  Jamani  (1999)  reported  impaired  performance  of  OCD 
(primary  symptom  was  checking)  patients  on  two  tests  of  visuospatial 
memory. First, in the Figures Recall task (Coughlan & Hollows, 1985), where 
the  participant  has  to  copy  an  abstract  line  drawing  and  then  recall  it 
immediately and after a delay. Second, in the Recurring Figures Task (RFT; 
Kimura,  1963),  where  20  geometric  or  irregular  nonsense  figures  are 
presented for 3 seconds each. After this the participant must identify those 20 
cards from 140 in total by classifying each card as ‘old’ or ‘new.’ In this latter 
task performance for OCD patients was poorer overall and they were more 
likely to identify new stimuli as old (i.e., false positives; see also Zielinski et 
al., 1991). Increasing symptom severity was associated with poorer overall 
score and more false positives. In the task similar to the RFT, Simpson et al. 
(2006) reported attenuated OCD performance on the Benton Visual Retention 
Task  (BVRT;  Benton,  1974).  We  suggest  that  executive  impairments  of  
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organization as observed in the Figural Fluency (e.g., Fenger et al., 2005) and 
Trail Making Tasks (Penades et al., 2005; Roh et al., 2005, Kim et al., 2002) 
(see  Table  5)  explain  OCD  RFT  and  BVRT  performance:  poor  executive 
organization (E) during encoding reduces the veridicality of memory traces 
that are maintained in WM and passed into LTM which in turn play a role in 
symptom severity. 
 
Summary of deficient visuospatial memory 
All  the  aforementioned  tasks  require  extensive  executive  control  within  the 
visuospatial  domain  which  manifested  itself  in  a  number  of  OCD  memory 
impairments. First, checkers were poorer at remembering actions, which by 
their nature are episodically rich requiring the integration of information from a 
number of domains, such as, temporal order and spatial location of actions 
(e.g.,  Rubenstein  et  al.,  Exp  1a:  1993).  Second,  Purcell  and  colleagues 
highlighted that OCD patients were poorer at remembering abstract shapes, 
their  colours  and  their  locations,  a  task  requiring  focused  attention  of  (1) 
shape-colour-location bindings and (2) suppression of distractors that shared 
features with the target during recall. Third, OCD performance on the FR and 
RF tasks (Tallis et al., 1999; Zielinski et al., 1991) and BVR (Simpson et al., 
2006)  tasks  indicates  that  OCD  patients  have  consistent  executive  deficits 
which  impair  their  ability  to  efficiently  attend,  organize,  and  actively  retain 
visuospatial information (see fig. 33 and Table 5: Executive Impairments).  
 
Rey Complex Figure Task 
The most common measure of visuospatial memory performance in OCD is 
the Rey Complex Figure Test (RCFT: Osterrieth, 1944). First, participants are 
presented with the Rey Complex Figure (RCF) that they draw immediately 
without distraction revealing their ability to copy/encode. Then, distractor tasks 
are completed and after 3 min they recall the RCF, which provides a measure 
of immediate recall. Next, more distractor tasks are completed and after 30 
min  they  again  re-draw  the  RCF  as  a  measure  of  delayed  recall.  Finally, 
twenty-four figures are presented and the participant has to identify twelve 
that  belong  to  the  RCF  from  twelve  that  do  not,  serving  as  a  measure  of 
recognition  (Segalas  et  al.,  2008).  Chiulli  et  al.  (1995)  highlighted  the  
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functional distinctions of the RCFT: (1) Copy: perceptual, visuospatial, and 
organizational,  (2)  Immediate  recall:  amount  and  quality  of  information 
encoding, and (3) Delayed recall: amount and quality of information stored 
and retrieved from episodic memory.  
 
Savage et al. (1999; and Deckersbach et al., 2000; Penades et al., 2005; 
Savage  et  al.,  2000;  Segalas  et  al.,  2008;  see  also  Martinot  et  al.,  1990) 
reported  intact  copy  but  impaired  immediate  and  delayed  performance  in 
OCD  patients.  Preserved  copy  performance  and  no  additional  loss  of 
information  between  the  immediate  and  delayed  conditions  indicated  that 
memory capacity (see also Penades et al., 2005 who reported intact memory 
for  faces)  did  not  moderate  memory  performance.  Rather,  Savage  et  al. 
(1999; and Savage et al., 2000; Penades et al., 2005) suggested that poor 
use  of  organizational  strategies  during  the  copy  condition  mediated 
performance in the immediate recall condition. A point supported by  Savage 
et al. (1999) who observed that OCD patients are more likely to attend to 
details  and  less  likely  to  shift  their  attention  to  larger  RCFT  components 
compared to controls (see also Shin et al., 2004). Furthermore, Penades et al. 
(2005)  highlighted  that  obsessional  severity  was  associated  with  greater 
impairments in organizational strategies and immediate recall. This suggests 
that unnecessary attention to detail (E: organization, set-shifting = longer copy 
times on RCFT; focusing on details over whole) interferes with early encoding 
(i.e., fragmentation in EB) which impairs memory (B and L) and possibly plays 
a role in obsessional symptoms.  
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Figure  34.  Positioning of  deficient  visuospatial  (light gray  text)  RCFT (black text) 
studies within the EBL Classification. The scale has been adjusted to allow clearer 
representation of visuospatial memory studies. To minimise cluttering we have used 
a shaded area to indicate the dimensional location of the RCFT studies that reported 
OCD impairments at the level of encoding and/or recall and/or recognition.  
No Group Differences in RCFT Performance 
Simpson et al. (2006) proposed that depression and/or between study ratio 
differences  in  executive  dysfunction  may  explain  a  failure  to  report  OCD 
RCFT memory impairments. Both of these fit the current EBL explanation in 
that  performance  differences  between  studies  are  attributable  to  the 
respective executive deficits of the OCD group tested: (1) Depression: Moritz 
et  al.  (2003)  reported  that  OCD  patients  with  higher  comorbid  depression 
No Deficit 
in OCD 
Memory 
HIGH  
BINDING 
REQUIREMENT 
(B) 
LOW  
EXECUTIVE 
ROLE 
(E) 
HIGH 
EXECUTIVE 
ROLE 
(E) 
HIGH 
LOAD 
(L) 
LOW  
LOAD 
(L) 
LOW 
BINDING 
REQUIREMENT 
(B) 
Deficits: 
Encoding, 
STM, LTM 
Pharmacological 
Intervention: No Change  
No Deficits: 
Encoding, STM, 
LTM 
Organizational 
Strategy: Improved 
Performance 
CBT: Improved 
Performance 
Deficit in 
OCD 
Memory 
Memory for 
Actions 
Recurring 
Figures Test  
Benton Visual 
Retention Task 
DMTS – 
Visuospatial 
Colors 
OCD RCFT STUDIES 
= Kim et al. (2002) & Roh et al. (2005) 
= Martinot et al. (1990); Savage et al. (1999, 2000); 
Deckersback et al. (2000); Segalas et al. (2008); 
Penades et al. (2005); Boldrini et al. (2005), Shin 
et al. (2004) & Rampacher et al. (2010) 
= Simpson et al. (2006), Buhne et al. (2005) & 
Moritz et al. (2003) 
= Kuelz et al. (2006) 
= Buhlman et al. (2006) & Park et al. (2006) 
DEFICIENT VISUOSPATIAL OCD MEMORY 
= Zelinski et al. (1991) & Tallis et al. (1999) 
= Purcell et al. (1998) 
= Rubenstein et al. (Exp 1a: 1993) 
= Simpson et al. (2006)  
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forgot more RCFT information between copying and delayed recall compared 
to  those  with  lower  depression  scores.  They  concluded  that  memory 
dysfunctions in OCD are moderated by comorbid depression a finding also 
supported  by  Segalas  et  al.  (2008).  However,  Rampacher  et  al.  (2010) 
proposed that organizational impairments were specific to OCD and not to 
major depressive disorders but did concede that depression may aggravate 
existing deficits in OCD. (2) Sub-group Ratios: Cha et al. (2008) found that a 
predominantly checking OCD subgroup had poorer immediate and delayed 
recall compared to cleaners and controls (also observed by Jang et al., 2010), 
which conforms to our notion of checking compulsions as the primary source 
of  executive  deficits.  In  sum,  a  specific  type  of  executive  dysfunction  is 
required to observe a memory impairment, one that is predominant in one 
OCD sub-group (checkers) but generally absent in another (cleaners), which 
may be aggravated by comorbid depression, and possibly influenced by age 
of onset (Hwang et al., 2007; Roth et al., 2005). 
 
RCFT and Pharmacological and Psychological Interventions 
Kim et al. (2002) examined OCD patients on the RCFT (among other tests) 
before and after a 4-month period of pharmacological treatment. At baseline 
OCD patients had similar copy- but impaired immediate and delayed recall 
compared to controls. Despite a significant improvement of immediate recall 
from baseline to follow-up, they remained significantly impaired compared to 
controls (see also Rao et al., 2008; Roh et al., 2005). These studies indicate 
that  certain  executive  and  non-verbal  deficits  are  stable  and  possibly 
candidate  endophenotype  markers  for  OCD  (see  Bannon  et  al.,  2006; 
Chamberlain  et  al.,  2005;  Rao  et  al.,  2008)  resisting  pharmacological 
treatment. Psychological interventions which either implicitly (i.e., cognitive-
behavior  therapy;  Kuelz  et  al.,  2006)  or  explicitly  (i.e.,  cognitive  retraining; 
Buhlmann et al., 2006; Park et al., 2006) targeted organizational strategies 
have been associated with improvements on RCFT memory performance and 
obsessional severity in OCD (i.e., Park et al., 2006). This highlights that not 
only  is  executive  efficiency  (E)  malleable  to  intervention  by  improving  how 
patients encode (integrated B = low L) information in memory (see fig. 28B)  
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(see also Buhlmann et al., 2006) but it can also attenuate symptom severity. 
 
Summary of RCFT OCD performance 
The  RCFT  is  a  task  with  the  following  EBL  requirements  that  make  OCD 
deficits very likely: (1) Executive-Functioning: For the RCFT, OCD patients 
show consistent executive impairments (E) in: (1) organization during early 
encoding, (2) attention to details over the whole and (3) shifting cognitive set 
from details to the whole. A failure to reveal OCD impairments on the RCFT is 
likely due to the tested OCD group not having a sufficient number of executive 
impaired patients, e.g., more cleaners than checkers (see Cha et al., 2008). 
(2)  Binding  Complexity:  successful memory  of multiple  geometric  shapes 
relies on binding. This occurs at the level of within-object binding (i.e., sides of 
triangle in bottom left corner) and between-object binding, where veridicality 
depends on the correct binding of parts in space relative to other parts (i.e., 
position of circle with 3 dots within triangle). Thus, poor executive functioning 
interferes with the veridicality of multiple RCF bindings (B) in encoding, WM 
maintenance and LTM. (3) Load: load in the RCFT depends on the executive 
efficiency  and  binding  complexity,  in  other  words,  the  ability  to  chunk  the 
complex  figure  into  manageable  sub-parts.  For  OCD  patients,  executive 
impairments (E) increase the load (L) and the binding complexity (B) of the 
RCF in memory (see fig. 28B). 
 
6.7. Comparing EBL system to other models in the OCD literature 
The EBL classification system allowed us to explain, in a unified manner, how 
executive  impairments  observed  in  OCD/checking  tend  to  impair  memory 
when the EB is extensively relied upon. However, we are aware that our EBL 
classification  system  is  primarily  cognitive  in  nature,  which  poses  the 
question:  How  does  it  relate  to  alternative  and  more  phenomenogical 
explanations  of  OCD  symptoms  in  general  and  of  memory  impairments  in 
particular? 
 
Salkovskis  (1999)  provided  one  of  the  most  influential  models  of  OCD 
suggesting an integrated relationship between a number of variables. In the  
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most general sense, this model saw early experiences and critical incidents 
as primers for the development of faulty assumptions and general beliefs. In 
turn, this motivates intrusive thoughts, images, urges and doubt which induce 
a  misinterpretation  of  the  personal  significance  of  these  intrusions.  This 
misinterpretation is then maintained by an array of factors such as attention 
and  reasoning  biases,  mood  changes,  counterproductive  safety  strategies, 
and  neutralising  actions.  These  then  feed  back  into  the  maintenance  and 
shaping  of  existent  and  future  intrusive  thoughts.  Within  this 
phenomenological model of OCD the cognitive EBL factors we propose fall 
into the category of ‘attention and reasoning biases’, while our account exactly 
specifies the executive mechanisms that have distractibility/biases as origin 
and memory impairment as effect. Compared to Salkovskis’ model, we argue 
for  a  more  direct  relationship  between  executive-memory  impairments  (as 
understood in the EBL system) and the content of obsessional thinking. The 
findings that executive functioning (i.e., ‘E’: organization) was associated with 
memory performance (for visuospatial stimuli high in ‘B’, see: Penades et al., 
2005; and ‘L’, see: van der Wee et al., 2007) and severity of symptoms in 
OCD supports this assertion (see Tallis et al., 1999; Park et al., 2006). We 
suggest  that  critical  incidents/early  experiences/personal  dispositions  likely 
prime executive/attentional impairments to become operant when faced with 
an  internal  and/or  external  stimulus/intrusion  associated  with  the  original 
incident. For example, a childhood incident of burning oneself with an iron 
may manifest subsequently as an attentional bias to irons and/or checking 
that they are ‘OFF.’ 
 
The role of inflated personal responsibility (i.e., preventing harms to others) 
has been identified as important in models of checking and impaired memory 
(Rachman,  2002;  Rachman  et  al.,  1995).  In  the  simplest  interpretation, 
Rachman (2002) proposed that responsibility influences perceptions of harm, 
increasing  anxiety  and  neutralising  checking  attempts.  However,  checking 
only  serves  to  increase  responsibility  and  impair  memory,  which  leads 
checkers  to  believe  that  their  behaviours  are  out  of  control.  A  likely 
consequence  would  be  increased  attention  to  aspects  of  a  memory 
representation  which  are  deemed  relevant  or  possibly  neutralising  to  the  
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perceived responsibility/threat. However, as we saw in our work (Exp. 1 of 
Harkin, Rutherford, & Kessler, 2011) and others’ (e.g., Savage et al., 1999), 
this  could  result  in  a  narrow  focus  on  specific  stimulus  details  or  deficient 
suppression of distracting thoughts/stimuli, which in any case comes at a cost 
for memory accuracy.  
 
Van den Hout and Kindt (2003a) validated their OCD-memory model using 
the  remember/know  distinction. They  showed  that  repetitively  checking  the 
same stimulus resulted in a shift in the nature of their memory recollections 
from being detailed and vivid (‘remember’ judgment) to being hazy, indefinite 
and  unclear  (‘know’  judgment). While  the authors  reported  the outcome of 
checking, the exact mechanism of memory changes was not stated. A more 
specific  indication  of  the  mechanism  underlying  checking-related  memory 
impairment  was  revealed  by  Radomsky  and  Alcolado  (2010).  They  asked 
participants to mentally check (“…imagine your hand manipulating the knobs”; 
p.347) and then recall “Which three knobs did you check on the last trial?” 
(p.347).  Those  who  engaged  in  mental  checking  were  significantly  less 
accurate than  those who  did  not  mentally  check. The  unnecessary  mental 
manipulation and increased complexity (i.e., imagining your hand when it is 
not  needed)  caused  by  mental  checking  (E)  likely  interferes  with  the 
veridicality of knob-to-stove bindings (high in ‘B’) maintained in the EB.  
 
More specifically, Ferreri, Lapp, and Peretti (2011) proposed that cognitive 
dysfunction in OCD (and in anxiety disorders in general) could be classified 
into four domains: (1) executive functioning (primarily attention), (2) memory 
(WM,  episodic, autobiographical),  (3)  maladaptive  cognitions  (thoughts  and 
beliefs),  and  (4)  metacognitions  (thoughts  and  beliefs  about  thoughts  and 
beliefs).  We  suggest  that  our  EBL  system  helps  integrate  the  first  two 
domains:  primary  executive  dysfunction  results  in  secondary  memory 
impairment. In turn, we have previously proposed (Harkin & Kessler, 2009) 
that  self-awareness  (metacognition)  of  repeated  loss  of  accuracy  may 
decrease confidence in memory and increase the likelihood and strength of 
misleading intrusive thoughts (maladaptive cognitions) which would then be 
harder to ignore. This was supported by a recent study (Harkin, Rutherford, &  
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Kessler,  2011),  where  we  found  a  metacognitive  deficit  specific  to  high 
checkers (i.e., a dissociation between accuracy and confidence in a baseline 
condition). We do accept that the direction of causality between memory and 
metacognition is intricate and likely differs from patient to patients, i.e., poor 
memory results in reduced confidence in those memories or alternatively poor 
confidence motivates checking, which we have seen impairs memory. Thus, 
we argue that our EBL system not only complements the models of Salkoskis 
(1999), Rachman (2002; Rachman et al., 1995) and van den Hout and Kindt 
(2003a)  and  the  classification  proposed  by  Ferreri  et  al.  (2011)  but  also 
provides a more specific and stringent cognitive framework for explaining and 
predicting executive-memory impairments in OCD.  
 
6.8. Limitations of the EBL classification system 
We highlight the following limitations to the EBL classification system. First, it 
is a good fit for OCD patients with prominent checking cognitions/behaviors, 
but  appears  not  to  describe  symptoms  such  as  cleaning  or  hoarding.  We 
propose that if the EBL factors are sufficiently stressed (as discussed above) 
then  memory  impairment  could  be  observed  in  symptoms  other  than 
checking. However, we do concur that due to the specific impairments (i.e., 
inhibition; Omori et al., 2007) and cognitive habits (i.e., iteratively checking the 
contents of memory, perseveration) associated with checking, this symptom is 
the most likely to affect executive functions that lie at the core of the EBL 
system.  Second,  we  do  not  make  many  solid  conclusions  regarding  the 
relationship  between  the  EBL  and  confidence  in  memory.  Whereby,  poor 
confidence  may  be  a  general  factor  –  tightly  linked  to  anxiety  –  which 
increases  the  likelihood  that  executive  dysfunction  will  impair  memory  for 
tasks which load high on B and/or L dimensions. Alternatively or in addition, 
executive-memory impairment may result in poorer memory confidence which 
then  motivates  detrimental  checking  and/or  obsessional thinking.  Third,  we 
make no comment on the reviewed studies with respect to general cognitive 
abilities like intelligence. However, we agree with the extensive OCD literature 
review  of  Kuelz  et  al.  (2004)  –  which  covered  many  of  the  papers  we 
examined  –  who  stated  that:  “It  is  well  established  today  that  general  
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intelligence is not affected in OCD” (p. 223). Finally, these limitations highlight 
the necessity for future experimental research to see if the EBL system does 
accurately predict where memory impairment will and will not occur. 
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6.9. Conclusions 
This review reconciles inconsistent findings as to memory deficits in OCD by 
suggesting  that  the  classic  view  in  terms  of  modality-specific  (verbal  vs. 
visuospatial) deficits and/or general capacity issues might not be the optimal 
way of conceiving of the problem, while we propose to follow and extend the 
more  recent  argument  that  OCD  memory  impairments  are  secondary  to 
executive dysfunction. Using our research as a basis, we argue that memory 
impairments  occur  when:  (1)  a  task  taps  into  executive  deficits  of 
OCD/checkers,  and  (2)  accurate  memory  performance  requires  attention-
dependent maintenance of bindings and/or the task has high encoding load. 
Thus,  executive  dysfunction  interferes  with  the  accurate  maintenance  of 
complex bindings and/or fails to reduce load, impairing memory. From this we 
propose the EBL classification system, which comprises executive functioning 
(E), binding complexity (B) and memory load (L) as central dimensions for 
understanding and predicting OCD memory impairments. This challenges the 
importance  of  the  modality-specific  view,  i.e.,  the  visuospatial-  vs.  verbal-
memory distinction, in two important ways. First, impairments are thought to 
be determined primarily by poor executive functioning (E) and then by the 
content of the task. Second, visuospatial- compared to verbal stimulus content 
inherently possesses different resource requirements that are best conceived 
of as binding- and load-requirements. 
 
In support of this challenge, we reviewed 58 findings across 46 studies. First, 
we observed that for visuospatial as well as for verbal tasks with low EBL 
scores, no OCD memory impairments were observed compared to controls. 
Second,  tasks  that  steadily  increased  load  (visuospatial:  n-back  task)  or 
employed  a  high  inherent  load  (verbal:  CVLT)  revealed  OCD  memory 
impairment,  as  the  patients’  executive  deficits  failed  to  match  the  task 
demands at higher load levels. Hence, across verbal and visuospatial tasks it 
is  poor  executive  functioning  that  cannot  cope  with  increasing  cognitive 
demands  that  differentiates  OCD  memory  performance  from  controls. 
However,  we  did  suggest  that  default  differences  in  EBL  scores  of  verbal 
compared to visuospatial tasks make OCD memory impairments more likely  
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in the latter (see fig. 28A vs. 28B). Verbal tasks, generally, present verbal 
information  in  a  format  (stories,  word  lists  that  benefit  from  semantic 
clustering) that are high in load but low in binding complexity. In this case, 
performance is benefited by efficient executive processes that utilize existing 
representations  in  LTM,  i.e.,  chunking  according  to  categories  reduces 
memory load. In contrast, basic visuospatial tasks, especially when random 
locations are employed, are usually less supported by LTM knowledge, so 
strategic executive organizing must cope with binding complexity and/or load 
even  at  low  demands.  This  increases  the  number  of  dimensions  (3  in 
visuospatial,  i.e.  EBL;  vs.  2  in  verbal,  i.e.  EL)  where  OCD  memory 
impairments  can  occur,  making  visuospatial  impairments  more  likely  than 
verbal.  
 
For  tasks  that  are  high  in  binding  complexity  (memory  for  actions,  Trail-
Making  Task,  Benton  Visual  Retention  Task,  Figural  Fluency,  Recurring 
Figures Test, Rey Complex Figure Task) consistent OCD impairments were 
observed across a range of measures. This can be simply surmised as an 
inability to organize complex visuospatial information in a manner to benefit 
early encoding, immediate and delayed recall and recognition. For example, 
in the case of RCFT performance in OCD, poor executive functioning (E) fails 
to  reduce  the  load  (L)  by  means  of  strategic  organization,  which  in  turn 
reduces the veridicality of multiple bindings (B) of the RCF representation in 
memory.  Such  a  representation  based  on  loosely  interconnected  feature 
assemblies  is  not  only  more  difficult  to  accurately  copy  and  recall  than  a 
tightly  structured  one,  but  it  also  places  additional  strain  upon  executive 
processes  during  maintenance,  which  are  already  operating  sub-optimally. 
Further  extrapolating  these  arguments  to  future  studies,  tasks  that  require 
complex binding of multiple and multimodal features (as in our recent studies) 
are also likely to tap into OCD-specific deficits due to sub-optimal executive 
organization of input and deficient ‘protection’ during maintenance. 
 
The central role of executive dysfunction was further supported by the finding 
that  targeting  executive  processes  in  OCD  patients  with  therapeutic 
intervention  not  only  reduces  obsessional  symptoms  but  also  improves  
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memory performance. We take this as evidence of a link between executive 
and memory impairments, anxiety, and the development of obsessions (e.g., 
doubt  and  uncertainty;  “Did  I  turn  the  stove  off?”)  and  neutralizing 
compulsions  (e.g.,  checking  to  compensate  for  poor  memory  and  high 
anxiety). Finally, we propose that our explanation complements existing OCD 
models  by  specifying  essential  cognitive  mechanisms,  which  will  hopefully 
help guiding future research. 
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7.  Conclusion:  Overview,  clinical  implications,  limitations  and  future 
research, and contribution to OCD memory research  
A summary of the main findings for Experiments 1-9 is provided in Table 11. It 
highlights the primary experimental manipulations, how high checkers’ WM 
performance  faired  with  respect  to  the  strong  (high  checkers’  memory 
impaired  in  misleading  trials)  or  weak  hypothesis  (high  checkers’  memory 
impaired  after  misleading  and  resolvable  trials),  and  the  main  confidence 
findings. We review the main findings from our experiments, followed by the 
possible role of executive-memory impairments in the development and the 
maintenance of obsessions and compulsions (see fig. 33). We then highlight 
the  limitations  of  the  research  and  the  solutions  to  these  through  future 
research. 
 
7.1. Working memory and inhibitory performance of checkers 
The present WM tasks placed an emphasis on the veridical binding of letters-
to-locations  (Exp.  1-5),  ‘ON/OFF’  states-to-appliances  (Exp.  8)  and 
appliances-to-locations (Exp. 9). Accurate memory performance required that 
attention be allocated to such bindings in a cognitive resource which Baddeley 
(2000)  referred  to  as the  EB. This  buffer  provided  a  pragmatic  solution  to 
manner  in  which  the  cognitive  system  bound  information  from  different 
modalities (i.e., a visual letter presented a location in space) into a coherent 
representation. However, it does come with a cost: Attention (automatic or 
controlled)  is  required  for  the  veridical  maintenance  of bindings  in  the  EB, 
which implies that interfering with this attention (i.e., away from bindings) will 
reduce the veridicality of those bindings and impair memory (see fig. 1). Due 
to  differences  in  the  content  of  the  encoding  set  stimuli  (Exp.  1-5:  non-
threatening letters versus Exp. 8 & 9: electrical kitchen appliances) between 
experiments,  we  present  the  results  separately  for  those  which  employed 
letters in locations (Exp. 1-5) and ecologically valid stimuli (Exp. 6-9). 
 
7.1.1. Letters in locations: Experiments 1-5 
In  our  original  experiments  1,  2  and  the  extreme  meta-comparison  we 
provided support to the strong hypothesis as high checkers’ WM impairments 
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Task Stimuli:  Letters in Locations  Ecologically Valid Stimuli 
Task Type:  Working Memory  Inhibition of Return  Working Memory 
Key Task 
Elements: 
Simple  Colour 
Added 
Visuospatial 
Distractor 
Eye-Tracker 
(Similar 
method to 
Exp. 1 & 2) 
Classic 
IOR Cue 
Novel ‘ON’ 
Cue  ON/OFF P2  Location 
P2 
Experiment 
Number/Type: 
Exp. 1  Exp. 2  Extreme 
Comparison  Exp. 3  Exp. 4  Exp. 5  Task 6  Task 7  Exp. 8  Exp. 9 
LC check score 
(mean/SD)  
1.11(1.10) 
[n=20] 
1.05(1.18) 
[n=20] 
0.5(0.71) 
[n=10] 
1.74(1.69) 
[n=20] 
0.89(1.15) 
[n=20] 
0.7(0.9) 
[n=17]  0.31(0.48) [n=50]  0.5(0.61) 
[n=20] 
0.0(0.0) 
[n=20] 
HC check score 
(mean/SD): 
9.53(5.49) 
[n=20] 
8.65(3.7) 
[n=20] 
15.8(5.32) 
[n=10] 
12.57(5.96) 
[n=20] 
10.48(5.96) 
[n=20] 
12.7(5.8) 
[n=18]  13.78(5.55) [n=52]  13.85(4.12) 
[n=20] 
13.75(6.16) 
[n=20] 
LC vs. HC: 
Primary 
Attention/Memory 
Finding: 
HC poorer 
memory in 
misleading 
trials vs. LC 
HC poorer 
memory in 
misleading 
trials vs. 
LC 
HC poorer 
memory in 
misleading 
trials vs. LC 
HC poorer 
memory in 
misleading for 
correct P2 vs. 
LC 
HC poorer 
memory for 
misleading & 
resolvable 
trials vs. LC 
HC make more 
fixations during 
misleading trials 
at empty 
locations 
HC (and 
LC) had 
normal IOR 
effects 
HC 
attenuated 
IOR for ON 
cues vs. LC 
HC poorer 
memory for 
ON/OFF 
states vs. LC 
HC poorer 
memory in 
misleading 
trials vs. LC 
Hypothesis 
Supported: 
Strong  Strong  Strong  Strong  Weak  Strong  Data N/A  Data N/A  Weak  Strong 
LC vs. HC: 
Primary 
Confidence 
Finding: 
HC meta-
cognitive 
impairment 
vs. LC. 
Enhanced in 
misleading 
trials 
No group 
difference 
No group 
difference 
HC meta-
cognitive 
impairment vs. 
LC. Moderated 
by Inter P1 
Strong HC 
meta-cognitive 
impairment  
vs. LC 
No group 
difference  Data N/A  Data N/A 
HC meta-
cognitive 
impairment 
vs. LC 
Strong HC 
meta-
cognitive 
impairment 
vs. LC 
Table 11. Overview of the main results for experiments 1 to 9 as divided by the stimuli used (letters vs. ecologically valid stimuli), type of 
experiment  (WM  vs.  IOR),  and  key  task  elements.  The  results  concentrate  on  WM/IOR  performance  and  confidence  of  high  checkers 
compared to low checkers. N/A Data = No data was taken with respect to this variable.  
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were specific to a misleading but not a resolvable context (Harkin & Kessler, 
2009). The replication of our findings in Experiment 2 and the extreme group 
meta-comparison speak to the robustness of our findings. Critically, the only 
difference  between  misleading  and  resolvable  trials  was  the  absence  or 
presence  of  the  Probe-1  letter  in  the  encoding  set,  respectively.  When 
confronted by a misleading mismatch high checkers appear to be unable to 
ignore it and so unnecessarily and fruitlessly search those letters presently 
maintained within WM. This assertion is supported by the observation that 
OCD checkers are poorer at tolerating uncertainty (i.e., misleading probe-1 
letter)  than  OCD  non-checkers  and  controls  (Tolin, Woods,  &  Abramowitz, 
2003),  and  that  an  inability  to  tolerate  uncertainty  is  associated  with 
subsequent  checking  and  repeating  rituals  (Lind  &  Boschen,  2009;  Tolin, 
Woods,  &  Abramowitz,  2003).  The  resultant  search  and/or  competition 
between a strong, visually present misleading letter to fragile letter-location 
representations in the EB likely impairs attention directed to those bindings, 
impairing memory. The extreme group meta-comparison provides evidence 
that the same misleading specific WM impairment was present in subclinical 
checkers  who  scored  in  the  clinical  range  and  that  this  impairment  was 
numerically larger. This indicates that there may be a relationship between 
severity of checking symptoms and extent of WM impairment (see Omori et 
al., 2007). High checkers’ performance was intact on no-probe-1 trials proving 
that basic WM capacity was in this case intact. 
 
Experiments 3 and 4 were a direct attempt to further target and interfere with 
the  fragile  bindings  maintained  within  the  EB  especially  in  high  checkers 
(Harkin & Kessler, 2011a). Experiment 3 increased the load of the encoding 
set  by  adding  the  additional  binding  of  colour  to  letters.  The  intermediate 
Probe-1 then asked for the colour of a letter which was either misleading or 
resolvable.  The  results  indicated  that  we  may  have  induced  a  degree  of 
checking  in  all  participants  which  possibly  obscured  the  clear-cut  WM 
impairments  observed  in  the  previous  experiments.  Despite  this  and  in 
support of the strong hypothesis: High checkers had WM impairments in the 
most  difficult  memory  condition  (correctly  located  Probe-2  letters)  in 
misleading trials. This indicates that the inability of high checkers to ignore  
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misleading trials was still sufficient to result in WM impairment specific to this 
condition relative to low checkers. Again, no group differences on no-probe-1 
trials were observed. Experiment 4 presented a strong visuospatial distractor 
at a misleading and resolvable location. Therefore, in accord with the weaker 
hypothesis high checkers’ WM was impaired in both conditions indicating that 
a  visuospatial  distractor  generally  impaired  high  but  not  low  checkers’ 
attention to bindings. WM performance in baseline conditions again proved to 
be intact. 
 
Experiment 5 measured eye movements in a slightly modified version of our 
original  WM  task  (Exp.  1  and  2).  This  was  a  direct  attempt  to  show  that 
checkers’  inhibitory  impairments  for  misleading  information  result  in  them 
searching  the  contents  of  WM.  In  line  with  our  strong  hypothesis,  high 
checkers  made  more  fixations  during  the  presentation  of  a  misleading 
intermediate  Probe-1 compared  to  low  checkers.  Further  analysis  revealed 
that in misleading trials high checkers fixated longer on empty encoded set 
locations, in comparison to resolvable trials and low checkers (Harkin, Miellet, 
&  Kessler,  subm).  This  provides  evidence  that  checkers’  inhibitory 
impairments do in fact lead them to check the contents of WM in a manner 
which is unnecessary (misleading trials) and uninformative (empty locations). 
Importantly, allowing high checkers to self-terminate the intermediate Probe-1 
appears  to  have  reversed  their  WM  impairments  which  were  previously 
observed when the intermediate probe terminated automatically (Exp. 1-4). 
These  findings  are  comparable  to  research  which  has  reported  intact WM 
performance  despite  abnormal  brain  functioning  in  OCD  participants 
(Ciesielski et al., 2007; Henseler et al., 2008). Further, high checkers’ intact 
WM performance across resolvable, misleading and no-probe-1 trials again 
indicates that basic WM capacity is preserved. 
 
7.1.2. Ecologically valid stimuli: Tasks 6-7 and Experiments 8-9 
We then employed ecologically valid stimuli (electrical kitchen appliances) in a 
novel  inhibition  of  return  (IOR;  Posner  &  Snyder,  1975)  and WM  tasks  to 
address two central limitations identified in the previous experiments. First, 
while  we  inferred  that  high  checkers’  WM  (Exp.  1-4)  and  eye  movements  
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(Exp. 5) was attributable to their inhibitory impairments, we were aware that 
this conclusion would be strengthened by explicit evidence of this. Second, 
despite letters in locations producing robust and replicable results, as stimuli 
they have limited relevance to the actual symptoms of checkers. Indeed, in 
our IOR task we showed that while high checkers’ inhibitory functioning was 
intact (Task 6) it was impaired when attention was drawn to a threatening ‘ON’ 
cue  (Task  7).  Thus,  an  inability  to  disengage  attention  from  a  threatening 
feature was sufficient to impair otherwise normal inhibitory control (i.e., IOR). 
In Experiment 8, high checkers were impaired in their ability to correctly recall 
if an appliance had been ‘ON’ of ‘OFF’. This is consistent with the previous 
findings from Task 7: Focused attention to threatening states may interfere 
with the binding of that state to that actual appliance. In contrast, Experiment 
9  produced  the  more  classic  WM  pattern,  where  high  checkers’  memory 
impairment was more focused to the misleading context. The intact no-probe-
1  performance  of  high  checkers  in  Experiment  9  (and  Exp.  1-5  generally) 
provides  important  evidence  against  the  argument  that  a  basic  capacity 
impairment underlies their general (across resolvable, misleading, no-probe-1 
trials) WM impairment for appliance states observed in Experiment 8. Further, 
a basic impairment in capacity would not have influenced WM capacity in an 
isolated manner (i.e., Exp. 8 only) but would have impaired WM performance 
across all conditions and experiments (Exp. 1-7). 
 
 
 
 
7.2. Confidence 
Confidence  responses  revealed  a  mixed  pattern  across  the  present  WM 
experiments  (see  Table  11).  In  a  manner  consistent  with  a  large  body  of 
literature (for review see Woods et al., 2002), high checkers have a general 
task independent impairment in their confidence (Exp. 4 and 9). However, a 
misleading  context  appears  to  further  attenuate  their  already  inferior 
confidence (Exp. 1), perhaps as the result of the uncertainty and checking 
which arises in this condition (Exp. 5). The complex nature of high checkers 
confidence  is  further  reflected  in  Experiment  3,  where  the  removal  of  no-
probe-1  trials  from  the  statistical  analysis  increased  the  magnitude  of 
difference  between  groups,  with  high  checkers  having  poorer  confidence 
across conditions (resolvable and misleading) compared to low checkers. This  
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also indicates that in this experiment, for no-probe-1 trials, high checkers have 
comparable confidence to that of low checkers. These divergent findings may 
be  explained  by  the  different  type  of  confidence  responses  used  between 
experiments.  For  example,  confidence  responses  were  provided  in  the 
following manners: (1) Experiments 1-4: on a scale ranging from 1 (totally 
confident) to 6 (totally not-confident), (2) Experiments 5 and 8: used a binary 
response option for confident versus not-confident and (3) Experiment 9 used 
a  quantitative  scale  ranging  from  1  (totally  not-confident)  to  100  (totally 
confident).  Furthermore,  Experiments  1-5  and  8  used  keyboard  responses 
while Experiment 9 required the participant to make their response by shifting 
their  hand  from  the  keyboard  to  a  mouse.  Therefore,  the  absence  and 
presence of general confidence impairment is more likely due to the use of 
the  binary/keyboard  response  option  in  Experiment  8  as  compared  to  the 
quantitative/mouse option in Experiment 9. In addition, using a 0-100 scale in 
Experiment 9 provided the option of calculating sensitive confidence-accuracy 
correlations which were not available with the confidence response options 
used in the other experiments (1-5 & 8). Therefore, in our future research we 
will  continue  to  use  the  1-100  scale  as  it  is  flexible  to  different  statistical 
designs  and  more  sensitive  to  between  group  differences  than  the  other 
measure employed. 
 
7.2.1.  An  intricate  relationship  between  working  memory  performance  and 
confidence 
The relationship between WM performance and confidence in high checkers 
is  both  delicate  and  complex.  High  checkers  suffer  from  inhibitory  deficits 
which  in  the  correct  experimental/environmental  circumstances  impair  their 
memory.  They  also  appear  to  ‘carry-around’  a  task-independent 
metacognitive  impairment,  which  potentially  primes  them  to  question  their 
memories,  actions,  and  thoughts  in  relation  to  stimuli/activities  that  are 
concordant  with  their  symptoms  (Exp.  5  &  9).  An  absence  of  a  general 
impairment in WM capacity (i.e., intact no-probe-1 trials), argues against the 
idea  that  poor  memory  explicitly  mediates  confidence.  Rather,  in  specific 
circumstances,  high  checkers’  dysfunctional  inhibitory  control  attenuates  a 
general  metacognitive  impairment  which  was  reflected  in  their  poorer  
    159 
confidence when preceded by a misleading (Exp. 1) or intermediate probe 
(i.e.,  Exp.  3).  However,  the  direction  and  strength  of  causality  between 
inhibitory dysfunction and confidence is unclear and highlights an interesting 
avenue for future research 
 
7.3.  Clinical  implications  of  checkers’  executive  and  working  memory 
impairments 
From the executive and WM impairments identified in Experiments 1-9 and 
the  EBL  (Executive  Functioning,  Binding  Complexity,  Memory  Load) 
classification system (see Section 6), we propose a model (see fig. 27) where 
primary executive dysfunction and secondary memory impairment potentially 
plays a role in the development and maintenance of obsessive-compulsive 
symptoms.  For  example,  in  Task  7,  high  checkers  were  less  able  to 
disengage  their  attention  from  a  threatening  ‘ON’  cue  to  the  detriment  of 
normal  inhibitory  functioning  (Task  6).  In  a  related  manner,  Experiment  8 
showed  that  high  checkers  were  generally  impaired  in  their  ability  to 
accurately recall the state (‘ON’ or ‘OFF) of an electrical kitchen appliance. 
Combined, the results of Task 7 and Experiment 8 indicate that high checkers 
suffer from a primary executive dysfunction in disengaging their attention from 
threatening  states  which  results  in  secondary  memory  impairment  by 
impairing state-appliance bindings within the EB. In turn, this poor memory will 
likely evoke a degree of anxiety and doubt regarding its original status which 
will increase the likelihood of intrusive obsessions (“Did I turn it OFF?”) and 
neutralizing checking compulsions (cognitive: checking the contents of WM; 
behavioural: physically checking if it was ‘ON’ or ‘OFF’). This is supported by 
the  finding  that  mental  and  physical  checking  of  electrical  stoves  impaired 
memory of the actual knobs checked on the last trial (Radomsky & Alcolado, 
2010). This suggests that if executive-memory impairment plays a key role in 
the  development  of  obsessions  and  compulsions  then  targeting  executive-
memory dysfunction should necessarily reduce the frequency and severity of 
obsessions and compulsions. Indeed, a body of evidence from the anxiety 
literature  indicates  that  targeting  and  reducing  attentional  biases  (i.e.,  
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executive functioning efficiency) to threat also attenuated anxiety levels (Amir, 
Najmi, & Morrison, 2009; Eldar & Bar-Haim, 2010; Schmidt et al., 2009).  
 
Furthermore, within this model we highlight three important points regarding 
executive impairments. Firstly, while inhibition, set-shifting, organization and 
attention is the primary executive impairments observed in OCD (see Table 4 
in EBL) this is by no means an exhaustive list. This is supported by Miyake et 
al. (2000) who reported that while inhibition, set-shifting and updating were 
relatively independent constructs, they were interconnected in terms of their 
unified reliance upon the attentional resources of the central executive. The 
identification  of  these  executive  constructs  supports  the  executive-memory 
link  proposed  here,  whereby  an  inability  to  ignore  irrelevant  stimuli  will 
potentially  reduce  the  attention  allocated  to  the  concurrent  updating  of 
information  presently  maintained  in  the  EB  of  WM.  Secondly,  executive 
impairments  do  not  operate  in  isolation,  for  example,  dysfunctional 
organization (whole-object vs. parts) will influence attentional focus (broad vs. 
narrow, respectively). Finally, we argue that executive impairments are state-
like  and  situationally  dependent  compared  to  obsessions  and  compulsions 
which once established become increasingly trait-like and stable in nature. 
Thus,  while  executive  dysfunction  is  consistently  observed  in  OCD  (e.g., 
Bannon, Gonsalvez,  & Croft, 2008), they only impair memory in a specific 
combination  of  EBL  scores  (see  fig.  27,  28A,  28B)  when  confronted  with 
stimuli/situations which are concordant with their primary symptoms. 
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EPISODIC LTM 
(Memorizing stove 
states over long-term)  
CENTRAL 
EXECUTIVE 
EPISODIC BUFFER  
(Binding of stove 
burners + knobs to 
on/off codes 
/letters to locations) 
Attention   Set-Shifting  Organisation 
- Hyper 
Rehearsal/Checking 
Control 
- Poor at Shifting Cognitive-Set 
from Distracting/Misleading/Details  
To Relevant/Global Information  
Inhibition 
- Lack of Suppression of 
Distracting/Misleading 
Information 
- Inefficient Encoding of 
Complex (Bias for Details 
over Global) Information 
- Comparison of 
External/Internal 
Stimuli/Thoughts to 
those in WM 
- Competition between 
Irrelevant and Relevant 
Stimuli/Thoughts in WM 
-  Overrepresentation of 
Distracting/Misleading/Details in 
WM Compared to 
Relevant/Global Information 
-  Inefficient (independent 
features) Representation of 
Object in Memory 
- Less Accurate 
Bindings Underlying 
Initial Stimulus Input 
 
ANXIETY PROVOKING 
STIMULUS INPUT (Stove) 
- Inaccurate Memory 
Representation 
 
- Anxiety & 
Doubt 
Regarding 
Initial 
Stimulus 
Input and 
induced by 
Distractions 
OBSESSIONS 
“Did I turn the oven off? If I 
forget it will burn the house 
down!” 
COMPULSIONS 
Check to neutralize 
ANXIETY and POOR 
MEMORY/DOUBT 
 
Figure 33. A proposed perspective, based on the original Harkin and Kessler model (2009), on how executive impairments of organization, 
attention, inhibition and set-shifting interfere with episodic buffer functionality (i.e., binding) impairing memory. From this anxiety and doubt 
develop with respect to the original memory which increases the likelihood of obsessions (e.g., “Did I turn the iron off?”) and subsequent 
futile compulsions to neutralize anxiety and to overcome poor memory. Further explanations provided in the text. 
Executive Deficits Activated in Specific Contexts (Stove/Threatening ‘ON’ states) 
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7.4. Limitations and future research 
We now identify the limitations to the present research and, when appropriate, 
propose solutions to these problems in future research. Firstly, high checkers 
were selected from a subclinical sample which possibly limits the extent of the 
conclusions  that  can  be  drawn  with  respect  to  clinical  OCD  checkers. 
However, the extreme group meta-comparison employed high checkers which 
scored in the clinical range (15.8) on the checking subscale of the VOCI (see 
Thordarson  et  al.,  2004).  In  this  case,  the  magnitude  of  high  checkers 
misleading specific WM impairment was increased, suggesting that the WM 
performance  of  subclinical  and  clinical  scoring  checkers  was  quantitatively 
analogous.  Further,  in  Experiments  3,  and  5-9  high  checkers  had  a  mean 
checking  score  which  was  in  the  range  of  the  checking  score  for  OCD 
patients. The high checking groups in this case were comparable to clinical 
checking and OCD which further substantiates any conclusions we draw with 
respect to clinical checking patients. Further, using subclinical checkers from 
an  undergraduate  sample  likely  removes  confounding  factors  such  as 
medication and comorbidity that is likely present in clinical groups (Mataix-
Cols  et  al.,  1997;  1999a).  Future  research  can  easily  address  this  by 
employing the present WM and IOR tasks in clinical patient groups. Secondly, 
across the experiments there was no measurement of anxiety, depression or 
an independent cognitive index of WM functioning and so we cannot exclude 
the role of group differences in these areas to the current findings. The first 
two points are presently addressed in the latest version of our WM task series 
where  we  explicitly  measure  anxiety  and  depression  with  the  state-trait 
anxiety inventory (Spielberger et al., 1983) and Beck Depression Inventory 
(Beck,  Steer,  &  Brown,  1996),  respectively.  This  latter  criticism  will  be 
addressed  in  upcoming  research  where  OCD  patients  will  complete  the 
Raven’s  Progressive  Matrices  (Raven,  Raven,  &  Court,  2004)  as  an 
independent  test  of  WM  functioning.  Thirdly,  a  criticism  of  the  first  5 
experiments was that letters in locations were not concordant with the primary 
symptoms  of  checkers.  This  was  addressed  by  using  ecologically  valid 
electrical kitchen appliances in the subsequent IOR (Task 6 & 7) and WM 
(Exp. 8 & 9) experiments. A subsequent limitation was the electrical kitchen  
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appliances  were  not  appraised  by  individual  participants  and  therefore 
differences  in  perceived  threat  of  low  and  high  checkers  is  unknown. 
However,  as  high  checkers  impaired  inhibitory  functioning  was  specific  to 
Task  7,  this  suggests  that  an  unpredictive  ‘ON’  cue  was  sufficiently 
threatening  for  high  checkers  to  interfere  with  otherwise  normal  inhibitory 
functioning (Task 6). Indeed, these effects occurred by using stimuli that were 
general  (i.e.,  present  on  checking  subscale  of  VOCI)  to  the  symptoms  of 
checking despite them not being idiographically selected or appraised. This 
suggests allowing for the idiographic selection of visual stimuli relevant to the 
symptoms  of  each  individual  high  checker  would  possibly  produce  greater 
IOR and WM impairments than presently observed. Alternatively, we would 
have expected larger effects if we had used checkers whose concerns were 
only for electrical appliance. Finally, related to the second and third limitation, 
the focus on checking limits the conclusions to this subgroup. An interesting 
avenue of future research would be to see if the WM performance of OCD 
washers is in the same or opposite direction to that observed for checkers. 
The body of evidence shows that domain specific checking impairs memory in 
that  domain.  Whereas,  in  contrast,  as  washers  do  not  have  the  same 
cognitive  impairments  as  checkers  they  may  actually  show  a  memory 
advantage  for  stimuli  (i.e.,  dirty  hands,  washing  paraphernalia)  relevant  to 
their symptoms in a group general or idiographic fashion. If so, this would 
provide  a  possible  indication  of  the  manner  in  which  the  divergent  WM 
performance  of  checkers  compared  to  washers  contributes  to  the 
maintenance and development of their unique symptoms. Furthermore, this 
would  highlight  the  need  to  separately  define  checkers  and  washers  in 
memory  experiments  which  would  otherwise  define  OCD  participants  in  a 
homogenous manner. This may control for the possibility of producing null 
findings  where  checkers’  memory  impairments  and  washers’  enhanced 
memory cancel each other out.  
 
7.5. Contribution of present work to OCD memory research 
Contrary  to  previous  research  which  has  concentrated  primarily  on  the 
outcomes of checking, the present research has proposed and supported the  
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actual mechanism of high checkers’ memory impairments. Specifically, that 
bindings maintained within the EB of WM (see Baddeley, 2000) are sensitive 
to interference, thus when attention from bindings is withdrawn, memory is 
impaired.  Thus,  the  present  work  shows  for  the  first  time  that  checkers 
memory is impaired when the distractor presented is concordant  with their 
inhibitory dysfunctions (Exp. 1-4; Harkin & Kessler, 2009, 2011a). Our eye 
movement study further revealed that high checkers only make more fixations 
during misleading trials to empty locations, in comparison to resolvable trials 
and low checkers (Exp. 5; Harkin, Miellet, & Kessler, subm). This is explicit 
evidence  that  checkers’  inhibitory  impairments  result  in  them  checking  the 
contents of WM at locations where no additional task-relevant information is 
present.  Furthermore,  checkers  appear  to  suffer  from  inhibitory  (Tasks  7; 
Harkin & Kessler, in press)) and WM impairments (Exp. 8; Harkin, Rutherford 
&  Kessler,  2011)  for  the  same  threatening  feature  of  an  electrical  kitchen 
appliance. This indicates that inhibitory impairments for threatening features 
(ON/OFF states) may interfere with their bindings to appliances in the EB of 
WM, thus impairing memory. Thus, we show explicitly that checking impairs 
memory for the very thing (i.e., “Did I turn the iron off?”) that theywant to be 
100%  certain  of,  which  likely  motivates  further  checking  and  memory 
impairment.  Furthermore,  we  also  observed  our  classic  WM  impairment 
pattern,  when  high  checkers  were  impaired  in  recalling  the  location  of  an 
electrical  kitchen  appliance  in  a  misleading  context  only  compared  to  low 
checkers (Exp. 9). Critically, high checkers’ intact performance on baseline 
no-probe-1 trials allows us to exclude a capacity-based explanation of their 
actual  memory  impairments.  Then  using  these  findings  we  created  a 
systematic  classification  system  based  upon  Executive  Functioning  (E), 
Binding Complexity (B) and Memory Load (L) (Harkin & Kessler, 2011b). We 
used this EBL system to clear up an otherwise messy area in OCD memory 
research,  which  up  until  this  point  has  erroneously  concentrated  upon  the 
visual-verbal  distinction  and  capacity  domain  as  a  means  of  explaining 
memory performance in OCD. In sum, we use this to highlight the potential 
role  that  executive-memory  impairments  play  in  the  development  and 
maintenance of obsessive-compulsive symptoms and thus provide an explicit 
target for cognitive interventions to focus upon (see section 7.3. and fig. 33).  
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Thus,  not  only  does  this  research  indicate  the  actual  mechanism  (i.e., 
bindings  within  episodic  buffer  of  WM)  of  memory  impairment  in 
checking/OCD but it also provides a research platform (i.e., EBL factors) on 
which base where we will and will not observe memory impairments in OCD 
participants.  
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